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Abstract 
Brown and Lenneberg (I954) and Rosch Heider (1972) were among the first to conduct 
psychological investigations to test the Whorfian view that language affects thought. They 
both asked about colour categories. The debate has continued with some research 
supporting a relativist (Whorfian) account (Davidoff, Davies & Roberson, I999; 
Borodistsky, 200I), and some supporting a universalist account (e.g., Kay & Regier, 
2003; Spelke & Kinzler, 2007). The present thesis adds to the debate by taking three 
different approaches i.e., cross-cultural, ontogenetic and phylogenetic frames in which to 
carry out investigations of categorization of various perceptual continua. 
Categorical Perception's hallmark is the effect of mental warping of space such as has 
beenfoundfor phonemes (Pisani & Tash, I974) and colour (Bornstein & Monroe, I980; 
Bornstein & Korda, I984). With respect to colours, those that cross a category boundary 
seem more distant than two otherwise equally spaced colours from the same category. 
Warping is tested using cognitive methods such as two-alternative:forced-choice and 
matching-to-sample. Evidence is considered for the continua under investigation i.e. 
colour and animal patterns. 
Experiments I and 2 find evidence of categorical perception for human-primates and not 
for monkeys. Experiment 3 finds that Himba and English human adults categorize 
differently, particularly for colours crossing a category boundary, but also show broad 
similarity in solving the same matching-to-sample task as used with the monkeys 
(experiment I) who showed clear differences with humans. Experiment 4 and 5 tested 
Himba and English toddlers and found categorical perception of colour mainly for 
toddlers that knew their colour terms despite prior findings (Franklin et al., 2005) 
indicative of universal colour categories. In experiment 6, Himba and English 
categorical perception of animal patterns was tested for the first time, and result indicate 
a cross-category advantage for participants who knew the animal pattern terms. 
Therefore, a weak Whorfian view of linguistic relativity's role in obtaining categorical 
perception effects is presented. Although there is some evidence of an inherent human 
way of grouping drawn from results of experiment I and 3, results in all experiments 
(1,2,3,4,5,and 6) show that linguistic labels and categorical perception effects go hand-
in-hand; categorization effects are not found when linguistic terms are not acquired at 
test and have not had a chance to affect cognition. This was true for all populations 
under observation in this set of studies, providing further support for effects of language 
and culture in perception. 
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1. General Introduction 
How groups are formed is an essential question in this thesis. Some categories, for 
example numbers, can be defined a priori and without any reference to experience. Most 
categories are not like numbers and so 'What defines a category' is a central question in 
their examination. Some researchers have argued that perceptual similarity is what drives 
membership to a category (e.g. Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Tversky, 1977; Murphy & Medin, 
1985). However, similarity may just be a by-product rather than a cause of 
categorization; similar things may share the same properties but similarity may not 
explain why they are in the same category (Medin & Ross, 1996). 
This thesis suggests that in some instances there is more to categorization than perceptual 
similarity. One of the first to suggest categories were relative was Whorf (1956), 
punctuating absolute relativity to language. In accordance, non-perceptual mechanisms 
such as labelling (Davidoff, 2001) have been found to be commonly used in identification 
and discrimination of category members (Pisoni, 1975). Discrimination differences have 
been more closely studied in the experiments that showed evidence of a sharp peak in 
discriminability of stimuli at category boundaries (e.g. Bomstein & Korda, 1984). 
Nevertheless, the different takes on the universality and origins of colour categories have 
provided some debate and are outlined with particular reference to colour. In some 
instances colour categories are found to be universal (e.g. Rosch, 1975) and innate (e.g. 
Sandell, Gross & Bomstein, 1979) and the origins of colour categorization are explained 
biologically/neurophysiologically (Kay & McDaniel, 1978; Bomstein, 1987). In other 
instances nurtured colour categories are found, and the origins are argued to be of a non-
biological or non-perceptual nature (Sapir, 1921; Whorf, 1956). This thesis re-evaluates 
the debate up to date to further understand how the study of grouping behaviours in 
illusion, colour and animal patterns fit and are relevant to explaining categorization's 
nature. 
The experimental chapters are divided into 5 sections and cover phylogenetic, 
ontogenetic, and cross-cultural approaches to grouping behaviour in the context of visual 
illusion, colour and animal patterns. The first, third and fifth sections address these 
various contexts by looking at the cross-cultural comparison of various grouping 
behaviours for two different cultures that have resulted from these experiments. The 
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second section covers comparative work with monkeys in two experiments looking at the 
emergence of colour categories. The fourth section addresses colour categories in 
ontogenetic work with the study of toddlers both within and across two different cultures. 
A series of experiments are reported that examined grouping behaviour of both 
perceptual and conceptual natures and in particular whether categories are nurtured by 
language. The concluding chapter examines the implications of these experiments for the 
current debate between universality and relativity and possible future directions for 
research. 
1.1 Grouping behaviour 
Perceptual grouping seems vital to the way we organize different parts of the visual 
world. Gestalt psychologists (e.g. Wertheimer, 1912) seem to have implemented this idea 
into their investigation of visual perception and what becomes figural (a group) in terms 
of the ground possibilities which are as good as the environment allows (Law of 
Pragnanz). Seeing a figure as more than the sum of its parts seems to be a very strong 
perceptual property, which has the effect of making things in the environment similar. 
Similarity has been argued to permeate all grouping behaviour and is therefore perhaps 
not the best theoretical construct to differentiate between different grouping processes 
(Goldstone, 1994; Hampton, 2004). Nevertheless similarity has been used in different 
ways to explain grouping. One of the consequences is that researchers tackle the 
difference between perceptual and conceptual similarity as grouping has been identified 
to be sensitive to both perceptual similarity (Coren & Miller, 1974; Choplin & Medin, 
1999) and conceptual similarity (Coren & Enns, 1993). Other times reports note the 
effect of conceptual knowledge on perceptual similarity or family resemblance as 
facilitating grouping (Medin, Wattenmaker & Hampson, 1987) and a further interest has 
been expressed (e.g., Murphy & Medin, 1985) about concepts that influence grouping 
behaviour in 'relations, operations and transformations that perceptual features participate 
in' (p. 277). 
Although the distinction between what drives perceptual or conceptual groupmg 
behaviour in humans is not yet clear, research on compound visual forms in the field of 
comparative psychology may give some clues about perceiving and processing visual 
16 
objects across species (Fagot & Deruelle, 1998; Fagot & Tomonaga, 1999). For example, 
global precedence effects have been identified in humans (Navon, 1977; Kimchi, 1988), 
and a processing discontinuity between monkeys and humans has also been identified, 
showing monkeys are local processors (e.g., Spinozzi, De Lillo & Salvi, 2006). Cross-
species grouping differences have further revealed our human nature and have also been 
emphasized by other comparative psychologists (Tomasello, 1999; Tomasello & Call, 
1997) who have focused on cultural learning based on understanding intentions only 
found in humans and not inherent to monkeys. Although the latter is debated (Homer, 
Bonnie & de Waal, 2005; Homer & Whiten, 2005; Whiten et al., 1996) in for e.g. 
instances where emulation behaviour is found in apes (versus imitation found in children) 
indicative of apes having accumulated experiences in the wild, conceptual grouping can 
be quite abstract when it involves for e.g. language that cannot be so readily found in 
non-human primates (Matsuno, Kawai & Matsuzawa, 2004). 
Grouping differences among people of different cultures are reported pertaining to more 
abstract thought (Roberson et al., 2005a; Kitayama et al., 2003), indicating that there are 
constraints on grouping that are culturally specific and require more than just perceptual 
mechanism to arrive to these differences. The nature of cultural constraints on grouping 
are also of particular interest in this thesis and are discussed possibly as a combination of 
minimal perceptual similarity and linguistic influence (Davidoff, Davies & Roberson, 
1999; Roberson et al, 2004, 2005a). The thesis explains further why it is believed that 
conceptual grouping is influenced by language (Steels & Belpaeme, 2005; Braisby & 
Dockrell, 1999; Hamad, 1987). 
Goldstone (1998) gives the metaphor of a bridge for perception, that implodes once 
language is learned i.e. perception is in pieces. The perceptual bridge needs to slowly be 
re-built with the idea that now perception is influenced by language. In whichever way 
the bridge is re-built, grouping seems to include a discrete flexibility that allows one to 
still group perceptually or conceptually in different situations after the bridge has been 
built at least in the human adult case. This thesis has attended to fmdings of different 
grouping behaviour and attempts an explanation of the context in which conceptual or 
perceptual grouping behaviour can occur. 
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1.2 Linguistic relativity: the philosophy behind it 
1.2.1 Anthropological pursuit 
Ideologies of how language and thought interrelate were discussed extensively in a past 
tradition that relates to the debate that is advanced in this thesis. Historically as far back 
as the 6th Century AD, the Indian mystic Bhartrihari said that language anchored thought 
and all mediated processes of experience such as perception. This opened a debate on the 
subject to last for decades in the Indian linguistic tradition. The Bhartrihari's following 
quote is an example of a relational anchor for the link between language and cognition: 
"Language infuses all cognition. Without this close relationship between awareness and 
language nothing would become known; it makes identification of things possible. 
Language is the basis of all branches of knowledge, or all crafts and arts. The 
consciousness of all migrating beings does not go beyond language .... " (in Vakyapadiya 
Kanda, 1983, p115). Later on, intellectuals and theoreticians in Europe shared similar 
thoughts. Philosophically Humboldt (1820) was the initiator of linguistic relativity which 
holds the axiom that language controls thought. Humboldt gave a strong version of 
linguistic detenninism, in his 'Comparative Study of Languages', that man lives in the 
world about him principally and exclusively as language presents it to him. 
Further, the German philosopher Cassirer made a strong claim for the symbolic world 
that language provides human beings with, and claimed that myth and language were 
once inseparable, and created worlds through which we were able to understand 
experience in symbolic form. Myth and language grew apart because of functional 
evolution but their means of expression are still equal in the way they represent the world 
so that no detachment can be considered between an object and the description of it: 
" ... the distinctions which here are taken for granted, the analysis of reality in terms of 
things and processes, permanent and transitory aspects, objects and actions, do not 
precede language as a substratum of given fact, but language itself is what initiates such 
articulations, and develops them in its own sphere" ( Cassirer, 1946, p. 12). 
Linguistic relativity, bound to its philosophical claims, took an investigatory form in the 
field of anthropology in the work of Boas. Founder of Anthropology in America, Boas 
believed that there was an overarching biological unity of psychological processes that all 
humans shared, but they also shared differences that took their form in culture. These 
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cultural areas influenced language which in tum influenced thought. Boas made three 
important claims on the basis of his work with Native Americans; languages firstly 
classify experience into categories; secondly different languages classify experiences 
differently; and thirdly, linguistic phenomena are unconscious in structure, so much so 
we are unaware of the process of classification. This said, the Boasian tradition still 
follows the idea that culture and thought influence language, but also suggests some cases 
where language influences culture and thought. Hence, the relativity of language remains 
quite controversial. It is this controversy that is presented in this thesis. This debate is 
also known as the Sapir-WhorfHypothesis. 
1.2.2 Whorf s Hypothesis 
Sapir, a student of Boas, elaborated on his arguments, and felt that language channelled 
thought in a more conclusive and absolute way, acting as a symbolic complete system of 
reference for thought and our perceptions of the world; thought arises from a 'reading 
into' linguistic classifications. He believed that language made thoughts possible and 
thoughts in tum (and only after) refined language to a lesser extent; "the instrument 
makes possible the product, the product refines the instrument" (Sapir, 1921, p 17, in 
Lucy 1992). It follows that if language is the instrument for thinking and making 
conceptual interpretations of reality (also social function of shared formal classification), 
there exists a relativity of concepts and a relativity of the form of thought depending on 
which language is being studied. Consequentially, relativity operates at the level of 
conceptual thought and NOT at the level of basic psychological processes or functions. 
Hence, Sapir moved away from his mentor. By respecting Boas' work, this cautious 
separation between overarching loci of psychological processes and the relativity of 
conceptual thought determined by language proved to be a distinction of great importance 
that attracted Whorf in his studies. 
Whorf, who came into contact with Sapir in his lectures on American Indian linguistics, 
elaborated on Sapir's careful distinction even further. Whorf first found his inspiration in 
religious texts, among which he first carefully studied the Hebrew language and looked 
into root-ideas that he thought underlies the whole language as suggested by Fabre 
d'Olivet (1921, in Whorf, 1956). He believed that these underlying ideas that help convey 
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meaning through language were a structure that lay at the heart of understanding the 
meaning of our own behaviour. He thus adopted two ideas that were the first stepping 
stones into his study of semantic influences. The first idea was Binary Grouping, how 
one word can carry a meaning for many exemplars; "A group of semantic roots having in 
common a certain sequence of two consonants, containing all the roots with this sequence 
in one language, and having these roots with but few exceptions associated to a "few 
certain kinds of meaning" (Whorf, 1956, p13). The second idea was Oligiosynthetic 
Languages which assumes that there are languages of which their vocabularies are built 
on a very small amount of elements, which lead to phonetic symbolism or more simply 
the suggested connection between ideas and their related linguistic elements. Whorf 
wanted to find evidence for these ideas and realized he needed to start objectifying 
semantic influences for research purposes. 
He started working with Sapir, at which point there was talk about carrymg out 
experiments. Working in the realm of linguistics, a wish for extensions to more 
systematic areas of study were primal and adapted to the study of the Hopi Indians. Lots 
of these more structured examples are given in his paper on 'The relation of habitual 
thought and behaviour to language' (Whorf, 1939; in Carroll, 1956) that supported the 
idea that language was at the heart of perception. Whorf noted that "The strange grammar 
of Hopi might betoken a different mode of perceiving and conceiving things on the part 
of the native speaker" (Whorf, 1956, p.17). Whorf further focused on distinctive 
linguistic analogies in the Hopi and English language and found that the cognitive 
orientation differed completely, depending on the individual interpretation of experience 
which in turn shapes specific cultural patterns of behaviour. These linguistic analogies 
have been analyzed according to their structure going from nonlinguistic observables, to 
mental interpretation, to linguistic meaning, to linguistic forms in both languages (in 
Lucy, 1992). Whorfs findings quickly found favour amongst scientists. 
An editor at the Technological Review encouraged Whorf to publish an article of his 
work: "Inasmuch as the analysis of reality is matter of language, and the relativity of such 
analyses can only be appreciated through studies that show the immense range of 
possible diversity in linguistic expression it will be seen that there is a connection here 
with the attempts of science to understand the universe and man- I think it would be very 
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interesting to see the ideas implicit in this statement from your october letter expanded in 
an article aimed at the Review's group. Is this project of interest?" Thus, Whorf came to 
make his statement public, into what we know today as the Linguistic Relativity 
Hypothesis in both its strong and weaker forms; Language influences thought which 
influences behaviour and the less deterministic version; language is related to thought, 
some influence of language on behaviour does exist. 
In other words, Whorf made his position on linguistic relativity open to further research 
by claiming firstly that structural differences between language systems will in general be 
paralleled by non-linguistic cognitive differences in the native speakers of two languages, 
and secondly that the structure of anyone's native language strongly influences or fully 
determines the world-view he will acquire as he learns the language. 
1.2.3 The Paradox of the Heap 
Whorf s hypothesis has been extended to categorization (e.g., Brown & Lenneberg, 
1954). The link between Whorfian thought and categorization has been debated on the 
grounds of similarity and typicality versus deeper relationships or rules that could affirm 
category membership (Hampton, 1998). Whorfs ideas may parallel the type of 
categorization that requires more than similarity based on surface features, and requires 
more in depth conceptual knowledge. Thus, Whorf also initially suggested that perceptual 
and conceptual thought could be dissociated with the latter qualifying as evidence of 
language's influence on thought. Those two types of grouping behaviours may indeed be 
dissociated (Rips, 1989). However, a complete lack of similarity is perhaps not the best 
way to explain categorization membership in particular because similarity has also been 
argued to be involved in the emergence of perceptual categories (Goldstone, 1994; 
Hampton, 2005). Therefore, a weaker Whorfian view, endorsing a milder form of 
perceptual similarity combined with a linguistic influence seems plausible under 
constraints suggested by the Paradox of the Heap that point out that non-perceptual 
mechanisms are at the heart of obtaining a perceptual category (Wright, 1975; Dummett, 
1975). Through the paradox one understands that if perceptual similarity were the only 
mechanism one could use to obtain a perceptual category one would never achieve it. 
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The paradox asks the question, 'what constitutes a heap?' In the instance of this thesis, a 
heap might be likened to a category because currently the same is asked of categories i.e., 
what constitutes a category? Further, the fact that concepts can have unclear and variable 
boundaries justifies the similarity between a heap and a category because both a heap and 
a category are vague predicates and in the paradox they are also considered as 
perceptually vague (Braisby & Dockrell, 1999; Davidoff et al., 2000). The answer to the 
question of the paradox when using a colour category is that one colour does not 
constitute a category, and if that colour is not a category, adding another colour will not 
make it into a category, therefore there are no categories of colour. The answer is 
paradoxical because we know that colour categories exist and that it is not only because 
two things are similar that they necessarily are of the same category (e.g., Gelman & 
Markman, 1986). 
Another way of looking at the paradox is to look at how one gets to discriminate between 
two colours (Davidoff, 2001). According to perceptual similarity, ifl take a red, and find 
its closest coloured neighbour in the continuum, the neighbouring colour will be so 
similar that the two colours will not be distinguished. One could cover the whole 
continuum in this way and all colours would then be considered as red. One would thus 
arrive at the paradoxical knowledge that this is impossibly so, because blue colours for 
instance would also be considered as red. So perceptual similarity may be useful for some 
judgments but not for the whole continuum of colour as a hole, and certainly cannot be 
held responsible for the emergence of categories in its entirety. 
Clearly the paradox is concerned with how vague one allows the concept of a heap or a 
category to remain and how similar exemplars cannot lead to anything but vague 
categories. If non-perceptually or theoretically one were to decide one needs ten grains 
of sand to form a heap, then that is fixed. One could then reproduce/learn the rule by 
similarity (Hampton, 2005). One could also say the same about colour categories; by 
acquiring a colour category one sets constraints to the colours that belong to its name and 
creates a boundary between this set of colours and other colours that allows one to further 
refer to differences as well as similarities between exemplars. The latter is in accordance 
with a weaker form of Whorfs (1956) suggestion of linguistic influence as a possible 
non-perceptual mechanism, to defy perceptual similarities' vagueness and the Paradox of 
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the Heap, and that nevertheless does not exclude the usefulness of perceptual similarity 
once boundaries have been fixed. Thus, one can say that there are non-trivial constraints 
on colour categories that are beyond grouping by similarity in order for perceptual 
categories to emerge. 
1.3 Cognitive Methods in Colour Research 
1.3 .1 Codability 
The research community struggled to find ways of investigating the Whorflan hypothesis 
beyond analysis of linguistic analogy. Lenneberg was the first researcher to reformulate 
the relativity hypothesis so as to make it adaptable to psychological concerns and 
methods, developing a procedure for investigating, comparing and characterizing 
language categories more objectively in terms oftheir denotational referents. 
Taking an intra-cultural view, Brown and Lenneberg (1954) made a big contribution to 
the advancement of the relativity hypothesis in "A study on Language and Cognition" 
and Lenneberg is much praised for his contribution to the monograph in a memorial 
tribute to him written by Brown (1976). Lenneberg thought Whorfs approach was 
rigorous enough for psychology's experimental purposes. However his view was that 
Whorf did not explain 'how' language influenced thought. Lenneberg sought to improve 
scientific knowledge about this connection. To support his view, he suggested the study 
of cognitive processes as this meant that there was a chance for more controlled 
assessment of the hypothesis (laboratory experiment). Moreover, Lenneberg placed 
emphasis on finding a research technique that would assess linguistic and non-linguistic 
data so that a direct relation could be demonstrated. This linking mechanism was named 
'codability', a composite measure of agreement in naming, length of name, and response 
latency in naming. Codability also expressed the inter-subject agreement on naming 
tasks. 
For their first set of experiments, based on the opinion of 5 participants, they created a 
colour selection of 24 colours (using glossy chips from the Munsell Company) including 
8 of the most frequently used colour terms. In their test on colour cognition and language 
they made the link between names and recognition. On the naming test participants saw 
the whole array, and were then given colours separately to name one at a time. Degree of 
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consensus was measured; the higher the consensus the higher the codability was to be for 
that colour. In the recognition task they were given a colour to remember (1-4) and 
shown the array in which they had to point to the correct colour. There was a positive 
correlation between codability and recognition accuracy indicating a relationship between 
naming and memory, in other words between language and cognition. 
In Lenneberg's (1957) thesis on the approach to language learning, he tested 27 
participants on their colour naming and found a frequency of occurrence expressed in 
varying symmetrical curves. A trend seemed to appear; the larger curves represented high 
frequency and matched category centres, overlapping with smaller ones at the 
intersection between two colours, indicating low name frequency. The fact that curves 
were overlapping seemed to also imply that colour names as concepts "are best 
characterised as areas of waxing and waning typicality on a continuum" (Lenneberg, 
1957, p.2). This implied a movement away from fixed semantics to a 'fuzzy set' of 
colours in which category membership was not an ali-or-nothing matter. This first 
expression of colours in approximation to category boundaries, was also iterated in 
Lenneberg and Roberts's ( 1956) "the language of experience" - a study on differentiating 
between foci and boundaries comparing the Zuni language (no distinction between 
orange and yellow) with English. This was a first attempt to transfer a controlled 
experiment onto cross-cultural work that unfortunately brought forward some 
inconclusive results. 
Following in Lenneberg's footsteps, there have been further developments of 
Lenneberg's view oflinguistic relativity- some of which are the availibility of controlled 
stimuli (Munsell colours) and evidence from intra-cultural study to draw on other 
populations' perception of colour in inter-cultural study, i.e. English lexical items as 
metacategories for comparative work (Berlin and Kay, 1969), and findings of behaviour 
at boundaries between colours has certainly been taken up in research to show the 
influence of language on cognition (Davidoff et al., 1999). According to Lucy (1992), 
Lenneberg produced a scientific approach tending towards universality of 
thought/cognitive processes and cutting out differences of linguistic content, which is 
also the position that Lenneberg adopted in his work in later years (e.g. Lenneberg, 
1967), and the position favoured by researchers in the next couple of decades. 
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1.3 .2 Communicability 
Lantz and Streffle (1964) revisited Lenneberg and Brown's work on language and 
cognition and found Lenneberg's measure for assessing colour names -codability- was 
not related to all colour ranges (such as Burnham and Clark's range, 1955, in actual fact a 
negative correlation) and added that although codability was associated to within-
participant variation it was not a good measure to make between-participant conclusions 
about linguistic relativity. They used "communicability" in which participants related 
colour names to each other and identified colours on that basis. This measure was 
positively related to both colour ranges and had implications for its relation to recognition 
in the way it captured both communicability between people in a community but also 
communicability within one person over time. Lantz and colleagues found that 
communication accuracy was positively correlated with colour recognition, and 
replicated this result across cultures (Spanish and Mayan participants). However they did 
not similarly find that communication errors correlated with a particular set of colours. 
This did not fit the positive correlation between recognition memory and communication 
because if recognition memory was higher for colours that were more viable in 
communication, others should be less well remembered. Moreover, much debate arose 
around how much communication accuracy explains intrasubject processes related to 
non-linguistic behaviour, and was finally abandoned in psychological circles to give way 
to codability as known in prototype theory further explored by Berlin and Kay (1969) and 
Rosch Heider (1972). These theories more thoroughly explained cognitive processes but 
showed a relative indifference to the influence of language structure. However, the 
importance of a measure of communication is revived in robot experiments mimicking 
human verbal interchange by Steels & Belpaeme (2005), in Ozgen & Davies' (2002) who 
found language to be a form of learning, and in a recent paper by Agrillo & Roberson 
(2007) indicating that cognitive advantages are naturally obtained when names are used 
consistently and with greatest consensus. However, before we get onto the supporting 
evidence, further influence of peak communication and highly coded boundary colours 
need to be addressed because they lead to the important findings on category 
demarcations. 
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1.3 .3 Categorical Perception 
Hamad (1987) and Bomstein (1987) eradicated the idea of the paradox of perceptual 
similarity to create categories (Wright, 1975; Durnmett, 1975), by finding some fixed 
characteristics by which a category can be recognized. The characteristic foundation of 
Categorical Perception is a perceptual warping effect so that some colours are seen as 
being closer and some as further apart in space, even though all these colours are in 
reality equidistant in a continuous array of colour (as quantified in for e.g. the Munsell 
continuum of colour). 
Hamad (1987) coined Categorical Perception, and relates his model of Categorical 
Perception to the Whorfian hypothesis as follows: 'The perceptual and conceptual 
discriminations we make are governed by the categories we name and by our 
representations of the invariant features underlying the categorization ... To the extent that 
discrete categorical differences could be demonstrated to be influenced by learned names 
and descriptions this version of the Whorf Hypothesis would be supported' (p.546). He 
further found evidence for high-level perceptual processes and language involved in the 
grounding of categories by neural network models because they fit his top-down view of 
Categorical Perception (e.g. Congelosi & Hamad, 2001). Although pre-dating Hamad's 
coining of the term and work mainly done in the realm of audition, Bomstein and Korda 
(1984, 1985) findings provided support for his model's extension to colour cognition. 
Bomstein and colleagues provided evidence for Categorical Perception in same/different 
matching and discrimination tasks of between and within hue pairs measured by reaction 
times. The paradigm Bomstein and colleagues have used (Bomstein & Korda, 1984; 
Bomstein & Monroe, 1980) related to previous work on audition (Posner, 1969) where 
latencies in a paired matching task have reflected which level of perceptual processing is 
necessary and in tum the type of information required for the comparison; mainly there is 
evidence of an immediate visual coding, however with a delay, more abstract, conceptual 
coding is used, and the advantage of visual coding is no longer present. These findings 
are also referred to as the distance rule of classification. Similarly, Bomstein's results 
indicate that matching by similarity brings up some minor differences on pairs of within-
category judgements, namely physical similarity judgments required more time on pairs 
from same category name, but participants reliably showed faster latencies on between 
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category pairs overall. In other words, the spatial warping of Categorical Perception 
showed improved discrimination responses on between-category pairs versus within-
category pairs (Bornstein & Korda 1984), and those colours at the centre of a category 
were classified together faster than colours that were nearer the boundary (Bornstein & 
Monroe, 1980). These findings are in accordance with Hamad's (1987) view of 
Categorical Perception, and the Paradox of the Heap that says that visual coding is not 
sufficient for categorization; if it was so one would address all stimuli pairs equally, but 
we now know that there are fixed characteristic for Categorical Perception. These 
experiments provided a grounding method to demonstrate the effectiveness of 
Categorical Perception and that there was something more to categorization than 
perceptual similarity could provide for. 
1.4 Whorfian evidence 
Evidence has been collected in favour of language's influence on cognition. Five sections 
of such evidence are described in detail. The first section looks at Kay and colleagues 
supporting evidence in a cross-cultural study and a colour detection study in the context 
of colour categories. The second section looks at language's influence on spatial 
cognition as studied cross-culturally by Levinson and colleagues. The third section looks 
at thought processes surrounding time and the role language plays as studied by 
Boroditsky and colleagues. The fourth section covers work on colour categories as 
simulated in robots by Steels and Belpaeme (2005) and finally the fifth section talks of 
particular type of learning needed for colour categories to emerge as studied by Ozgen & 
Davies (2002). All sections have in common that they provide results of conceptual 
grouping with particular attention to language's role in this kind of grouping behaviour. 
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1.4.1 Supporting evidence for colour categories 
In support of the Whorfian hypothesis, and one of the first studies of its kind, Kay and 
Kempton (1984) have shown that the Tarahumara speaking Native South Americans and 
English perceived colours differently using a Categorical Perception paradigm. The 
English, having colour names for blue and green, judged two out of three colours to be 
more similar because they shared the same name irrespective of the fact they were 
physically, in Munsell notation, further apart. The Tarahumara, not under the same 
linguistic influence, made their judgments on a perceptual level, judging two chips to be 
more alike because they were physically more alike. Kay and Kempton suggested that 
although there was a linguistic influence when using colour names, this influence could 
be eliminated. When participants were refrained from using a naming strategy in the 
same task, they made their judgments on the basis of perceptual distance. Kay and 
Kempton's results therefore showed that English and Tarahumara speakers were 
primarily bound to language to group conceptually and grouping perceptually by 
similarity when deprived from accessing colour terms. 
Gilbert, Regier, Kay and Ivry (2006) have equally been successful in showing linguistic 
influence in a cognitive colour detection task, but this time with an additional biological 
effect of lateralization. The hypothesis is that perceptual discrimination may be affected 
by language through the use of unspoken lexical codes in the left hemisphere (LH) of the 
brain responsible for language processing but not the right hemisphere (RH). A 
lateralized colour discrimination task with between- and within-category trials was 
administered to 11 participants who judged whether the target colour was in the right or 
left part of a circle. When targets appeared in the right visual field (R VF or LH) 
participants were faster on between-category trials and slower on within-category trials, 
as compared to when targets were presented to the left visual field (L VF or RH). With 
verbal interference during this task, the effects were reversed, subjects became slower on 
between-category trials and quicker on within-category trials for targets presented to 
RVF, and on the whole, faster on between category trials when targets were shown in the 
L VF. Non-verbal interference did not reverse the Categorical Perception effect. To make 
sure that the laterality effects were solely caused by the LH and not some inter-
hemispheric communication, a callosotomy patient JW was tested. Laterality effects were 
28 
replicated showing, with more conviction, that lexical categories influence perception at a 
cortical level, in the RVF. Thus, these findings confirm that linguistic relativity and 
categorical perception can be found to have an impact on language-related areas of the 
brain confirming categorical perception is relative to language. 
1.4.2 Linguistic relativity in the spatial domain 
The spatial directions most commonly known to us such as right/left, front/behind, 
up/down used in an egocentric coordinate system of reference (Miller and Johnson-Laird, 
1996), are not preferably used by all. Some other languages such as Guugu Yimithirr 
(Queensland, Australia) and Tzeltal speakers (Mayan, Mexico near Guatemalan border) 
use an allocentric coordinate system with fixed bearings such as cardinal orientation 
points. The difference in use of cognitive systems of reference is studied cross-culturally 
whereby relative frames of reference (FoR) and absolute FoR are allocated in speech and 
produce very different ways of thinking about space. The differences point to a non-
universal account of spatial cognition, with linguistic origins at the basis of these 
differences (e.g. Levinson 1996c, Levinson et al, 2002). 
Levinson (1996a) argues that the FoRs are essential to locate oneself and other objects 
around us, but are also used as a means to locate buildings and areas out of sight (Brown 
and Levinson, 1993). Those FoRs vary in language and also vary in cognition. For 
example, there seems to be an adaptation of 'spoken' FoR to a horizontal plane, an 
example would be the adaptation of the cardinal directions to a table top, if a notebook 
would be lying to the right of a cup on the table it would be lying to the east (for us). For 
Guugu Yimithirr speakers, the notebook would be relative to fixed cardinal coordinates 
('real' North-South-East-West like having an internal compass), so that having fixed 
bearings alters the perception of the location of the notebook. Evidence of this is found in 
a rotation tasks e.g. Animals-in-a-row (developed by Levinson and Schmitt, 1993; or 
Maze Task developed by Pederson and Schmitt, 1993) in which a participant sees 
animals in a row and has to select and remember those animals once he has turned 180 
degrees to face another table. The participant is scored for remembering the correct 
sequence but also for the reconstructions of the 'spatial time-line'. Cross-cultural findings 
indicate that Dutch speakers use a relative FoR whereas Guugu Yimithirr speakers use an 
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absolute/intrinsic FoR to reconstruct the row of animals (Levinson, 1997). Similarly, the 
Tzeltal Maya have also been found to have a discrete absolute FoR made evident in their 
use of cardinal directions (geocentric i.e. uphill/downhill) (Levinson, 1993). Levinson's 
conclusion is that non-linguistic FoR found in cognitive rotation tasks that are devoid of 
the use of language, align nicely FoR of people's own language and show that a mental 
model is created based on FoR's cultural expression (Levinson, 2003; Majid et al, 2004). 
As further support for this work, some developmental studies (e.g. Brown and Levinson, 
2000; Bowerman, 2000; Choi et al., 1999) have shown that language specific spatial 
categories extend to children. Bowerman & Choi (200 1) suggest that the earlier a child 
acquires meaning through language, the more defined the role of language in structuring 
children's early spatial semantic categories, and cognition. In accordance, children 
accustomed to different languages (English, Korean, Dutch, Tzoltil Mayan) do show 
evidence of different spatial categories in line with the linguistic use of these categories. 
In studying their development, Brown and Levinson (2000) showed that children as 
young as 2 seemed to be tuning in with thoughts aligned to spoken spatial concepts found 
in Tzeltal Mayan adults, such as uphill and downhill orientations. The children seem to 
adopt and produce an absolute FoR in speech. Furthermore, Brown and Levinson (2000) 
report that there is early although varied acquisition of conceptually complex FoRs but 
that Relative FoRs show the slowest developmental understanding (around 8 years of 
age; Brown and Levinson, 2000; replicated from De Leon for Tzoltil speakers, 1994) 
indicating a non-universal approach in FoR acquisition as well. Choi et al. (1999) further 
contributed to the investigation of the origins of spatial categories. They found that 
children at an age of 16-20 months (Choi & Bowerman, 1991), showed evidence of 
spatial categories in a preferential looking paradigm when target words were present. 
Language use was of particular importance because English and Korean children were 
found to be sensitive to different spatial morpheme use (English categories 'in' and 'on', 
Korean categories for same actions 'nehta', 'kkita', 'ssuta', 'kelta', 'nohta', all delineated 
by verbs and usually related to 'tight or lose fit'). Thus, infants' spatial categories were 
relative to cultural experience and shows that there is a process of capturing language to 
orient oneself that happens according to the culture one belongs to. 
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1.4.3 Linguistic relativity in the temporal domain 
Boroditsky asks: Do we rely on sensory and perceptual experiences or do we have 
conceptual understandings related to deeper semantic structures that enable us to 
understand we are perceiving 'red'? Boroditsky suggests that what seems biological in 
nature demands a process of deeper metaphoric structuring. Boroditsky means that 
mental models are created under the influence of language. Metaphoric structuring (e.g. 
Boroditsky, 2000; Boroditsky, Ramscar & Frank, 2005) is under investigation in the 
study of space-time mapping. For example, participants were shown to be affected by 
ego-moving metaphors when making time judgements (Boroditsky et al, 2005). 
Participants who took part in an office chair rodeo, showed that whether they were 
'riding' on a chair or roping the chair to the finishing line did not make a difference to 
participants' ego-moving thoughts about time, thus showing it is the concept for moving 
through time that allows a person to make accurate time estimates. Boroditsky further 
looked at influences of language on thought in 'thinking for speaking' (by which 
language is secondary to a brain process affected by the language spoken, in accordance 
with Slobin, 1996) type experiments that did not require explicit language resources to 
predict the effect of language on cognition. She further argues that time is more free to 
vary across languages and cultures because they are not as heavily constrained by 
perception as colour or other perceptual categories may be. 
In an experiment using ego-moving or object-moving priming information (such as 'the 
flower is in front of me' and 'the hat-box is in front of the Kleenex', Boroditsky, 2000), 
results indicated the use of spatial metaphors to think about time when answering 
temporal questions ('Next Wednesday's meeting has been moved forward two days. 
Which day is the meeting now it has been moved?'). Moreover, doing so is not necessary 
(can also use temporal information to think about time), but this cross-domain effect 
cannot be reversed i.e., temporal information cannot be used as a metaphor to think about 
space. If thinking about time is a high-level process that requires conceptual thought, is it 
also Whorfian? The answer is yes and Boroditsky has adopted the Whorfian view in 
cross-cultural experiments. 
In one of her first investigations of this kind, Boroditsky (200 1) showed that conception 
of time varies cross-culturally. Mandarin speakers rely on vertical spatial metaphors for 
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estimates about time whereas English speakers commonly use horizontal spatial 
metaphors. When participants were given a vertical spatial prime and probed with a 
temporal question, Mandarin speakers were faster to respond than English speakers were. 
When probed with a horizontal spatial prime, English speakers were faster to respond 
than Mandarin speakers. This was shown to be an effect of exposure to one's native 
language, whether Mandarin or English. To remove any cultural factors that might be 
impinging on this task, English speakers received Mandarin linguistic training in the 
vertical concept of time, and showed same results as Mandarin speakers at test, 
concluding that differences in talking do lead to differences in thinking. 
Other linguistic effects on thought are demonstrated in a paper by Boroditsky, Schmidt, 
& Phillips (2002) in which German and Spanish speakers had different effects of 
grammatical gender on thought. German and Spanish speakers have inverse conceptions 
of grammatical gender use e.g., the sun is feminine in German and masculine in Spanish. 
Boroditsky and colleagues showed memory effects induced by preferred grammar use, so 
that consistent grammar pairs would be remembered better than inconsistent ones. 
Grammatical gender was also found to have an effect on object descriptions. Different 
adjectives were used by both language speakers for a set of words, and in learning a new 
distinction that represented male/female categories, English speakers used adjectives in 
the same way Spanish and Germans were depending on which language they were 
exposed to. It can be concluded that differences in grammar are enough to influence how 
people think about objects and it can therefore be concluded that grammar affects 
thought. Concept acquisition is therefore seen as direct evidence of deeper language 
structure. 
Developmental work (lmai & Gentner, 1997; Imai & Mazuka, 1997) has further 
supported the idea that language influences object descriptions (Boroditsky, Scmidt, & 
Phillips (2002). Cross-cultural developmental findings of the influence of object and 
substance extensions in Japanese and English participants found that English have a 
shape bias when perceiving complex objects, and that Japanese have a material/substance 
bias. This leads participants to make similarity judgments in a triad task based on the 
corresponding word-extension patterns, with English focusing on common shape and 
Japanese focusing on common substance. Further these cognitive effects appear quite late 
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as 4-year-olds do not extend their bias to similarity judgments indicating considerable 
linguistic experience is needed in accordance with other studies on shape classification 
patterns (e.g., Smith & Sera, 1992; Lucy & Gaskins, 2001). 
Thus, in accordance with developmental work, Boroditsky and colleagues are suggesting 
language has a deeper influence on thought by administering indirect tests of the use of 
space to think about time; Boroditsky and colleagues have made language evident in 
cognition without on-line language use. The latter is quite important because it suggests 
that in some cases perceptual categories are accessed via mental models that operate 
according to the language they originate from. 
1.4.4 Cognitive modelling and robot-behaviour 
In agreement with Jameson (2005), Steels and colleagues base their experiments on a 
model that highlights that colour categories are constructed via colour perception under 
cultural pressures that rely on 'cultural consensus and linguistic charity' as a way of 
ending up with somewhat similar categories in a particular culture while maintaining 
some individual differences that are not relevant to the communication of these 
categories. This approach points at a complex interaction of linguistic and non-linguistic 
mechanisms of categorical perception. Steels and colleagues (Belpaeme, 2001; Steels & 
Belpaeme, 2005) give such evidence for the role of language in cultural evolution. Steels 
considers "language to be a distributed, complex dynamic system; in which self-
organization in the representation of the individual and in the dynamics of the language 
community is responsible for stable states" (Steels, 1997, 1998). This aspect of language 
responsible for producing stable states, has been verified in the study of how meanings 
can be associated to words under a computational model as an alternative to 
'neurophysiological prototype theory' (Lammens, 1994; Steels, 1997; Lamberts, 1997). 
In robot studies, robots perceived, categorised perceptions, and finally lexicalised the 
resulting categories (Steels & Belpaeme, 2005). Author's predictions were made with 
computer models for robots' category outcomes that addressed the debate of the origin of 
colour categories. The computational experimental account consisted of robots solving 
discrimination and guessing games to make these predictions. First, the discrimination 
game allowed for robots to acquire a colour category set on the basis of discriminating a 
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colour from its context successfully. The robot does this by matching colour to internal 
representations. Ifthere is an internal category, all colours will be placed in the same one 
and discrimination will not be possible. If the robot managed to allocate a 'topic' colour 
to a category to which all other colours do not belong the discrimination game is 
successful. Second, the guessing game is played between 2 agents, hearer and speaker. 
The speaker knows what the topic is and plays a discrimination game. Once the relevant 
category is found the speaker relays the category name or word to the hearer. The hearer 
plays an inverted game where he looks for word associated to particular category, which 
can be mapped onto the colours in turn. It then points to the colour that matches best with 
the category. The speaker gives 'correct/incorrect' feedback. The game is successful 
when two robots manage to communicate category exemplars to each other. The game 
fails if speaker fails the discrimination game, if speaker has no word associated with 
category and has to create new word, if hearer does not know word, and if the hearer fails 
to pick out the topic in which cases strength of colour-word decreases. Thus, the robots 
are responsible for self-organising vocabularies and create perceptually grounded 
meaning if they are successful. Discriminative and communicative successes are 
analysed. 
Belpaeme's (2001) and Steels and Belpaeme's (2005) results suggest that when there is 
no communication (as in genetic evolution and individual learning without linguistic 
interaction or cultural learning), categorization of the colour space is not at its optimal 
condition (i.e. the eleven basic colour categories are not achieved). A better coherence of 
categories is achieved through shared environments where robots are subjected to the 
same colours, although coherence between categories stays low because there is no 
communication. More accurately, it is the communication between agents that results in a 
shared lexicon and also increases agents' coherence of categories to the full set of basic 
colours. The conclusion shows that the role of communication is to increase differences 
to find optimal use of a continuum such as colour and confirms a weak Whorfian 
hypothesis because the work shows that perceptual similarity can also amount to some 
colour groupings but not in the most optimal way as language can. Moreover the 
simulation that included successful communication in robots resulted in the closest set of 
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colours to those found in humans, indicating humans conceptualise further through 
language. 
1.4.5 Learned colour categories 
Communication being crucial to categorization, Ozgen and Davies (2002) suggest that 
language affects Categorical Perception and is evidence for a form of category learning 
involved in colour recognition. The authors suggest this route may be interesting to 
discriminate between categories that might be acquired at birth and others that are learned 
as a member of a language community so that language is not a pre-requisite for colour 
categories, only a probable route to take when colour terms are being acquired. 
In the set of experiments, participants show improvement on hue and lightness judgments 
with training on a successive same-different judgment task. When participants were then 
exposed to novel categories and not trained, they were more accurate at within/new 
category judgments than between/new category judgments. Next, category learning by 
training reversed this effect; participants were found to be more accurate on between/new 
category judgments than within/new category judgments. Some have argued this is 
evidence for adaptation (Goldstone, 1994, 1998) i.e. being able to unlearn pre-existing 
colour categories while learning novel ones. Nevertheless, linguistic effects are 
prominent during training to induce Categorical Perception effects. Moreover, 
participants were also quite flexible in their learning, as category effects seem to emerge 
after just one day indicating a possible linguistic learning mechanism. In their discussion, 
Ozgen and Davies (2002) point out that names can be used to learn colour categories, 
although it is arguable and not very probable that names were used directly at test seeing 
that training and test phase were not matched for colour. This means that this was an 
indirect test of the effects of language on colour categories, and the results strongly 
suggest that without language very little can be learned and cognition would not be 
affected at test. The authors do not suggest learning is exclusive to Categorical 
Perception. Their results rather suggest that Categorical Perception effects are facilitated 
by naming, and these results are again in accordance with a weaker form of the Whorfian 
hypothesis. 
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1.5 Evidence of an innate view 
1.5 .1 The eleven basic colours 
Berlin and Kay's (1969) research characterises a period of colour research in which 
colour space was shown to have an innate evolution in which 11 basic terms could be 
acquired. Berlin and Kay (1969) founded their results upon investigation of colour 
terminology systems of 20 languages using the stimulus array of Lenneberg and Roberts 
(1956) consisting of 320 colour chips reconstructing the Munsell colour array. Three 
tasks were administered to mostly bilingual subjects in California in the US: a basic-
colour-term inventory, naming and focus task (point to the best example of). Data 
analysed, found significant clustering in particular areas of the colour array and 
conclusion of the research were: "The referents for the basic colour terms of all languages 
appear to be drawn from a set of eleven universal perceptual categories, and these 
categories become encoded in the history of a given language in a partially fixed order" 
(Berlin & Kay, 1969, p.4). Moreover, Berlin and Kay suggested the evolutionary order of 
colour term acquisition was the same across cultures so that a particular language would 
possess a number of terms predicted by its stage of acquisition. Different languages are 
therefore suggested to have different levels of terminology-development (for the criteria 
see figure 1.1 ); Stage 1 would suggest a language with 2 colour terms; stage 2 with three 
colour terms; stage 3 with five colour terms; stage 4 with 6/7 colour terms, stage 5 
consisting of the acquisition of the eleven colour terms as we know them to be in the 
English language and several other languages. 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 
Figure 1.1 Berlin & Kay's (1969) colour stages of evolution. 
36 
Although various criticism on the research i.e. non-authentic sampling (bilinguals with 
English as their second language) and 20 non-industrial languages which were however 
tested in industrial California (e.g. Hickerson, 1971, Conklin, 1973; in Saunders & Van 
Brakel, 2002) did not lessen the impact of Berlin and Kay's findings that implied that 
something other than language determines colours that are perceived, probably 
responsible for an innate order of colour terminology. Thus, there is something about the 
world that humans perceive to be constant, even though they live in different 
environments and speak different languages. 
1.5.2 Prototype and cognitive dominance over language 
Rosch ( 1971) introduced the 'prototype', probed by innate colour categorisation 
advanced by Berlin and Kay (1969), adopting the idea of rigorous cognitive study set by 
Lenneberg (1967). It is with her input of systematic methods of experimentation (Heider, 
1972a) giving the colour domain as an example of ethnographic study in her work with 
the Dani, that linguistic codes were shown to be 'artefacts' for colours and other domains 
of natural categories (Rosch, 1973). The latter meant that linguistic terms were just codes 
to communicate that were a result of deeper underlying representations of best examples 
of different categories (Rosch, 1975a), and these best examples were suggested to be 
biologically determined anchors that directed our perception and language use. Therefore, 
continuous natural categories, such as colour and shape, were thought to be universally 
agreed upon and to shape human cognitive representation. 
Cross-cultural research (Rosch Heider, 1972b) of groups of American and Dani people 
of New Guinea (who only had two colour names) included tasks of finding the best 
examples, naming, recognition, memory, and learning. Rosch found that focal and non 
focal codes for colour (best examples of for instance 'red' and other exemplars that are 
less good examples of 'red') do not vary across languages, and memory co-varies with 
changes in this 'universal' code; focals were given shorter names, named more rapidly, 
and remembered more accurately than non-focals in both cultures. Hence memory for 
colour seems to elicit same cognitive responding across cultures irrespective of colour 
terms acquired. In addition, Rosch (Rosch Heider & Olivier, 1972) looked more closely 
at the relationship between naming and memory for the Dani and the American English 
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speakers as a way of uncovering whether the structure of colour terminology, obviously 
varying for both cultures (the Dani dividing colour on the basis of brightness and the 
American on the basis of hue), influenced internal cognitive colour space. Rosch 
addressed the comparison by multi-dimensional scaling of the 'confusions' made in 
colour naming and memory tasks. The schematic drawing and statistical analysis 
confirmed that there was a significant difference in naming structures for both cultures. 
However, the naming structures did not seem to carry over in parallel fashion to the 
memory structures within cultures. The important finding was that memory structures 
were more similar than naming structures across cultures. The only difference found was 
that overall performance was lower for the Dani than the Americans. 
Next Rosch tried to find a theory that could explain universal categories in more detail. 
Other models of categorization e.g., concept-formation, i.e. correct learning of 
combination of discrete attributes (e.g. Katz & Postal, 1964; Bourne, 1968; in Rosch, 
1973), and abstraction-processing, i.e. arbitrary abstraction of central tendency on basis 
of culture or givens (e.g. Posner, 1969), were refuted as explanations of the development 
of categories and Rosch (1973) started advocating for 'natural categories' that were 
structured in a non-arbitrary semantic way by perceptually salient 'natural prototypes'. A 
prototype is natural in all languages and characterised by its central position in a basic 
colour category. All other members of that category are said to cluster around this 
prototype. Investigation of the Dani (Rosch, 1973) showed that colours and geometric 
forms that were prototypical were more easily and rapidly learned, and more often chosen 
as typical exemplars of particular categories in naming and triad-pointing tasks. Further 
looking at the nature of the mental codes for colour categories, using priming in a 
matching paradigm, Rosch ( 197 5b) showed that the prime facilitated responses to 
prototypical examples of that category and inhibited responses to colours that were poor 
examples. It was concluded that colour names generate a cognitive representation of 
colour to help encode physically coloured stimuli, and that this representation reflects the 
prototype structure of colour categories. Rosch argued that there was no reason to believe 
that this prototype structure is any different across cultures because of different colour 
taxonomies, as mental codes are translated to cognitive representations, which are 
prototypical in nature. 
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To summanse, Rosch is a strong advocate of the universality hypothesis of 
categorisation. She made this assumption on the basis of her findings that reflect cross-
cultural similarities in perception of colour space according to cognitive organisation of 
natural categories that have inbuilt focals exemplars cross-referencing Berlin and Kay 
(although Rosch never managed to show any evidence in favour of the evolutionary 
stages). Subsequently, a complementary line of investigation addressing Berlin and Kay's 
work was taking place, preoccupied with the nature of prototypes, Kay and McDaniel 
suggested physiologically determined colour categories. 
1.5.3 Neurophysiological determinism 
Kay and McDaniel extended the findings of semantic and developmental colour 
universals to clarify the origins of colour categories. A bridge is created between 
phenomenal and biological understanding of colour category encoding. Fuzzy set theory 
is suggested with the basic assumptions that colour categories are continuous in colour 
space and a degree of membership can be allocated to every colour. The membership 
functions that represent the semantic structures of these categories can be derived directly 
from the neural response functions that make up the physiological code for colour. 
Prior evidence for the physiological code of colour (Jameson & Hurvich, 1968) suggests 
that a tripartite response of the retina's 3 cone system is transformed into a set of 
opponent neural responses from the retina to higher points in the visual pathway. 
Accordingly, opponent response cells (phenomenally described by Hering and 
physiologically studied by De Valois and others) were identified in the Lateral Geniculate 
Nucleus (DeValois, Abramov, & Jacobs, 1966; DeValois & Jacobs, 1968). According to 
Kay and McDaniel, this physiological code of colour in the Lateral Geniculate Nucleus 
are triggered by functional neural responses (FNRs), and can best be treated as fuzzy sets 
that give a precise representation of colour. Membership has a degree, with a maxima and 
a minima of 0 for colour category membership to colour space i.e. green will find its 
maxima at the peak response (510 nm), and its minima of 0 in all other areas of colour 
space that are outside the region of 475nm to 575nm. 
Fuzzy sets predict universal foci and universal boundaries (McDaniel, 1974; in Kay and 
McDaniel, 1978). Kay and McDaniel suggest there are 3 colour groups that can be 
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perceived as fuzzy sets in their model. Primary colours are the four FNRs derived from 
opponent processes of neural mechanisms for which there is semantic evidence and hence 
underlies colour perception in its most basic form. Composite categories are those that 
are created by fuzzy union and arise at the early stages of the basic colour term system, 
before primary basic colours do. These categories are characterized by their membership 
in functional response categories from which they are formed, and the absence of focal 
choices in those colour regions. There are four composite categories, 'warm' (red or 
yellow), 'light-warm' (white or red or yellow), cool/Grue, and dark-cool (black or dark 
colours). Derived categories are at fuzzy intersections and are found at later stages of the 
basic colour term system. These colours are brown, purple, pink, orange, and grey, 
orange for example being a derived category from red and yellow, but also a basic 
category in its own right. Although there is some discussion around orange and its status 
(Boynton, 1997), orange seems to be derived from primary colours and is part of the 
fuzzy logical operation of successive differentiation of pre-existing basic colour 
categories. 
The evolution based on fuzzy partitioning of colour space is revised from Berlin & Kay 
(1969), and suggests derived categories are the last colours to evolve and therefore do not 
carry the differentiation characteristic. Composites arise first in evolution, followed by 
primary colours, which are a refinement of composite colours, followed by colours 
derived form the primaries. Kay and McDaniel suggested these stages were not finite; as 
an example Kay and McDaniel described colours such as chartreuse and maroon to 
perhaps become derived basic categories in the future such that the '11 basic colour 
categories' are not a necessary condition. 
These are the premises for a neurophysiological basis of colour categories as suggested 
by Kay and McDaniel, supported by some researchers (Kay, Berlin and Merrifield, 1991; 
Kay, Berlin, Maffi and Merrifield, 1997; Kay and Maffi, 1999) and refuted by others 
(MacLaury, 1997; Saunders and Van Brake!, 1997; Lucy, 1997) who have questioned the 
simplicity of the premises of their work. Nevertheless, from Kay and McDaniel's analysis 
it is suggested that there are pan-human colour categories modelled by fuzzy set theory, 
that are further endorsed as support for biological determinism in later research. 
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1.5.4 Biologically determined colour categories 
Bomstein has argued that if children at a pre-linguistic stage and monkeys show evidence 
of colour categories using psychological methods that are equivalent to those used with 
adults or in cross-cultural contexts, then it could be concluded that colour categorization 
is innate and probably has a neurophysiological locus. Bomstein and colleagues have put 
forward strong evidence in favour of this argument and it is therefore appropriate to look 
at their work in more detail. 
In a study on infants using a preferential looking paradigm, Bomstein (1975) subjected 4-
month-olds to stimuli presentations, either colours presented in pairs (all possible 
combination of centre and boundary colour pairs), and infants were monitored and taped 
for looking time to a particular colour. Adults were asked to rate the same colours for 
pleasantness on a scale from 0 to 20. It was found that adults' pleasantness ratings and 
infants' fixation times seemed to correspond. More importantly, infants preferred looking 
at category centres ('prototype', Rosch, 1973) than category boundary colours. This 
finding was in concordance with adults shown to identify category centres faster than 
category boundaries that are between hues which are more psychologically complex. This 
infant study is a preliminary study that gives a first indication of fixation times as 
evidence for colour vision and a hint of a similar preferential mechanism in both infants 
and adults. More sophisticated studies were carried out using the habituation paradigm in 
which infants' recognition memory for hue was evident. 
Bomstein, Kessen and Weiskopf (1976) first of all demonstrated that infants, who were 
habituated to a particular colour, chose to look at a colour with a different colour name 
when given the choice to look at this colour or a colour equally distant but from the same 
category. Infants did this reliably for all parts of the continua provided by the four 
primary colours i.e. blue-green, green-yellow, and yellow-red. In a similar vein, 
Bomstein (1976) showed more evidence for memory of colour being organised around 
hue categories. Using a single-stimulus habituation paradigm, infants saw a triplet of 
colours serially, including the habituated-to colour, one colour from the same category, 
and a colour that crossed the category boundary. What was so remarkable about this 
study was that infants looked longer at the cross-boundary colour despite interference in 
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the form of delays. This shows more deeply rooted categorisation than one merely 
acquired during habituation. 
To address the question of human uniqueness of colour categories, a study of colour 
perception was carried out with macaque monkeys (Sandell, Gross and Bomstein, 1979). 
These monkeys were also made to habituate to a colour, and then responded to different 
colours. Responses were analysed. The experimenters used a generalization/extinction 
paradigm in which the monkey was reinforced (with juice) every time he responded to a 
training colour, and kept from reward at test at which time the monkey saw new colours. 
Monkeys responded to colours that fell under the same category name, and failed to 
respond to colours that were from a different category. Hence, macaques recognised a 
category boundary that matched human colour naming boundaries and therefore colour 
categories were not unique to humans. 
In a further attempt to clarify the neurophysiological locus of Categorical Perception, 
Bomstein and Korda (1985) used identification and adaptation of hue for further 
investigation. The authors showed that Categorical Perception varied according to 
adaptation of a particular hue; adapting to for e.g. blue, in a 2AFC test shifted inflection 
points and peaked reaction times were found to have shifted from green to blue 
wavelengths. Bomstein concludes that the locus of Categorical Perception is neurological 
and relies on mechanisms that do not include language, even though his tests did not 
assess linguistic mechanisms. 
Although there are several criticisms to Bomstein's work that will be discussed later in 
this thesis, Bomstein has researched colour perception using a two-pronged approach. 
This approach parallels with the current direction in this thesis, in that the same paradigm 
is used to draw comparative conclusions on the origins of Categorical Perception. 
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1.6 Current findings related to universal and linguistic influences on 
categorization 
1.6.1 Relative and linguistically influenced colour categories 
The ideas suggesting Categorical Perception's relativity to language have been expressed 
by Davidoff (200 1 ). Davidoff (200 1) starts by claiming that observation alone cannot 
account for colour categorization as there is no evidence for neuronal selectivity to any of 
the four basic colours, or any other secondary colours (e.g. Webster, M.A, Miyahara, E., 
Malkoc, G., and Raker, V.E., 2000). Moreover, Categorical Perception is argued to be 
paradoxical if based on a perceptual mechanism (Wright, C., 1975; Durnrnett, M., 1975; 
Paradox of the Heap) and is particularly applied to colour to explain colour categories are 
impossible unless a non-perceptual mechanism is involved in cognition. Linguistic 
relativity is therefore suggested as the basis for categories, because evidence of 
thresholds at boundaries between colours is found that indicates how one would parse the 
colours into discrete categories based on linguistic differences. Davidoff (1999; 2001) 
further elaborates his intentions by cross-cultural investigations. 
Davidoff, Davies & Roberson (1999), in 'Color categories in a stone-age tribe', showed 
that the Berinrno, living in Papua New Guinea and possessing 5 colour terms, have a 5-
term language-specific cross-category advantage that resembles the cross-category 
advantage the English have with respect to their 11 colour terms. CP effects were found 
in their 2AFC judgments relative to their language, and double dissociation was reported 
between the Berinrno and the English in a learning paradigm where both languages 
showed preferential linguistic advantages. Berinrno participants learned paired 
associations more easily for the nol/wor distinction than the yellow/green boundary and 
found blue I green and green (shade 1) I green (shade 2) distinction equally difficult to 
learn. The English participants found association to blue/green distinction easier than 
learning green (shade 1) I green (shade 2) and found yellow/green learning easier than 
nol/wor. Results indicate that familiarity with different colour terms may lead to different 
cognitive results across cultures. 
Roberson, Davies & Davidoff (2000) elaborated their findings in the form of an 
investigation of Rosch's findings that were argued to be in need of replication. Rosch 
(1972; Rosch Heider & Olivier, 1972) argued that the Dani possessing just two colour 
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terms, showed a closer memory pattern to the English memory pattern for colour, than to 
their own colour naming pattern. Therefore it was accepted that cognitive patterns did not 
vary across culture like naming did and rather reflected an innate disposition to a 
universal colour parsing. However, among other flaws, the colour array used by Rosch 
was concluded to be biased towards focals (Lucy & Schweder, 1979) and the statistics to 
back the multi-dimensional scaling conclusions were not as clear-cut with some questions 
about the multi-dimensional scaling looking at the relationship between naming and 
memory (Roberson et al., 2000). Thus, this study was revised. 
In the first 3 experiments meant to serve as replication of Rosch's work, none of the 
findings were replicated; a relationship between colour memory and colour name 
vocabulary was confirmed over and above a relationship between colour memory across 
cultures, no superior short-term recall of focal colours and no facilitation of associative 
learning of these focal colours was found. The results took on a cultural significance 
rather than a universal one. Signs of incipient colour term evolution were also found; 
Berinmo disagreed on where best examples for basic colour categories should be and the 
secondary terms used by the Berinmo were not in concordance with the evolutionary path 
suggested by Berlin and Kay (1969). Although, disagreement with the evolution of basic 
colour terms was also found by Rosch (1972), the data were not interpreted as culturally 
significant variations. Further, in the latter three experiments of the study, Roberson et al 
tried to extend Rosch's findings to shed new light on the matter of the universality of 
colour categories. New paradigms were used based on Categorical Perception literature 
(Hamad, 1987; Bomstein, 1987). The first test required participants to make similarity 
judgments in a method of triad presentation of colours. Triads either crossed the category 
boundary or exemplars in the triad were called the same name. In the second test, 
participants had to learn English and Berinmo categories by association to pictures. In the 
third test participants were subjected to a 2AFC recognition memory task. The results 
indicated that two colours were judged as more similar when called the same name, 
learning demonstrated facility for existing linguistic distinction, and a colour was more 
easily remembered when presented in a cross-category boundary pair. These results all 
together point towards a linguistic relativity of the kind that does not make universal 
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focals salient, neither in similarity judgments, memory recognition or learning. Do these 
results carry-over to other non-Western cultures? 
Same results were obtained in a cross-cultural study usmg the same experimental 
procedure comparing Himba to English and Berinmo speakers (Roberson, Davidoff, 
Davies and Shapiro, 2005). As with the Berinmo, the Himba, a semi-nomadic tribe from 
Namibia in Southern Africa, equally have 5 colour terms and although at first glance they 
showed a similar parsing of the colour space, they had small boundary position 
differences that lead to salient cross-cultural cognitive differences in colour perception. 
These results were not exclusively found for colour. A replication of Rosch's finding of 
cross-cultural 'prototypical geometric shapes' with English and Dani speakers, 
demonstrated that the Himba did not show any evidence of prototypical geometrical 
shapes like circle, square, triangle. Roberson, Davidoff, and Shapiro (2002) argued that 
the absence of straight lines in nature was reflected in the Himba's linguistic absence of 
these concepts that explained the equal difficulty in learning paired associations of shapes 
whether typical or a-typical. Thus, findings show generalizing across different cultures 
and for different perceptual continua. 
1.6.1.1 Relativity's developmental approach 
Results in favour of linguistic relativity were also supported by developmental work with 
the Himba. A longitudinal study tracking colour term acquisition was explored to this 
avail. In Roberson, Davidoff, Davies, and Shapiro (2004), colour category acquisition 
was studied over 3 years among Himba and English children tracked from the age of 3-4 
years. Naming, comprehension, memory and a list task were administered in both 
populations over the period of study. The aim of the study was two-fold; the first aim was 
to compare the universalist and relativist argument for the development of colour 
categories; the second aim was to examine the trajectory of colour term acquisition in 
both cultures. The first finding was that in the recognition memory task, children that did 
not master colour names, made errors based on perceptual distance rather than errors 
reflecting pre-determined colour categories. Children that knew colour terms made more 
language specific errors (of the within-category type). This finding suggests that language 
plays a role in re-organisation of colour space reflected in memory errors. The second 
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finding was that there was no predictable order in which the colour terms were acquired. 
Colour term acquisition was acquired slowly and with great individual variation in both 
cultures. This suggests that colour terms are not acquired in the ordered fashion according 
to innate basic colour categories (Berlin & Kay, 1969; Kay & McDaniel, 1978) as shown 
by for example early naming confusions made by English (white called pink, orange 
called yellow, brown called black) and Himba children (zoozu called dumbu or vinde, 
serandu called dumbu or honi). The third finding that bears on 'basic order' as well, is 
that children who knew no colour names did not show an advantage for focal colours in 
memory, hereby counter-replicating Rosch's (1973) findings with the Dani adults. 
Focality is concluded to be language dependent; when children learn colour names, 
effects of focality arise in memory tasks in function of learned terms and colour 
boundaries. Thus there is a drastic colour space re-structuring during colour term 
acquisition that is linguistically triggered. 
The second aim of the study, to outline the trajectory of colour term acquisition, indicated 
that children still refine their colour categories after first colours are learned. It seems that 
focality, as seen in the advantage to remember focal colours better than non-focal ones, 
improves over time as colour term acquisition improves. Thus no evidence of biological 
influence is distinguished. For both populations colour memory performance is 
determined by the number of terms acquired. Children that know few will remember the 
few they know, and older children that know many will remember the many colours they 
have learned. Memory error patterns also vary over time; older children make less of 
them and make more within-category memory errors regardless of perceptual distance 
whereas perceptual categorization contributed to a lot of errors made by young children 
early on in the study. In sum, this work confirms a linguistically formed internal space of 
colour representations (Davidoff, 1997). Evidence from cross-cultural adult and 
developmental work, correspond and support linguistic relativity of colour perception. 
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1.6.2 Universal and innate colour categories 
A revision of Berlin and Kay's (1969) study , the 'World Color Survey' (WCS; Kay, 
Berlin & Merrifield, 1991 ), was made in the hope of more rigorous data analysis on the 
universality of colour categories. Shortcomings of Berlin & Kay's (1969) study were re-
addressed, e.g. sampling and testing in country of origin by linguist-missionaries rather 
than testing in California, samples consisted of at least 25 participants per language rather 
than smaller samples of sometimes just two people. The data encoding and analysis were 
also a lot more rigorous; naming arrays and term maps were produced to construe a WCS 
data archive that would reflect more acceptable universal tendencies. The purpose of the 
new database is to investigate ' ... two broad questions, one concerning universals, and the 
other addressing variation of colour naming' (Cook, Kay and Regier, 2005, p 9). 
Using WCS data, Kay and Regier (2003) gave a first objective demonstration of universal 
tendencies in colour naming. They set two questions; Is WCS clustering of colour terms 
greater than chance and do WCS colour terms fall near colour terms of industrialized 
societies? They demonstrated WCS clustering principles on the basis of statistical 
analyses on WCS; calculating one centroid per term and distances between centroids 
within each language, summing all distances across languages and terms, and adapting a 
measure of dispersion, low dispersion values showing strong clustering which was their 
result after 1000 WCS data rotation calculations that maintained a within language 
structure and randomized cross-language structure. Kay and Regier (2003) confirmed that 
WCS colour terms fell near terms of industrialized societies. They additionally used a 
Monte-Carlo rotation to measure the separation between WCS data and Berlin and Kay's 
data and showed that as compared to the Monte-Carlo expectation the separation was 
much less than predicted by chance, validating Berlin and Kay's data (1969). Moreover, 
Kay and Regier (2003) showed that the WCS centroid-clustering were significantly found 
at the location of the 11 basic colours in English, vs. the remaining 319 colour positions 
in the Munsell array. These data signify universals are present in the data. 
The nature of these universals were further studied by Kay and colleagues (Kay, cook & 
Regier, 2005; Kay & Regier, 2006b) by investigating whether the universals in naming 
data stern from universals in the foci or in the category extensions. First, Kay and 
colleagues show interest in disproving linguistic relativity supported by the study of the 
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Berinmo in Papua New Guinea (Davidoff, Davies & Roberson, 1999) and fmd that 
Berinmo colour centroids are in agreement with English foci so that colour universals are 
found to be best examples foils of categories across written and unwritten languages. 
Their findings are based on contour plots (by pooling best-example data and calculating 
number of hits on each chip) and compared best examples choices from WCS data with 
best examples of English colour terms. Contour plots matched 6 most basic English 
colour terms. The second part of the paper focuses on whether the foci from WCS data 
were derived from category boundaries or foci, by comparing whether best examples of 
categories cluster more tightly across all languages than do the centres of those 
categories' extensions. Again using centroid calculation and measures of dispersion the 
finding were that best examples were clustered more tightly together across languages. 
The affirmation of foci's role for the universality of colour perception is still not absolute 
due to cross-cultural investigations refuting universals. Therefore, Kay and colleagues 
further question the basis of these universally-favoured regions with case studies. 
In a further case study of the Berinmo, Kay and Regier (2006a) demonstrated the same 
colour universals as the ones found in WCS thus offering a further counter-argument to 
previous studies carried out (Davidoff, Davies, & Roberson, 1999; Roberson, Davies & 
Davidoff, 2000) that emphasised linguistic relativity with respect to colour categories and 
their boundary locations. These differences were demonstrated non-linguistically through 
memory experiments. Using statistical rotation techniques, the original Berinmo naming 
data seem to align (accumulating boundary chips with same scoring in boundary map) 
more closely to WCS boundaries than did any of the rotated versions, showing that there 
are universal constraints on colour term boundaries. The second step was to demonstrate 
that not only were the Berinmo boundaries typical of WCS boundaries but also in 
particular alignment with eight other 5-term languages. This was successfully shown, e.g. 
Berinmo vs. Bauzi (Irian Jaya) had a 73% boundary match. From a look at the maps, the 
boundary maps for all these languages are incredibly similar to the Berinmo's and 
boundary matches that lay between 69% and 80%. Kay and Regier drew from findings 
that the Berinmo were not in any way exempted from having universal constraints on 
their colour categories and are moreover similar in evolutionary stage to 8 other WCS 5-
term languages. As discussed in the previous section, these findings are in sharp contrast 
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to linguistic influence on categorical perception of colour found for two 5-term languages 
(Roberson et al., 2005). Nevertheless, Kay and colleagues argue for colour universals 
using the WCS, the largest cross-cultural colour survey ever carried out, and 
convincingly show that universal pressures on colour categories exist. 
1.6.2.1 Universality's developmental approach 
As with Bomstein, Franklin's approach to the nativist account is to show that infants as 
young as 3 to 4 months of age show effects of CP in categorical responding. Seeing that 
they do not have verbal labels, they are a perfect population to test under the hypothesis 
that if they were to respond categorically to colour, colour categorization could be 
concluded to be innate. According to Franklin and colleagues (e.g. Franklin & Davies, 
2004) this account leaves two options to the origin of categorization open to inspection 
and the following rationale is reflected in their studies. The first option takes the 
incompatibility of cross-cultural findings into account, following which it could be 
implied that learning verbal labels re-shapes colour categories; the second option implies 
that we are predisposed with this ability from birth despite language- in this case infant 
categories should be universal (for which there is no evidence yet). 
After highlighting concerns on poor methodology used by Gerhardstein, Renner, and 
Rovee-Collier (1999) to show that infants did not have Categorical Perception in a visual 
search task (colour pop-out), Davies & Franklin (2002) addressed their methodological 
concerns by testing adults on a target detection task in which participants showed 
Categorical Perception effects, concluding that infants might have colour categories after 
all. These conclusions lead Franklin to investigate Bomstein's work. 
Bomstein Kessen & Weiskopfs (1976) results have been criticized due to the method 
adopted, in particular the wavelength coordinates (e.g., Werner and Wooten, 1985) and 
habituation technique (e.g., Franklin, Pilling and Davies, 2005). Franklin and Davies 
(2004) wanted to investigate the validity and reinstall reliability to these results and 
replicated this study using a paired-comparison novelty preference method. Infants were 
familiarized to a stimulus and when shown a novel colour, infants looked longer to the 
right or the left depending on which screen it appeared. Infants showed Categorical 
Perception for colour near the 'linguistic' category boundary, for 2 parts of the colour 
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continua (blue-green, blue-purple), not showing any novel preferential responding for 
within-category trials even when the distance between stimuli was increased for the 
between-category trials, and when saturation and brightness were made to vary on trials 
(pink-red). Bomstein, Kessen & Weiskopfs (1976) results were thus replicated and 
extended to secondary colours refuting the differential treatment of colour such as might 
be predicted from Berlin and Kay's work (1969). Nevertheless, Franklin and colleagues 
concluded that despite the latter infant categories showed an innate, universal nature. 
Taking a step further, a target detection study was carried out, using the same paradigm 
for infants and adults, in which evidence from eye movements showed Categorical 
Perception for both adults and infants. The target detection task comprised of a 
participant detecting a circle against a background of same or different colour. Franklin 
Pilling & Davies (2005) present this task as being advantageous for several reasons; the 
first being that this task could be administered to infants and adults so that direct 
comparison could take place; the second reason is that this task was free of a memory 
component, thus eliminating a possible use of colour terms that might be stored in 
memory (e.g. prototype effect in memory in Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Vevea, 2000). 
Their point was extended further in their results which showed shorter target fixation 
times on between-category trials than on within-category trials, and this effect was found 
for two chromatic separation sizes, showing that neither infants nor adults were sensitive 
to perceptual distance. Thus, this paradigm was applicable across populations and 
showed inherent colour categories. Seeing that Categorical Perception is innate, perhaps 
colour categories are also identical in older children and evidence of those should then be 
found across cultures. 
Franklin et al. (2004) argued that 'colour term knowledge does not affect Categorical 
Perception of colour in toddlers'. Himba and English toddlers were tested on a 2 AFC 
task, adjusted to fit a 2-year-old's attention i.e. bear/boy wearing shirts. The English 
toddlers were found to produce cross-category accuracy effects for blue-green and blue-
purple irrespective of colour term acquisition. Only tested on the blue-purple continuum, 
coupled with a lack of naming and comprehension data, the Himba were also found to 
show Categorical Perception effects identical to the English. Thus, from this cross-
cultural developmental study colour categories also appear to be innate. 
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In conclusion, the infant and children's findings by Franklin and colleagues are 
challenging for the linguistic relativity hypothesis. However these results seem to be 
incompatible with several other cross-cultural investigations (Roberson et al., 2004) and 
also another study of which Franklin is the co-author in which older children and adults 
show Categorical Perception differences based on colour terms (Daoutis et al., 2006). 
Therefore Franklin suggests that it remains to be seen whether linguistic reorganization of 
colour categories when colour terms are acquired, is at the origin of the incompatibility 
between the infant work and the cross-cultural investigation of categorization. 
2. The current study 
2.1 Motivation for the current study 
In practice, there are three experimental approaches to address the nature/nurture debate 
in the quest for the origins of colour categories: phylogenetic (e.g. Sandell, Gross & 
Bornstein, 1979; Matsuzawa, 1985; Matsuno, Kawai & Matsuzawa, 2004), ontogenetic 
(e.g. Bornstein, Kessen & Weiskoph, 1976; Pitchford & Mullen, 2001; Franklin & 
Davies, 2004), and cross-cultural (e.g. Berlin & Kay, 1969; Davidoff, Davies & 
Roberson, 1999; Kay & Regier, 2003). These approaches address different populations 
under the same hypothesis, testing the relation between language and categorization. If 
similar colour categories between two populations are found, the innate view would be 
favoured; a biological mechanism can be adopted as a valid explanation for Categorical 
Perception in both populations and the relation between language and categorization is 
denied. However, if differences are found, colour categories are acquired through 
learning, and a non-biological mechanism can be suggested. This non-perceptual 
mechanism affecting conceptual grouping could be argued to be language. 
The proposed research contains a phylogenetic investigation questioning differences in 
colour categorization between human and non-human primates (baboons), and cross-
lingual investigations of toddlers in an ontogenetic enquiry, and cross-cultural 
investigations of adults addressing possible category differences. From the literature it 
seems that there is a fairly shared amount of experimental evidence supporting different 
experimental outcomes. It is the aim to establish a novel link between comparative, cross-
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cultural, and ontogenetic approaches to assemble and expand the knowledge and research 
carried out on the origins and nature of categories. 
2.2 The current set of experiments 
2.2.1 Methodological considerations 
Some methodological considerations have been made during the course of the studies of 
this thesis. The four paragraphs below assess methodologies for cross-cultural, 
phylogenetic and ontogenetic work, and also discuss the Munsell coloured stimuli briefly. 
More detail can be found in the various experiment chapters that are to follow (see 
method sections of chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7) and are therefore not further elborated here. 
From a cross-cultural point of view, Lucy (1992) reviews possible flaws in previous 
comparative research within the paradigm of colour cognition both from the period 
before 1969 and from that which followed. He concludes that multicultural comparisons 
shed light on the issue of linguistic relativity and puts forward a number of 
methodological recommendations for future work. He suggests that new methods of 
examination should include 'back-translation' (requiring at least two bilingual members 
of a speech community so that the experimenter can ask one individual to translate a 
question into their own language, and then ask the other member to translate it back again 
to ensure that the question being asked is the correct one). In the current set of 
investigations back-translation was possible and carried out with the translator and 
translator's colleague before carrying out the experiments with the Himba (Languages 
used were English to Himba and Himba back to English). Lucy also recommends that 
experiments should be designed so that precise behavioural predictions can be made 
about the influence of language on thought; the experiments in section 2-7 of the 
experimental work have been so designed. He suggests the use of materials and/or 
categories which are familiar to both the Western and traditional cultures being compared 
such as the Munsell colours presented to the Himba and English were, and in the colour 
experiments of this thesis in experiment 4 the Himba and English are both exposed to a 
part of the continua characterized by a firm linguistic boundary and another unfamiliar 
boundary to their language. The naming data of this section confirms the cross-cultural 
validity of the materials in that both cultures are equally well able to name the colours 
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presented to them. Although the picture portrayed is that the English have more colour 
category boundaries and therefore have an advantage at recognizing colours along the 
spectrum, another experiment in the series of this thesis makes sure the Himba also have 
the opportunity of being the ones that have the larger vocabulary and thus of perhaps 
showing an advantage for recognizing differences on the animal pattern continuum. Thus, 
one is warned of Emics (Pike, 1954), i.e., exposing a culture to another culture's 
knowledge, yet this aspect is counterbalanced and perhaps not such a concern seeing that 
perceptual processes are being tested. 
Taking a phylogenetic approach, methodology needs to be adequate in order to provide 
more information about the presence or absence of monkey categories and the data needs 
to be comparable to that of humans. Even though they are our closest relatives in the 
animal world apart from apes, comparative studies need to be sensitive to monkey's 
abilities to fulfil task demands. Monkeys usually have to be trained on experimental 
procedures in order for them to learn procedures that can then be carried over to test 
conditions (e.g., Fagot, Krushke, Depy and Vauclair, 1998). For the case of the matching-
to-sample method, monkeys have been shown to successfully learn via identity-matching 
and are just as good at carrying out this task as human primates are (e.g. Fagot and 
Deruelle, 1997). There is evidence that monkeys are capable of classifying by abstraction 
(Neiworth and Right, 1994) using transfer skills so that the conceptualizing is not ruled 
out by learning and transferring skills and makes the matching-to-sample and ideal and 
simple procedure to follow (McKone, Martini & Nakayama, 2001). Moreover, the 
evidence for identity concept learning in monkeys, although by no means uniformly 
positive (e.g. Premack, 1983; Fugita, 1982), seems stronger than it is for other members 
of the animal kingdom (e.g. birds, Holmes, 1979). Thus the experimental procedure 
chosen in this thesis for the comparative work seems adequate (D' Amato, Salmon, and 
Colombo, 1985). Another important methodological consideration is the monkey's work 
routine established in the animal laboratory. Monkeys are usually invited to work for no 
longer than an hour a day and are not taken out of their daily routines such as food-time 
etc. Monkeys lose their focus of attention quite rapidly and in order to keep their attention 
levels high while at work, they are reinforced during training and only partially 
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reinforced (at random) during the test phase. This is a standard procedure used in most 
monkey studies and does not interfere with results obtained. 
Taking an ontogenetic point of view, toddlers are of interest here because they can 
enlighten lifespan issues and more particularly can possibly point to the origins of colour 
categorization because they too have not acquired colour terms at a very young age, and 
provide another situation in which non-linguistic grouping can be tested. Thus such 
questions as put forward by Bomstein, Kessen & Weiskopf (1976) can be tackled by 
studying infants or very young children; 'Does the infant see colour? If so, what 
organization of the colour world does the child bring to language learning? Lastly, in 
what ways does the preverbal child's organization of colour resemble that of adults?' The 
method adapted to this area of study depends on how old the children are. Very young 
infants have been studied using the habituation technique (Franklin & Davies, 2004; 
Borstein, Kessen & Weiskopf, 197 6), a method that induces the infant to get accustomed 
to seeing a particular colour, followed by a record of the infant's looking time to a novel 
colour (novel colour can be from the same or different category to the training colour). 
This diffuculty here is that this method has not been used with adults to make adequate 
comparisons. The closest to the habituation technique may be the often used two 
alternative-forced-choice or the detection method that currently replaces the habituation 
technique (Franklin, Pilling & Davies, 2005). However, with older children, methodology 
can be adapted to be closer to the ones applied to adults. Tests to assess development, 
such a language acquisition, are usually administered to children, so as to categorize them 
into various groups of different ability, and test them according to those abilities. The 
difficulty of the experiment needs to be controlled so as to make a methodology easy 
enough for children to follow, and fun enough to keep their attention at a high enough 
level to carry out the task. This, we believe, has been done following Franklin et al. 
(2005) procedure. From the assessment children can be expected to be at different stages 
of development, the first stage is comprised of children who don't know any colour terms 
(colours for purposes of test), the second stage is comprised of children who know some 
but not all colour terms, and the third stage is comprised of children who know all colour 
terms. Further children's performance at the first and third stages is compared as they 
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provide two groups that differ on their level of colour term acquisition and that can be 
controlled i.e. their results subsequently interpreted. 
To resume, the colour studies all used Munsell stimuli (although a set of color aid stimuli 
was also used for the toddler study). The reason for this being first that early work such 
as Rosch Heider's and more recent work by Roberson et al. (2004, 2005) used the same 
stimuli and these experiments were partly meant as an extension of their work. Second, 
some findings with an English population have shown that the use of these stimuli do 
provide comparable results to the only other widely used manual set of colour stimuli, the 
OSA system (Sturgess & Whitfield, 1995). ). Third, use of the Munsell system does not 
presuppose that the organization of the Munsell colour space (or any other system) 
necessarily reflects the underlying organization of the representation of colour in the 
internal colour space but that these dimensions are sufficient, if not necessary, for the 
precise methodologies in this series of experiments using colour e.g. matching-to-sample 
(Jameson & Hurvich, 1989; Thompson, 1995). Also Indow (1988) found that 3-
dimensional Euclidian map is a close-fitting representation of the perceptual colour space 
that does not lose significant amounts of information compared to models of greater 
dimensionality (7 -dimensional). From this and other conclusions about the Munsell 
system, Munsell stimuli were chosen in the present set of cross-cultural experiments as an 
available set of calibrated, easily portable stimuli. Third, some of the studies by Bomstein 
and colleagues under direct scrutiny (e.g. Sandell, Gross & Bomstein, 1979) have also 
been addressed for their methodological flaws of colour illumination (monochromatic 
beam, lamp) using wavelength (nm) as the standard colour metric and instead the 
Munsell system has been found to be a reliable set of stimuli to use. 
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2.2.2 The participant populations of this thesis 
TheHimba 
The Himba are semi-nomadic pastoralists who inhabit the Kunene Region in north-
western Namibia. Unlike many indigenous groups in Africa, the Himba have managed to 
maintain much of their traditional lifestyle, perhaps owing to the fact that the land they 
occupy is so harsh and unyielding that it has been rarely coveted by the colonialists and 
commercial farmers that have affected so many other regions of the continent. They are 
monolingual and are not subject to western influence. 
The Himba (together with the Herero) moved into present-day Namibia and Botswana as 
part of a larger migration of Bantu-speaking peoples from east Africa several hundred 
years ago. About 150 years ago, the group began to split and a large group that we know 
today as the Herero moved southward, while the ancestors of the present-day Himba 
remained. 
The estimated 20,000 to 50,000 Himba, long among Africa's most prosperous herders, 
are resilient. In the 19th century those in Namibia survived cattle raids by marauding 
ethnic groups from the south. Most fled to Angola, joining with the Portuguese military 
and forming their own armies of raiders. Eventually many returned to Namibia. Starting 
in the 1920s, South African rulers confined them to a prescribed "homeland," officially 
forbidding them to trade, graze livestock freely, or garden and gather wild plants along 
the Kunene River. Yet they endured, even if at times life was extremely difficult. 
When drought and war struck Namibia in the 1980s, it looked as if the culture of the 
indigenous Himba people might disintegrate. Ninety percent of Himba cattle, the centre 
of their economy and identity, died. Some families left to Angola. Lacking any other 
means of survival and desperate for cash, a number of men joined South Africa's army in 
its fight against guerrillas seeking Namibian independence. Unable to feed themselves, 
Himba flowed into the town of Opuwo for relief food, settling in slums of cardboard and 
plastic sacks. 
With the peace and good rains that came to Namibia in the 1990s, the Himba rebuilt their 
herds and, working with international activists, helped block a proposed hydro-electric 
dam that would have flooded ancestral lands along the Kunene. They also have benefited 
from new opportunities provided by the government of independent Namibia-mobile 
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schools where Himba children are slowly learning English, and conservancies that give 
Himba control of wildlife. This does not withstand that the fortunes of the Himba are still 
very much tied to the earth and its weather as they continue to try and maintain there 
pastoral way of life. 
Today, the Himba live as they have for centuries by following their herds of goats and 
cattle to new grazing areas and waterholes as existing areas become depleted. They are 
still affected by the threat of setting up a hydraulic dam at the Kunene River, but seem to 
live on despite upcoming pressures. They live in small villages or family groups 
throughout the Kunene Region. 
The Himba language is a dialect of the Herero language, but cultural isolation has 
resulted in a variety of cultural and linguistic differences from Herero. The Herero culture 
is stable and broadly agricultural. Most villages now have schools and radios, and the 
people have adopted Western dress. Herero has acquired borrowed colour terms such as 
'grine' and 'pinge' (green and pink) that Himba speakers do not use. Himba people are 
semi-nomadic and have a strong and distinctive traditional cultural identity. They have 
retained traditional clothing and lifestyles and usually are in little contact with other 
cultures. 
With some of the Himba's history in mind, they proved to be an interesting population to 
study as they are monolingual and are not subject to the same abstractions that Western 
people have in the domain of colour. Previous field work has been carried out in this 
region by Roberson, Davidoff, Davies & Shapiro (2004, 2005) and also Roberson, 
Davidoff & Shapiro (2002). Interesting results have been reported about their colour term 
knowledge, of most interest for the purposes of this thesis. I have therefore chosen to 
include a summary of naming patterns distributions (figure 1.2), as reported in Roberson 
et al. (2005). 
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Himba Naming Distribution 
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*The colour terms that span the Himba's vocabulary are Vapa, indicating white, light and pastel colours, 
Serandu, indicating red, orange and pink, Zoozu, indicating black, and all dark colours, Dumbu, indicating 
mixtures of yellow and green with brown undertones, and burou, indicating mixtures of green and blue. 
English Naming Distribution 
Fig. 1.2 Distribution ofHimba naming and choices of best exemplars for the 160 chip saturated array (for 
31 observers) compared to those English speakers for the same array. Numbers represent number of 
individuals choosing an exemplar as best example of the category. Munsell lightness values are indicated 
on the vertical axis; hue values are indicated on the horizontal axis. 
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Figure 1.2 supports the idea that there are linguistic boundary differences (where the 
thick black lines intersect), lines that do not correspond to the predicted places of the 11 
colour terms found in the English and also other western languages (Berlin & Kay, 1969). 
This tells us that the Himba have colour groupings that correspond to their colour 
naming. 
Himba animal patterns were also investigated in this thesis for the first time. Although 
Himba might base their naming judgments on a combination of colour and shape, this 
thesis addresses animal patterns as a separate issue for which it is not easy to establish a 
continua so unfamiliar to the Western eye. The advances made are finding out some 
naming patterns to explore further possibilities of fieldwork experiments to support 
linguistic relativity. The main pattern names are illustrated in Eckl (2000), who carried 
out a more in depth investigation of herds and naming patterns some of which are 
illustrated in the table 1.1. Those patterns correspond to the findings in this thesis, and 
several animal patterns are used for further testing. 
Table 1.1 Animal patterns used in Goldstein & Davidoff (in press) that also correspond to description found 
in Eckl (2000). These animal patterns have been collected from 32 Himba observers based on picture 
naming ofvarious animals. 
Name Pattern 
Omvahe Light, yellow-brown 
Ombahiona/ombahozu Spotted on light-coloured background 
Om bambi Dark, red-brown 
Ongwenje Spotted and white stomach 
Ongange Speckled dark, white spotted 
Ekwara White neck 
Onganja Chestnut, lots of even tiny spots 
Ongara Coal-coloured, black 
Ondamberawa Coloured-back 
Onzoozu Pitch dark, black 
Ondumbu Beige, colour of dry soil 
Ombotozu Dark, with dark patches 
Ekondo Dark with white stripes 
Ongwiti Coloured head and neck (brown or black) 
Onthemba White spots on dark colour 
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Himba adults and their children (toddlers) participated in the experiments of this thesis. 
Although there are some mobile schools in some areas, the Himba that were sought out 
for participation were from remote areas, where mobile schools were not the norm. Due 
to rapid changes in this area and the invasion of beer traders, some Western cloth has 
become accessible to the Himbas. The cloth is mainly worn by young Himba men. 
Women have not adopted any of the invading culture and remain strongly set in their 
traditional ways of dressing e.g. mix of butter fat, ochre, and herbs on their skin, and shell 
hanging around their neck with a metal plate hanging from the back, heavy metal 
bracelets around their feet etc. The women are seen to preserve the culture a lot more 
than men (see picture below). 
Himba woman and man 
Children and men are often in charge of travelling with the herds to waterholes, located 
close to riverbeds that have usually dried up, and only fill up again during the rain season. 
Those have provided good locations for testing. Himba were always tested just outside of 
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their settlement or at waterholes, and remunerated for participating with maize flour 
which is a produce they are familiar with; the Himba have their own maize fields, where 
they collect the seeds, and grind them to flour. Last but not least, the Himba have always 
been friendly, and very cooperative and happy to see us. They have received pictures 
from us and have always been very welcoming. 
Baboons (Papio Papio) 
The Guinea Baboon (Papio papio) is a baboon from the Old World monkey family, 
probably one of the most common non-human primate species after the chimpanzee 
which belongs to the ape family. Some (older) classifications list only two species in the 
genus Papio, this one and the Hamadryas Baboon. In those classifications, all other Papio 
species are considered subspecies of Papio Papio and are called the Savannah Baboon. 
The Guinea Baboon inhabits a small area in western Africa. Its range is from Guinea, 
Senegal, Gambia, southern Mauritania and western Mali. It has reddish brown hair and a 
hairless, dark-violet or black face with the typical dog-like face, which is surrounded by a 
small mane. The Guinea Baboon is the smallest baboon species. It is terrestrial, but sleeps 
in trees at night. The number of suitable sleeping trees limits the group size and the range. 
Although little is known about its social behaviour, it is likely to live in harems. Like all 
baboons it is omnivorous, eating fruits, buds, roots, insects and small mammals. Due to 
its small range and the loss of its habitat, the Guinea Baboon is classified as 'near 
threatened' by the IUCN (World Conservation Union). 
The baboon population used in this study lives in the CNRS in Marseille, in the animal 
laboratory in enclosures that have an outside platform and inside chamber with several 
metal floors so that the monkey can sleep in an elevated place at night. They are fed once 
a day in the afternoon and monkeys do not work more than an hour to two hours a day 
prior to feeding time. In order for monkeys to work, monkeys are seized in an animal-box 
vehicle and transported to a different enclosure in the testing rooms. The monkey has 
been trained to use a joystick, and most psychological experiments are based on the use 
of this joystick (see picture below). The monkey is usually reinforced with flavoured fruit 
pellets during training by a feeder attached to the experimental enclosure. The 
experimenter controls the animal behaviour and behavioural responses on monitors that 
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are located outside the experimental room. Once the monkey has finished the task they 
are returned to their living enclosures. 
Male baboon (Papio Papio) carrying out an experiment 
The baboon population consists of 3 female and 6 male monkeys. The dominant male 
monkey does not participate in experiments, probably out of fear of losing the dominant 
role in the group. Thus, eight baboons have been tested in the experiments of this thesis. 
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3. Experiments 1 and 2: A cross-species comparison of colour 
categorization in a matching-to-sample task. 
3 .1 General introduction 
Herrnstein and Loveland (1964) were the first to demonstrate that an animal species (i.e., 
the pigeon) could learn to sort visual stimuli on a categorical basis. In their study, pigeons 
learned to provide behavioural responses consistent with the categorical structure of the 
stimuli and, even more impressively, generalized to novel, previously unseen, exemplars 
of the categories. Since Herrnstein and Loveland (1964), categorization has been 
demonstrated in a variety of species and with a variety of experimental procedures 
(D'Amato & van Sant, 1988; Depy, Fagot & Vauclair, 1997; Fagot, Young and 
Wasserman, 2001; Martin-Malivel & Fagot, 2001).While these studies show that some 
forms of categorization are possible in animals, and consequently that language might not 
be a necessary condition for categorization, the cognitive procedures permitting those 
categorical responses still remain largely unclear. It is particularly unclear if animals 
solve the task by way of categorical procedures, such as feature analysis or prototype 
learning, implying an analysis of the physical dimensions of the stimuli, or rely on more 
abstract thought. 
Among the possible reasons limiting the heuristic values of categorical studies in animals 
is the general use of non-continuous variables to define differences between categories. 
For example, studies have tested the capability of animals to discriminate between 
categories such as tree, monkey or people (e.g., Herrnstein & Loveland, 1964). Use of 
these types of categorical structures makes it very hard to identify the cognitive 
procedure employed by the animals to solve the task, and therefore to make conclusions 
about the level of abstractness achieved by the subjects. 
Notable exceptions for the use of non continuous variable with animals species are the 
studies on categorical perception of auditory stimuli in chinchillas or monkeys (e.g., May, 
Moody, & Stebbins, 1989; Ohlemiller et al., 1999). Most of these authors consider the 
Voice Onset Time (VOT) as the critical variable in their studies. The VOT corresponds to 
the interval between consonant onset and the start of rhythmic vocal-cord vibrations. 
Perception of consonants such as /d/ and /t/ appears indeed categorical in humans, with a 
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boundary lying at a VOT of 20-40 ms. Application of the VOT paradigm has suggested 
that the discrimination of such auditory stimuli is also categorical in animals (e.g., May, 
Moody, & Stebbins, 1989; Ohlemiller et al., 1999; Steinschneider, Fishman & Arezzo, 
2003), like humans, and therefore that there is no need for language for this kind of 
categorical perception procedure to appear. This conclusion might however be premature 
for the following three reasons. First, it should be noted that the stimuli employed in 
VOT paradigms are not unidimensional, as they vary in a number of dimensions, such as 
spectral, temporal, or overall energy. It is therefore difficult to ascertain with this 
procedure the actual mechanism at the origin of categorical perception effects. Listeners 
in VOT studies were noticeably found to attend to different phonemic cues (Ohlemiller et 
al, 1999), therefore confirming that different cognitive procedures might be applied by 
participants with VOT procedures. Second, not all experiments could demonstrate 
categorical perception with the VOT procedure ( eg., Hopp, Sinnot, Owren, & Petersen, 
1992). Finally, this kind of procedure does not rule out the possibility that the stimuli are 
of special ecological value for the animals, and therefore hardly control for training 
effects. 
Other evidence for categorical perception in animals has resulted from categorization 
studies using visual stimuli. Thus, Wilson and Debauche (1981) tested categorical 
perception of length, orientation and texture in macaques. After training with the 
extremities of a set of stimuli, category boundaries were identified for each dimension 
(50 choices over all comparisons). After training, normal macaques (in comparison with 
animals with inferotemporal lesions) had improved discrimination performance for 
between compared to within category discrimination. 
Unfortunately, very few studies have assessed categorical perception of colours in 
animals, including in primates that are known to have the same wavelength 
discrimination function as humans (Bowmaker et al., 1991). A few attempts have been 
made. First, categorical perception of colours was obtained in Sandell, Gross & Bomstein 
(1979), but there are concerns regarding the stimuli used in their study. Because their 
study did not take into account the spectral sensitivity of the primate eye, the advantage 
reported by the authors for cross-category contrasts might be accounted for by a 
perceptually easier discrimination for cross-category than within-category contrasts. 
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Second, Yoshioka et al. (1996) claim that neurons in the visual cortex of macaques that 
are specific to colours is not a definitive demonstration of categorical perception of 
colours, and provides no evidence for the origin of this specificity. Third, the fact that a 
chimpanzee categorises colours as humans (Matsuzawa, 1985) after being trained to use 
symbols to name the so-called 11 basic colours provides no evidence that such process 
would be applicable in absence of specific training, as these categories do not seem to be 
well-formed in a chimpanzee with only two years of experience with colour symbols 
(Matsuno, Kawai & Matsuzawa, 2004). The comparative literature therefore provides 
some evidence for categorical perception in animals, and only controversial evidence 
supporting the hypothesis that animals have colour categories. Replication and extension 
of previous studies is therefore warranted. Therefore, this phylogenetic comparative 
investigation was aimed to examine discrimination thresholds and colour perception 
similarities and differences between monkeys and humans, using simple procedures 
inclined to elicit categorical responding and verify whether monkeys and humans show 
basic perceptual differences (McKone, Martini & Nakayama, 2001). 
A matching-to-sample procedure with further modelling was used in Experiment 1 to 
ascertain the boundary behaviour of monkeys and humans for colours of the chosen 
continuum. If boundary differences are found between monkeys and humans, the reason 
may be human's use of language as a grouping device that seems to allow for more 
abstract perceptual processes and perhaps a clear division between colours. However, 
more evidence from biological and discrimination functioning are needed to reinforce 
those result if they are true. To confirm findings of categorical perception, a 
psychophysical indicator of biological functioning was ascertained in experiment 2a, and 
categorical perception was tested on this basis in experiment 2b. Discrimination 
thresholds were measured, by way of an adaptive staircase procedure (Levitt, 1971) 
leading to a rapid convergence near the asymptotic threshold level. Expectations are that 
monkeys and humans will have similar colour perception thresholds (see Bowmaker et al, 
1991 above), but will show a difference in behaviour on a test that involves category 
decision over an above simple discrimination (two-alternative-forced-choice procedure). 
Thus, one expects monkeys and humans to categorize colour differently, but show very 
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little differences in discrimination thresholds indicating that language is at the heart of 
categorization of colour rather than categorical perception being inherited biologically. 
3.2 Experiment 1: Colour categorization in matching-to-sample 
(Also a publication: Fagot, Goldstein, Davidoff, & Pickering (2006). Cross-species 
differences in colour categorization. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 13 (2), 275-280). 
3 .2.1 Method 
3 .2.1.1 Participants 
They were 5 male and 3 female adult Guinea baboons (Papio Papio ), who lived in the 
same social group at the CNRS-INCM institute. The baboons were already familiar with 
the matching-to-sample procedure (MTS ; Fagot & Deruelle, 1997; Fagot, Wasserman & 
Young, 2001) and were not food deprived. Five men and three women also served as 
subjects for payment. They all had normal colour vision as tested by Ishihara plates 
(Ishihara, 1998). The adults varied in age from 21 to 37 years (mean 25.7 years). 
3.2.1.2 Apparatus 
The experiment took place m a darkened room. The baboons were tested in an 
experimental enclosure (60x50x72 em) facing an analogue joystick, a metal touch pad, 
and a 14 inch colour monitor driven by a Pentium 4 personal computer. On the front of 
the enclosure were a view-port, a hand-port, and a food dispenser delivering banana-
flavoured food pellets into the enclosure. Manipulation of the joystick induced 
isomorphic displacements of a cursor on the monitor. The monkey viewed the screen 
through a viewing-port, maintaining the eye/screen distance at approximately 49 em. For 
the human participants, the same monitor and joystick were placed on a table so that 
viewing distance remained approximately equal to 49 em. Control and randomisation of 
conditions were achieved through purpose-made programs written in E-Prime V 1.0 
(Psychology Software Tools, Inc). 
Reliable, consistent representation of highly specific colour samples (see stimuli) requires 
that a computer screen be precisely and reliably calibrated. This calibration process must 
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be carried out repeatedly and always if the computer monitor has been switched off or 
exposed to daylight. The monitor should also be switched on for 45 minutes prior to 
calibration. The custom written software was used in conjunction with a Minolta CS 100 
colour gun camera. The customised software measures the white point for luminosity and 
colour along its variant intensities of red, green and blue allowing for the required gamma 
correction, for which each monitor has its own characteristics. The relationship between 
gamma and any presented colour is a non-linear one; in other words there would be a 
discrepancy between the actual value and the intended one. Calibration compensates for 
this non-linearity, the underlying formula thus matches actual image to desired image as 
presented via the computer's video card. The monitors used in this research were always 
calibrated prior to testing and also calibrated intermittently during the testing process to 
ensure reliability of presentation. The monitors were running Windows 98 and had a 
14inch-monitor screen. The PCs were Pentium class processors with integrated graphics 
cards set to 32 bit colour, 'true colour mode', which ensured sufficient spectral resolution 
to guarantee reliable repeated presentation of specific colours. 
3.2.1.3 Stimuli 
The stimuli used in the program were derived from Munsell colours (Munsell, 1905). The 
stimuli are standardized so that adjacent stimulus pairs are perceptually equidistant by 
comparison to the distance between pairs of stimuli on the grey scale. Each Munsell 
stimulus is identified by a hue followed by two numbers divided by a slash mark. The 
first number (increases in steps of 1) indicates the sample's lightness (higher number 
means lighter), the second (increases in steps of 2) indicates saturation (higher number 
means more coloured). In this experiment, Munsell stimuli were represented on a 
computer screen (same one used for both participants groups) with the help of computer 
programs that produced colour patches from the Munsell coordinates. The computer was 
subsequently calibrated so as to verify that the colour presentation on screen matched the 
colour coordinates, and the correct coordinates on the computer (see apparatus for 
calibration details). 
All colours in the present studies kept brightness (level 5) and saturation (level 6) 
constant. Twelve colours were chosen to be linearly spaced (with 2.5 Munsell hue units 
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between each adjacent colour), going from 2.5G to lOB. Colour stimuli subtended 6.4 by 
6.4 degrees visual angle. Those colours were chosen on the basis of a boundary found 
around 495 nm for spectral stimuli and close to 7.5BG when using the Munsell system 
(Davidoff et al., 1999). Contrary to some criticism (e.g., Ratner,1989), the Munsell 
preference ratings have been noted as carefully calibrated standard stimuli of which the 
range and foci of colour terms have been compared across a wide variety of cultures 
(Berlin, Kay & Merrifield, 1991; MacLaury, 1991, 1992). Nevertheless, a number of 
other colour systems have since been introduced which have attempted to address some 
problems of Munsell stimuli presentation e.g., controlled under Illuminant C lighting and 
presented against a grey background (Derefelt, 1991 ), but comparisons of different 
systems to the Munsell system have found them to be comparable (Sturges & Whitfield, 
1995). Additionally since 1931 the C*I*E* (Commission Intemationale de l'Eclairage) 
has produced specifications for a standard observer, under specified illuminant 
conditions, which allow translation of the position in the colour space of any stimulus 
from one system into another. 'Standard Observer' data (taken as the adjusted mean for a 
number of human observers) represents perceptual differences between two colours on 
three dimensions (hue, lightness and saturation) as co-ordinates three dimensions (L *, u*, 
v*) of Euclidean space. Thus, the exact position of a stimulus from one system can be 
compared to that for one from another system, in the same standardized colour space. 
Because of this widely acclaimed specification for a standard observer in psychology, 
Munsell glosses that have been used in these studies were also plotted in Euclidean space 
and translated into Y,x andy values in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 Munsell stimuli plotted in CIE L*u*v* space. 
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3.2.1.4 Procedure 
In each trial, the baboons placed one hand on the touch pad that produced a .5° circular 
green cursor along with a white .5°x.5° square-shaped stimulus on the screen, located 
1.5° above or below the cursor. Baboons had to manipulate the joystick in order to place 
the green dot on the white square so as to initiate the MTS procedure; then a square-
shaped sample stimulus appeared with 4.5° of lateral eccentricity on the right or the left 
of the screen. The sample stimulus was displayed for 500 ms and immediately replaced 
by a display comprising a cursor and two patches of colour for comparison with the 
preceding sample. In balanced order, one colour square appeared on the top, and the other 
on the bottom half of the screen. In response to the display, baboons had to point with the 
cursor to the comparison stimulus matching the sample. There was no time limit for 
responding. Response choices and response times were recorded. Baboons sometimes 
received a food pellet inside the enclosure, in accordance with the prevailing 
reinforcement contingencies. 
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The training procedure used only 2.50 and 1 OB stimuli as sample and comparison 
stimuli. Training sessions were composed of 96 randomly ordered and differentially 
reinforced identity matching trials, resulting from a completely balanced stimulus identity 
by stimulus position design. Participants from both species were required to reach a 
criterion level of 80% correct in training trials before being tested. Verbal instructions 
were given for humans, but they had to discover the matching rule by themselves. 
Experimental test sessions were composed of identity (baseline) and similarity (probe) 
matching-to-sample trials. In the identity trials, the target was identical to one of the 
comparison stimuli. In the similarity matching trials, the target was randomly chosen 
from the 10 intermediate colours, going from 50 to 7.5B. For all trials, the colour-
comparison stimuli were 2.50 and 1 OB. All possible combinations of stimulus position 
were given equally often in a random order. The 2 stimuli used on identity matching trials 
were each shown 15 times, and the 10 stimuli used on similarity matching trials were 
each shown once, for each combination of sample and comparison stimulus position, 
resulting in a total of 160 trials per session. The proportion of identity and similarity 
matching trials (3:1) was chosen so as to maintain attention during the test. Ten test 
sessions were required for each participant and species. Baboons received a food pellet 
whenever a correct matching response was given in baseline trials. Independently of 
response, probe trials were randomly reinforced at a 80% rate. In cases of an incorrect 
baseline response, and for the remaining 20% of the probe trials, baboons received a 3-
sec time-out period with a black screen. The unique procedural differences for humans 
were that they were allowed breaks on every occasion after completion of the first three 
test sessions and were not reinforced during this test. 
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3.2.2 Results 
Training performance varied from one baboon to the next. The sessions needed for the 
MTS rule to be learned varied between 4 and 26, but overall an average of 10 sessions 
was needed for baboons to reach criterion. One session sufficed for all human 
participants to learn the rule. 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the percentage of"green" responses for probe trials for each species. 
There are clearly different response profiles in baboons and humans across the 10 probe 
stimulus types, with the human profile being curved above the negative diagonal on the 
left (green) side and below the negative diagonal on the right (blue) side. Although 
generally more linear, the baboon graph shows the opposite pattern of curvature. 
Figure 3.2 Responses choices (% of "green" responses) and standard errors for human and baboon 
participants. 
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The frequency of selection of the extreme green colour (i.e., 2.5G) was considered as the 
dependent variable in a species (human, baboon) by probe sample colour (1 0 possible 
colours from 5G to 7.5B) ANOV A. Findings indicated a significant main effect of probe 
colour, F(9,126) = 177.9, p < .001, as well as a significant probe colour by species 
interaction F(9,126) = 34.5, p< .001. Tukey honestly significant difference post-hoc tests 
(Tukey HSD, p < .05) were computed to understand this interaction. When the left side of 
the curve is considered, corresponding to colours in the green range, Tukey tests revealed 
a reliably greater number of"green" responses in humans than baboons for the 5G, 7.5G, 
1 OG and 2.5BG colour patches. When the blue colours of the right side of the curve are 
considered, data indicated a reliably lower number of "green" responses for humans than 
baboons, for the 7.5BG, lOBG, 2.5B, 5B and 7.5B colours. There was by contrast no 
reliable difference for the 5BG colour. 
The analysis of scores for probe trials was completed by an analysis of response times. 
Because there was no correct response in probe trials, all the trials were retained for the 
analysis, and log transformed, before being submitted to a species (human, baboon) by 
sample colour (10 colours) two-way ANOV A. The main effect of species emerged as 
significant, F(1,14) = 2.79, p < .03, humans being faster on average than baboons. The 
main effect of sample colour was also significant, F(9,126) = 17.52, p < .001, 
intermediate colours giving rise to longer response times than more extreme colours in 
the continuum. More importantly, there was a significant sample colour by species 
interaction which is illustrated in Figure 3.3, F(9,126) = 8.2, p < .001. Tukey HSD tests 
showed faster responses times in humans than baboons for 5G, 7.5G, lOG, lOBG, 2.5B, 
5B, 7.5B. Note that there was no difference between humans and baboons for 2.5BG, 
5BG and 7 .5BG. 
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Figure 3.3 Observed latency data and standard errors for human and baboon 
participants. 
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Modelling green responses 
A central question for this research is whether the participants' categorisation behaviour 
can be characterized by a "boundary" between subsets of the probe stimuli. If evidence 
for such boundaries is found, then an ancillary question is whether human and baboon 
participants use them in a similar way. Fortunately, categorization behaviour has, for 
many years, been analysed using formal models, which postulate the existence of such 
boundaries. These models are referred to as decision boundary (DB) models (Ashby, 
1992) and they have proved extremely successful in accurately capturing human 
performance on a range of category learning tasks (Maddox & Ashby, 1993 ). 
We constructed a hierarchy of simple DB models, which could be fit to the probe trial 
responses made by each participant. The models begin by assuming that the probe trial 
stimuli each create a perceptual response. We can denote this by Pi for the ith probe 
stimulus (where i ranges from 1 to 10 for the ten probe stimuli from the most green to the 
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most blue along the Munsell hue continuum). The perceptual response, pi, across 
repeated presentations of the same probe stimulus, is assumed to vary due to perceptual 
noise. As such, it is assumed to be drawn from a random normal distribution with a mean 
Xi and variance ap/. In the simplest DB model, which can be applied to the current data, 
it is assumed that the values of the means (x1 - x10) are equally spaced, in keeping with 
the equal spacing, in Munsell hue terms, of the probe stimuli. In addition, we can 
arbitrarily set the mean values ofx1 to x10 to be 1 to 10, as the values are scaled by other 
(noise) parameters in the model. Furthermore, the variance ofthe noise is assumed to be 
independent of the mean, and to be the same for each probe stimulus. It can therefore be 
represented by a single parameter: ap 2. 
The DB model then proposes that the participant sets a simple linear boundary at a 
particular value somewhere along the range of perceptual response values created by the 
probe stimuli. The perceptual response value corresponding to this boundary is denoted 
by k. For each probe trial, if the resulting perceptual response is greater than the value of 
the boundary, then the participant responds with the same behavioural response as was 
learned for the blue training stimulus: if the perceptual response is less than the value of 
the boundary then the participant emits the same behavioural response as was learned for 
the green training stimulus. The same boundary is employed for all probe stimuli but its 
position varies according to a zero-mean Gaussian noise term, ab2. This noise can be 
collapsed together with the perceptual noise term (a/) into a single overall noise variance 
parameter, cl. It is straightforward to estimate the probability of green responses 
produced for each probe stimulus by using the properties of the normal distribution. The 
probability of a green response for probe stimulus i, P( Gli), is given by, 
P(Gii) = <P([k- xi]/ a) ... (1) 
where <P(z) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. To 
fit this model to each participant's data we used an iterative fitting routine to obtain 
maximum likelihood estimates of the two parameters ( a2 and k). The two-parameter 
model, given by equation (1 ), was fit to the probability of green responses made for each 
of the 10 types of probe stimulus. 
In fact, we began the modelling with a more elaborate 4-parameter version of the above 
model. In this model, we assumed that participants adopted two boundaries, one closer to 
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the perceptual response elicited to the green training stimulus (at perceptual response 
value, kG), and one closer to the blue training stimulus (at perceptual response value, ks). 
If a probe stimulus produces a perceptual response below kG then the behavioural 
response produced is the same as that given to the green training stimulus; if the 
perceptual response is above ks then the behavioural response produced is the same as 
that given to the blue training stimulus; a guess is produced if the perceptual response lies 
at or between the two boundaries. On the guessing trials, the probability of emitting the 
same behavioural response as that given to the green training stimulus is given by a 
parameter, g (0 ~ g ~ 1); the probability of emitting the same behavioural response as that 
given to the blue training stimulus is (1 -g). Thus, the four-parameter model can be 
written formally as, 
P(Gii) = (1 - g)*ct>([kG- xi]! a)+ g* ct>([ks- xi]/ a) ... (2) 
The characteristic curve shape produced by the 2-parameter, single decision boundary 
model resembles the mean performance of the human participants in Figure 4 (convex 
then concave, from left to right). By contrast, the curve shape produced by the 4-
parameter, double decision boundary model resembles the mean performance of the 
baboons in Figure 4 (concave then convex, from right to left). It was therefore anticipated 
that the 2-parameter model would better be able to account for the human performance 
whereas the 4-parameter, double boundary model would better be able to account for the 
baboon performance. 
A likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic was computed in order to compare the fits of the two 
models (for a review of this standard approach to modelling response probabilities and 
comparing model fits, see Maddox & Ashby, 1993; Wickens, 1982). The 2-parameter 
model was considered the better fitting model when the LR test statistic was non-
significant, i.e. when its value did not exceed the 5% value of the chi-squared distribution 
(with degrees of freedom (df) equal to the difference in numbers of parameters between 
the two models; df = 2 in this case). As a final test of fit, the better fitting model (with 
either two or four parameters) was then compared with a perfect saturated model. This 
saturated model used ten parameters (which were the observed probabilities of "green" 
responses for each of the ten probe stimulus types). Of course, such a model is (trivially) 
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able to predict the observed probabilities perfectly. Another LR test statistic is computed 
to compare the fit of the two (or four) parameter model with this perfect model. If this LR 
test statistic is non-significant (below the 5% value of the chi-squared distribution, with 
df = 6 or df = 8 as appropriate) then the simpler model is not significantly worse than the 
perfect model, and can be deemed a well-fitting model. 
The model parameters needed to be constrained to certain ranges in order to compare the 
two models appropriately. First, one can see from equations 1 and 2 above, that if g 
approaches 0 or 1 then the 4-parameter model reduces to the 2-parameter model. The 
value of g was therefore restricted to lie in the range 0.2 to 0.8. Second, if the noise 
parameter becomes very large under either model the curve shape tends towards linearity 
and so can produce a reasonable fit to either of the curve shapes illustrated in Table 3.1 
Given the range of values used to code the stimulus parameters (1-1 0), it was decided to 
restrict the noise variance parameter, d, to lie between 0 and 10 (most of the good fits 
were achieved with values between 1 and 3; see Table 3.1 ). Finally, the positions of the 
boundaries were also restricted: for the 2-parameter model the single boundary (k) was 
constrained to lie somewhere between the perceptual values corresponding to the two 
training stimuli (0 and 11 in the stimulus space used in the modelling). For the 4-
parameter models the green boundary (kG) was constrained to lie between the value of the 
green training stimulus (0) and the midpoint of the stimuli used (5.5); the blue boundary 
(ks) was constrained to lie between the midpoint (5.5) and the value of the blue training 
stimulus (11). 
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Table 3.1 Best-fitting models and parameter values for individual human and baboon participants. 
*The p-value given in parentheses is that associated with the likelihood ratio (LR) test comparing the 2-
and 4- parameter models (p>0.05 means that the 2-parameter model is preferred); 
**This LR statistic compares the better-fitting model with the perfect saturated model. 
Participant Better-fitting k kB kG g rl LR** df p* 
model (2 or 4 
parameters)* 
Human#1 2 (0.28) 4.61 - - - 2.30 21.3 8 0.0064 
Human#2 2 (0.95) 5.01 - - - 0.74 3.84 8 0.87 
Human#3 2 (1.00) 5.34 - - - 4.27 6.34 8 0.61 
Human#4 2 (0.08) 5.32 - - - 1.32 9.09 8 0.33 
Human#5 2 (1.00) 4.49 - - - 1.56 21.0 8 0.0071 
Human#6 2 (0.45) 5.73 - - - 1.38 6.00 8 0.65 
Human#7 2 (0.67) 6.05 - - - 2.28 21.95 8 0.0050 
Human#8 2 (0.08) 4.69 - - - 1.59 20.89 8 0.0074 
Baboon #1 4 (0.01) - 1.21 9.64 0.40 0.74 1.60 6 0.95 
Baboon #2 4 (0.002) - 3.20 9.37 0.28 10.00 1.96 6 0.92 
Baboon #3 4 (0.02) - 2.09 8.14 0.71 3.01 6.79 6 0.34 
Baboon #4 4 (<10-14) - 1.20 10.41 0.51 3.13 10.11 6 0.12 
Baboon#5 4 (<10_1:z) - 1.52 10.02 0.39 2.89 8.60 6 0.20 
Baboon#6 4 (0.014) - 2.31 8.80 0.41 1.56 5.82 6 0.44 
Baboon #7 4 (<10-14) - 0.94 9.41 0.47 2.13 3.38 6 0.76 
Baboon#8 4 (0.011) - 2.50 10.57 0.32 2.99 2.90 6 0.82 
Table 3.1 shows the model-fitting results for each baboon and human participant. Clearly, 
the 2-parameter model better fit the human data than the 4-parameter model (8 out of 8 
humans); the 4-parameter model, by contrast, better fit the baboons, than the 2-parameter 
model (8 out of8 baboons). For 4 of the human participants even the saturated model was 
not a better fit than the 2-parameter model. The baboon data, with the exception of 
baboon #2, were extremely well fit by the 4-parameter modeL For baboon 2, the best-
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fitting noise parameter was the maximum allowed (1 0.0), a much higher value than in 
any of the other model fits. As already noted, such a high noise value tends to remove the 
curvature from the curve produced under the model, and so allows the model to fit the 
data artefactually. However, the fit of the 2-parameter model was significantly worse than 
that of the 4-parameter model, and the best-fitting 2-parameter model also was obtained 
with the maximum noise parameter of 10.0. For this participant, it seems that neither 
model truly captured the data. For the remaining 7 baboons the fit was excellent; in all 
cases the fit of the 4-parameter model was not significantly inferior to that of the 
saturated model (which captures the data exactly). For the human participants, the single 
boundary was close to the mid-point of the probe stimuli used (range 4.49-6.05 c.f. the 
midpoint of 5.5). 
3 .2.3 Discussion 
Experiment 1 shows that monkeys and humans perform differently on a matching-to-
sample task. This is perceived in their category functions both for accuracy and latencies. 
Whereas humans show categorization effects for green responses and latencies at test, 
baboons show a somewhat gradual decline in their green-response scores, invoking 
matching behaviour, and a flatter latency function showing little difference in reaction to 
various foils on the blue-green continuum. However, behaviour for the middle point of 
the continuum did coincide; monkeys and humans showed similar accuracy and latency 
scores for colour 5BG. To further ascertain whether monkeys and humans were truly 
behaving differently these results were statistically modelled. In the modelling of green 
responses it was found that humans showed evidence of processing colours according to 
one boundary located in the middle of the continuum whereas baboons showed that they 
were processing colour according to two boundaries located close to the training foils, 
indicative of matching-to-endpoint behaviour. The latter is not characteristic of 
categorical perception and a possible explanation of similar behaviour is therefore 
excluded. It was therefore concluded that human and non-human primates show very 
different behaviour on a task requiring matching-to-sample of colours, with only humans 
showing evidence of Categorical Perception. 
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3.3 Experiment 2: Colour discrimination and categorization in 2 alternative-
forced-choices 
Experiment 2 (Fagot et al, 2006) casts doubt on whether monkeys show Categorical 
Perception as humans do for the blue-green part of the continuum. The results of the 
matching-to-sample task were interpreted as evidence against the proposal that colour 
categories are innate (Bomstein, Kessen & Weiskopf, 1976) and for the proposal that 
they are linguistic in origin (Davidoff, Davies & Roberson, 1999; Roberson, et al., 2005). 
However, similarity matching tasks are inherently open to subject interpretation 
(Roberson et al 1999). It could be that the human would just as easily mimic the monkey 
behavior if instructed to match only if the similarity was very close. We therefore decided 
to adopt a task where both humans and monkeys have to simply decide which of two 
stimuli is the same as the one previously presented. The two alternative-forced-choice 
task will allow category effects to be demonstrated because in this task it is harder to 
distinguish between a perceptually equidistant within-category foil than a perceptually 
equidistant cross-category foil (Hamad, 1987). 
In changing the task from similarity matching-to-sample from Experiment 1 (Fagot et al., 
2006) to one of an identity match, one opens the possibility that some colours might be 
inherently easier to discriminate than others due to the visual neurophysiology. For 
example, pigeons categorize colours differently from humans and these categories have 
been argued to be based on the avian wavelength discrimination functions (Wright & 
Cumming, 1971). Thus, we need to show that there is no enhanced discrimination at the 
colour boundary within our chosen colour range. It is known that baboons have the same 
retinal colour vision as humans (Adams, Bryan & Jones, 1968) but in Experiment 2a, we 
also reassured ourselves that baboons and humans show the same discrimination 
functions for the specific colour range that will be used in Experiment 2b (identity 
matching-to-sample or 2 alternative-forced-choice). 
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3 .3 .1 Experiment 2a: Discrimination data 
There is general agreement on the boundary position between green and blue, at least in 
Western populations. It is around 495 nm for spectral stimuli and close to 7.5BG when 
using the Munsell system (Roberson, Davies & Davidoff, 2000). In this human/baboon 
experiment, we examined discrimination thresholds in the range of Munsell stimuli that 
were used in Experiment 1 (Fagot et al, 2006) and that crossed the human green/blue 
boundary. 
3.3.1.1 Method 
i. Participants 
They were two Guinea baboons (Papio Papio) who lived at the CNRS (Marseille) and 
two young human female adults. The baboons had already taken part in many different 
experiments using the matching-to-sample procedure and joystick computerized systems 
(e.g. Experiment 1 ). 
ii. Apparatus and Stimuli 
The apparatus and stimuli were identical to Experiment 1. 
iii. Procedure 
Discrimination thresholds were measured with an adaptive staircase procedure (Levitt, 
1971) leading to a rapid convergence near the asymptotic threshold level. Thresholds 
were obtained in separate blocks for the following reference (sample) stimuli: 7.5G-10G-
2.5BG-5BG-7.5BG-10BG-2.5B-5B, avoiding the training stimuli used in Experiment 1 
(Fagot et al (2006)). The same sample stimulus was systematically employed in all trials 
of a single session. All stimuli were of constant brightness (Value 5), saturation (Chroma 
6) and of6.4° by 6.4° visual angle. 
Each trial started with the display of a .5° circular green cursor along with a white .5°X.5° 
square-shaped stimulus, located 1.5° above or below the cursor. In response to this 
display, the participant had to place the green dot on the white square so as to initiate the 
trial. Once done, the sample stimulus was displayed at random on the left or right of the 
80 
screen for 500 msec and was immediately followed by a pair of stimuli arranged 
vertically on the mid-line of the screen. One of the stimuli was identical to the sample. 
The task was to point with the cursor to the stimulus matching the sample. Baboons 
received a short inter-trial interval (ITI) of 1 second and a food pellet inside the enclosure 
in case of correct response. When their response choices were erroneous, responses were 
followed by a three second timeout during which the screen remained black. For humans, 
the feedback consisted of a short ITI for a correct response, and a three second timeout 
for an incorrect choice. 
The session started with trials having a high probability of positive response. In these 
early trials, the foil was two Munsell steps different from the sample. When a run of three 
positive responses was obtained, the next trial reduced the match/foil colour difference by 
1/20th of a Munsell step. When a single negative response was obtained, the colour 
difference was increased by 1120th of a Munsell step. The procedure continued until 35 
reversals (defined as either a colour difference increment or colour difference decrement) 
were obtained; this compares favorably to most other usage of the staircase procedure 
(Garcia-Perez, 1998). Humans received three series of test sessions with each ofthe eight 
possible sample colours. Baboons received 6 series with each sample colour. The order of 
colour testing within a series was randomized. For baboons, the test sessions lasted 
approximately from 200 to 350 trials. Humans often reached the asymptotic 
discrimination level more quickly than baboons, and needed from 150 to 200 trials to 
perform a session. The total testing time was thus of approximately 12,000 trials for each 
baboon and 4,800 for humans. 
3.3 .1.2 Results 
The increment thresholds were defined, for each sample colour, as the minimal average 
colour difference obtained in any run of 8 consecutive reversals in any session (Garcia-
Perez, 1998). In the context of very low thresholds for both species, there was generally 
superior performance from the baboons (see Figure 3.4). Thus, on average for the 8 
sample colours, discrimination thresholds for the two baboons were of .29 (baboon 2) and 
.34 (baboon 1) Munsell steps. It was of .48 Munsell steps for each of the two human 
participants. Correlations between the thresholds were extremely high and significant 
81 
within species (humans: r = .99; baboons: r = .93) and between individuals from the two 
species (range of rs: .81-.89). In addition, each baboon indicated a lower discrimination 
threshold than the humans (two-tailed pair t-tests, all ps < .02). Regardless of these 
similarities and differences, it is clear from Figure 3.4 that there is no evidence for 
superior sensitivity at the category boundary in the region of7.5BG. 
Figure 3.4 Discrimination thresholds obtained in humans (dash lines) and baboons (continuous lines) for 8 
equally spaced Munsell colours in the green-blue range. 
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3.3 .1.3 Discussion 
Experiment 2a allowed two conclusions. First, in spite of lower discriminations 
thresholds in baboons than in humans, baboons show the same pattern of results as 
humans with similar threshold variations along the colour continuum. Second, there is no 
evidence for either human or baboon for an enhanced sensitivity at the known human 
green/blue colour boundary (i.e., 5BG-7.5BG). Therefore it seems safe to conclude that 
any categorical similarity in colour appearance can not derive from the differential 
sensitivity at the boundary. However, whether Categorical Perception of the blue-green 
continuum is unique to humans remains to be demonstrated. This will be investigated in 
Experiment 2b. 
3.3.2 Experiment 2b: Establishing a cross-category advantage 
Experiment 2b assessed Categorical Perception as defined by Hamad (1987). After 
having re-confirmed the category boundary of humans with our testing system, cross- and 
within-category trials were presented to both humans and baboons in a sequential identity 
matching task. There have been no other colour studies with monkeys that have used the 
2AFC recognition procedure but Sandell, Gross & Bomstein (1979) reported Categorical 
Perception for macaques from a generalization paradigm that followed habituation to 
Munsell stimuli. The task involved training Monkeys to respond in the presence of one 
chromatic stimulus and were tested, in extinction, for generalization to others. Sandell, 
Gross & Bomstein (1979) found that the macaques were more likely to generalize within 
a category than across a category boundary. They therefore claimed that colour categories 
were to be found innately within the primate visual system. However, there are some 
concerns about the stimuli used in this study. 
The colours that were mounted on a rotating disk were illuminated at three different 
luminance levels. Although this is worrying, as luminance levels may affect the viewed 
colour sample, the most worrying were the actual stimuli that were chosen to be used at 
test. The distances between the colour samples in 3 of the 4 experiments seemed to 
predict outcome; the Munsell-metric-distance was always smaller between the target and 
foils that were of the same category and the distance was always larger between the target 
and foils crossing a category boundary (ascertained by human colour naming). The 
83 
Munsell-metric-distance values are illustrated in table 3.2. As indicated by the Munsell 
distances, the within-category pairs always, without exception, span a smaller distance 
than the between-category pairs. In other words, the within-category colours are always 
easier to recognize at extinction because they are closer in Munsell distance to the target 
the monkeys have been trained at recognizing. Thus, it is no surprise that in extinction, 
the monkeys responded at similar and high levels to stimuli that fell in the same basic 
human hue category as the training stimulus and at similar and much lower levels to 
stimuli that fell in a different human hue category from the training stimulus. The 
conclusion that macaques and humans categorize the spectrum in a similar fashion is 
therefore not conclusive and rather shows that macaques can learn to match colours to a 
closely related target in a perceptual fashion based on samples that are most similar to the 
target rather than carry out a generalization task categorically. 
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Table 3.2 Munsell-metric-distance for experiment 1,2, and 3 between the target and foils for within- and 
between-category pairs of Sandell, Gross & Bomstein's (1979) study. In the experiments, monkeys were 
habituated to a target and made to generalize to a foil at test. Foils in experiment 1 and 2 were all equal in 
Saturation and Brightness (Munsell values 6 and 8 for experiment 1 and values 7 and 10 for experiment 2). 
Foils in experiment 3 and 4 varied in Saturation. There were three different trials in experiment 1 
comprising of green targets, experiment 2 contained a green target as well, and experiment three and four 
had a red and yellow target respectively. 
Experiment Luminant Human Munsell Munsell Human Category Munsell 
1 
1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
wavelength colour name designation designation colour name pair distance 
(nm) (target) (target) (foil)* (foil) (with target) (steps from 
target) 
497 green 2.5BG 6/8 5G green within 3 
7.5G green within 2 
2.5B blue between 4 
5PB blue between 9 
505 green 7.5G 6/8 5G green within 1 
2.5BG green within 2 
2.5B blue between 6 
5PB blue between 11 
513 green 5G 6/8 7.5G green within 1 
2.5BG green within 3 
2.5B blue between 7 
5PB blue between 8 
552 green lOGY 7/10 2.5R yellow between 11 
2.5Y yellow between 7 
5GY green within 2 
2.5G green within I 
609 red 5R 6/10 2.5R 5/10 red within 1 
2.5R 6/10 red within 1 
10YR 6/10 yellow between 6 
2.5Y 7/10 yellow between 7 
582 yellow lOYR 6/10 2.5R 6110 red between 7 
5R 6/10 red between 7 
2.5Y 7/10 yellow within 6 
7.5GY 6/10 green between 7 
It was therefore decided that an experiment would be carried out to verify whether 
monkeys have colour categories, with the prediction that although monkeys and humans 
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share the same biological functioning, they do not perceive colour categorically as has 
been suggested by Sandell, Gross & Bomstein (1979). 
3.3.2.1 Method 
i. Participants 
They were 5 male and 2 female adult Guinea baboons (Papio Papio) who lived in three 
social groups at the CNRS, Marseille. This group included the two subjects tested in 
Experiment 3a and was the same as tested 22 months previously in Experiment 1 (Fagot 
et al., 2006), with the exception of one baboon that was unavailable for testing. Eight 
young French adults also served as subjects for payment. They all had normal colour 
vision (Ishihara, 1998). 
ii. Stimuli 
In a preliminary testing, the green/blue category boundaries of 10 different French 
participants were determined in a naming task from 12 linearly spaced Munsell colours 
going from 2.5G to lOB. This boundary was established between 5BG and 7.5 BG, as 
found with English speakers (Roberson et al., 2000). Consequently, we used 8 stimuli in 
Experiment 2b (i.e., 5G, lOG, 2.5BG, 5BG, 7.5BG, 10BG, 2.5B, 7.5B) selected to have 
the boundary approximately in the centre of the continuum. 
iii. Procedure 
Each trial began with a fixation procedure identical to Experiment 1. Once the cursor has 
been placed on the fixation point, a square-shaped sample stimulus appeared with 4.5° of 
lateral eccentricity on the right or left of the screen. This stimulus was displayed for 500 
ms and immediately replaced by a display comprising a cursor and two patches of colour 
for comparison with the preceding sample. In balanced order, one colour square appeared 
on the top and the other on the bottom half of the screen. During the response period, 
participants had to point with the cursor to the comparison stimulus matching the sample. 
There was no time limit for responding. Response choices and response times were 
recorded. Reinforcement contingencies were as in Experiment 1. 
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The testing consisted of three sessions of 64 randomly ordered trials each per participant, 
using the stimulus pairs 5G-1 OG and 2.5B-7 .5B for within-category comparisons, and the 
stimulus pairs 2.5BG-7 .5BG and 5BG-1 OBG for cross-category comparisons. All stimuli 
were used equally often as sample and comparison and their location on the screen was 
completely balanced. Prior to testing, the participants from the two species received 16 
randomly ordered and differentially reinforced training trials using two colours (purple 
and grey) different from the test colours. These trials were repeated until subjects reached 
a criterion level of 80% correct. 
3.3.2.2 Results 
Trials associated with latencies less than 150 ms or greater than 4 sec (less than 3% of the 
total number of trials) were omitted from statistical analyses because they likely reflect 
anticipation or inattention. Baboons responded in 1167 ms on average, humans were 
faster with an average response time of 772 ms. Response times were log transformed 
prior to statistical analyses. Application of species (baboons, humans) by category 
(within, between) ANOVA on transformed response time revealed a significant effect of 
species, F(1,13) = 18.75, p < .001, and a significant species by category interaction, 
F(1,13) = 63.95, p < .001. Analysis of this interaction with a Tukey HSD test indicated 
that response times were reliably shorter for humans in cross- compared to within-
category trials (mean of log RT for cross = 6.50, mean for within = 6.59, p< .05). 
Baboons showed an opposite effect corresponding to a reliable within-category advantage 
(mean log RT for within= 6.86 ms, mean cross= 7.0; p < .05). 
Accuracy scores were also submitted to an ANOVA using the species (baboons, humans) 
as between-subject factor and the category (within, cross) as within-subject factor. 
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Figure 3.5 Percentage of correct responses for the two species, and for cross- and within-category pairs. 
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As confirmed in figure 3.5, there was a significant effect of species, F(l,13) = 38.5, p < 
.001, corresponding to greater performance on average for humans (90.8% correct) than 
for baboons (70.3%). The other reliable effect was the species by category interaction, 
F(1,13) = 18.55, p < .001, showing a numerically greater performance for cross- (93.7% 
correct) compared to within-category trials (88%), but ceiling effects prevented this 
difference reaching significance (Tukey HSD, p > .05). Baboons showed the opposite 
effect. For baboons, performance was greater for within- (75.56% correct on average) 
than for between-category trials (65.1% correct; Tukey HSD, p < .05, see figure 2). In 
brief, the analyses of accuracy converge on the pattern of performance for the latency 
data with no indication of a speed-accuracy tradeoff. 
Both latency and accuracy analyses revealed an initially surpnsmg within-category 
advantage only for baboons. There would be no a priori reason why baboons should 
show a within-category advantage unless it was a consequence of the previous training in 
Experiment 1 (Fagot et al, 2006). To examine the within-category advantage for baboons, 
we tested recognition performance for the 8 individual sample colours to verify if 
matching performance was uniform throughout the continuum. A one-way ANOV A on 
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latencies revealed a reliable effect of sample stimulus, F(7,55) = 4.69, p < .001. 
Significant differences only emerged from pair-wise comparisons involving the two 
endpoints of the continuum (i.e., 5G and 7.5B). A similar analysis on accuracy also 
revealed a significant effect of sample colour, F(7,55) = 4.92, p < .001. Tukey HSD post 
hoc paired-comparisons between all colours again revealed that only contrasts involving 
the endpoints (5G and 7.5B) gave significant differences (p < .05). Not surprisingly a 
similar analysis on the human data gave different effects. For accuracy, there was an 
overall difference between colours, F(7,63) = 2.45, p =.029, but no post-hoc Tukey tests 
were significant. The comparisons less than p < .2 were all cross-category not within-
category pairings. For latencies, there were no reliable effects of sample colour, F(7,63) = 
1,53, p = .18. 
3.3.2.3 Discussion 
The results for accuracy and latencies repeated the cross-category advantage for humans 
found in previous studies (Davidoff, Davies & Roberson, 1999; Roberson & Davidoff, 
2000). A quite different result was shown for baboons, who surprisingly gave a within-
category advantage in the same task. However, further analyses showed that this within-
category advantage for baboons was restricted to stimulus pairs involving either endpoint 
of the continuum of test stimuli. The most likely explanation for the superior performance 
for the endpoints is that our baboons had simply remembered these colours from the 
previous and first experiment (Fagot et al., 2006). That conclusion is only credible 
because baboons have prodigious visual memories (Fagot & Cook, 2006) allowing them 
to retain thousands of visual stimuli over extended periods (in the range of a year, Fagot 
& Cook, 2006). So it is quite reasonable that they were able to remember two highly 
trained particular colours for 22 months. The training stimuli in Experiment 1 (Fagot et 
al., 2006) were 2.5G and 1 OB. Modeling the matching performance of these baboons 
showed that they were prepared to match only the 5G and 7 .5B stimuli to the training 
stimuli. In consequence, if the baboons were basing their recognition partly on their 
previous experience, then it would only be the endpoints for which we would expect 
superior performance, and this is precisely what has been found in our research. 
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3 .4 General Discussion of experiments 1 and 2 
Human and non-human primates show different results when asked to categorize colour; 
humans categorize showing effects of Categorical Perception and baboons do not 
categorize in a similar fashion, rather they match to endpoints as a result of learning. 
Thus, there is no indication of colour categories for non-human primates and suggests 
language has a role in the formation of colour categories. This view was first suggested in 
Experiment 2 and reinforced in experiments 2a and 2b. In Experiment 2a, we looked for a 
differential sensitivity between species at a colour category boundary but found no 
evidence for enhanced sensitivity in either species. This confirmed similar biological 
functioning and colour discrimination function as suggested by Bowmaker et al (1991). 
In Experiment 2b, only humans showed Categorical Perception for colours implying that 
it is only humans that see within-category colours as resembling each other more than 
equidistant cross-category colours. The results of Experiment 2b do not fit well with the 
view that colour categories derive from inborn discontinuities in colour discrimination 
functions (Bomstein, Kessen & Weiskopf, 197 6) and confirm that only humans have the 
capacity to show Categorical Perception. Thus, our data do fit the view that colour 
categories are instantiated through top-down influences and, in particular, from the colour 
terms in a speaker's language (Davidoff, Davies & Roberson, 1999; Roberson et al., 
2005). Recent computer simulations come to a similar conclusion because robots with 
human colour vision do not arrive at the same colour categories unless they communicate 
with each other (Steels & Belpaeme, 2005). 
The data also speak to the differential effects of training for the two species. It is clear 
that the baboons benefit in our recognition task from their previous experience. In 
Experiment 1 (Fagot et al, 2006), the baboons were initially trained to match two specific 
blue or green colours, after which they had the opportunity to match a range of 
intermediary colours to the training samples. Here we found that, even twenty-two 
months later, superior recognition was achieved for colours close to those two trained 
stimuli. However, the learning outcome for the monkeys was simply to reinforce the 
trained exemplars as they only gained advantage for colours that were very similar to the 
training stimuli. Such a restriction in similarity matching would make human broad 
colour categories difficult to achieve. It would rather appear that some form of labeling is 
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required to achieve the acquisition of new colour categories (see for example, Ozgen & 
Davies, 2002). For that reason, it could be that chimpanzees, unlike monkeys, are capable 
of demonstrating colour categories. Matsuzawa (1985) trained a chimpanzee (i.e., Ai) 
with extensive symbol training to associate symbols to human prototypical colours. The 
learning generalized to other colours and mimicked human colour categories though this 
did not appear clearly in another chimpanzee with only two years experience with colour 
symbols (Matsuno, Kawai & Matsuzawa, 2004). Thus, even the large number of trials 
required to establish categorization of multi-dimensional stimuli (Freedman et al., 2001) 
could be insufficient to produce Categorical Perception for colours if the species is 
incapable of symbol use. 
In conclusion, these set of experiments have made a novel contribution towards trying to 
establish Categorical Perception in animals by using a uni-dimensional set of stimuli 
(Munsell colours with measurable factors) in a set of simple testing procedures that adds 
value to the more extensively researched area of categorization found in speech sounds 
(May, moody & Stebbins, 1989; Ohlemiller et al, 1999). The experiments also tried to 
address some of the pitfalls of the only other study showing colour categories in monkeys 
(Sandell, Gross & Bomstein, 1979) and found that possibilities of colour Categorical 
Perception in animals are minimal, if any, and that the ease with which Categorical 
Perception manifests itself in humans is probably due to what separates human and non-
human primates, namely language. 
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4. Experiment 3: A cross-cultural comparison of colour categorization 
in matching-to-sample 
4.1 Introduction 
The second strand of the research studied Himba and English populations to ascertain 
whether language differences affect perception. The direct link between language and 
cognition has been proposed in several studies (e.g., Roberson et al., 2005a; Roberson, et 
al., 2002; Roberson et al., 2000) using similar or same cross-cultural contexts. More 
particularly, language-specific categorical effects have been found for the Himba, the 
Berinmo and the English using a range of procedures such as short-term and long-term 
recognition memory, similarity judgements, two-alternative forced-choice judgements, 
and paired-associate learning. In this experiment, a MTS procedure is used to be 
consistent with the Baboon-Human data, and to detail categorical findings further. 
Moreover, universal and cultural constraints have been identified in a grouping task 
across cultures (Roberson et al, 2005b) indicating some expectation that participants 
group (universal) and do so with some marked differences (relative). Consequentially, 
were a grouping measure also found to be a categorizing measure able to account for 
differences and similarities in categorical responses, it could be concluded from using an 
matching-to-sample task that the categorization process is perhaps not solely perceptual 
but also influenced by language. These results would be all the more compelling under 
the restraints of such a perceptual task that has also been used previously as a 
psychopysical measure of similarity (e.g., Sperling & Harwerth, 1971 ). 
Nevertheless, evidence of grouping variations can be found among the colours under 
scrutiny that are suggested to be largely determined by non-perceptual, arguably 
linguistic, influences (green-blue vs. grue, in Roberson et al, 2005b) and are also 
expected under the conditions at test. The English have two colour names, blue and 
green, and a category boundary between them; this is shown in their categorical function 
of previous research when comparing monkeys and humans. The Himba, however, only 
have one colour name, buru (Roberson et al., 2005a) for both blue and green and 
therefore will predictably not show the exact same categorical function. Using the 
identical matching-to-sample colour paradigm that has been used in comparative work 
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(see section 4), a quantitative difference between the Himba and the English is foreseen. 
The reason is that both cultures have acquired colour terms, and on this basis linguistic 
relativity would predict the use of those terms to categorize differently although using a 
universal grouping mechanism. So, having the terms increases the likelihood for marked 
differences. Thus category grouping on matching-to-sample tasks is predicted to be more 
pronounced for the English on the blue-green boundary and for the Himba on the 
dumbu!buru boundary. This prediction, if true, will also be visible by looking at the 
category functions, as typical categorization curves have been identified (e.g., Maddox 
and Ashby, 1993). Those categorical functions show steepness around category 
boundaries with a sharp drop in positive responding. 
In sum, predictions are that the Himba will perform with more certainty in grouping and 
their response function will look steeper when using colour terms specific to their 
language. In comparison, their responses to the blue-green boundary should show a 
flatter, less determined categorical function. The English will perform with the reversed 
pattern, more determined in grouping in the green/blue boundary matching-to-sample 
task. This may lead to a perceived double dissociation in which differences in acquired 
linguistic terms sets English and Himba performance apart, not in terms of accuracy but 
in terms of conceptual grouping advantages. 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
Different participants took part on the different matching-to-sample tests. For the Blue-
green Set there were 12 English (4 men and 8 women, varying in age from 18 to 30 years, 
with a mean age of21.5 years) and 12 Himba (eight woman and four men aged from 18 
to 40 years) participants in this experiment. For the Dumbu-buru Set there were 12 
English (5 men and 7 women, varying in age from 18 to 33 years, with a mean age of 
20.9 years) and 12 Himba (4 men and 8 women, varying in age from 18 to 40 years) 
participants in this experiment. The English participants were students at Goldsmiths 
College and took part for course requirements. The Himba were monolingual, tested in 
Northern Namibia and paid in kind. All participants were screened for colour vision 
abnormalities with the City Color Vision Test (Fletcher, 1980). 
93 
4.2.2 Apparatus and Stimuli 
Stimuli used were in the form of 1 inch square glossy finish Munsell chips that were 
mounted on 2 inch square pieces of white card, and the choice given in the MTS 
comprised of two colours being mounted on a white card in vertical alignment. Per Set, 
twelve Munsell colours were used covering eleven equally spaced steps in the Munsell 
continuum, for the Dumbu-buru Set going from 5Y to 2.5BG, covering the Himba 
boundary 7 .5GY between dumbu and burn colours, and for the Blue-green Set going 
from 2.5G to 1 OB, covering the boundary between 5BG and 7 .5BG. All colours had value 
of 5 and chroma of 6 following Munsell notation. The boundary locations were 
previously estimated and taken from Roberson et al (2004, 2005). The colours are also 
represented in CIE L *u*v* colour space (see figure 4.1 for Dumbu-buru and refer figure 
3.1 for Blue-green). The experiments were carried out in controlled lighting conditions 
under a lamp with Illuminant C lighting. Same lighting conditions were aimed for with 
the Himba; the experiments were carried out manually under a shaded tree and colours 
were placed into a metal box when shown to the participant. The light conditions 
(verified with a Gossen Luna-star light meter) were at 6000 K (brightness) and 2000 Lux 
(Luminance) with minor fluctuations that did not seem to affect the level of responding. 
The experimenter registered responses on a scoring sheet. 
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Figure 4.1 Equidistant (Saturation 5, Brightness 6) Munsell colours 5Y, 7.5Y, lOY, 2.5GY, 5GY, 7.5GY, 
1 OGY, 2.5G, 5G, 7 .5G, 1 OG, 2.5BG represented in CIE L *u*v* colour space. 
4.2.3 Procedure 
Practice- Identity Matching Trials 
For the Blue-green Set colours 2.5G and lOB, and similarly for the Durnbu-buru Set 
colours 5Y and 2.5BG, were used in the practice trials. They were shown individually, 
one at a time in random order and participants were asked to look at the colour carefully. 
The colour was then removed, and with an interval of a couple of seconds, it was 
followed by the administration of the choice comprising of the two colours, 
corresponding to the top and bottom colour, placed on a card, shown upright or upside 
down so that the presentation of the order was counterbalanced. The participant was then 
asked which colour he/she had seen. The participant was trained until he/she got all the 
practice trials right 4 times consecutively. 
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Test- Similarity Matching Trials +Identity Matching Trials 
The probe trials were introduced and administered individually in equal random fashion 
to the training procedure. There were 10 alternative probes ranging from 5G to 7 .5B for 
the blue-green Set, and 7.5Y to 10 BG for the Durnbu-buru Set. The choice given at 
matching-response time remained the same as in the practice trials. The similarity 
matching trials were intermixed with the identity matching trials for 5 experimental 
sessions comprising of 240 trials. 
Naming 
At the end of the experiment, for both sets, participants were shown the twelve stimuli, 
one at a time, in random order and asked, in English or Himba, for its colour name. As 
said previously, the colour terminology used by the Himba consisted of 5 colour terms 
(Roberson et al., 2005): vapa (light and pastel colours, white), serandu (red, orange and 
pink), zozu (dark colours and black), dumbu (beige, yellow and some light green), and 
buru (green and blue). 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Naming 
Naming: Blue-green Probe colours 
English participants used colour terms green and blue for this colour range. The mean % 
of colour terms used for every colour is illustrated in table 4.1A. A boundary was 
determined where the 2 colour terms were each used 50% of the time, and averaged 
across. For example in table 4.1A, for the colour green, one can see that the 50% mark 
would be between 7.5BG and 10BG. The boundary calculation substracted 50% from the 
actual value of colour term use for 7 .5BG (91. 7% ), and the remaining figure was then 
divided by the difference between the 7.5BG's value and 10BG's value amounting to 
66.7% difference. The value of the division was then multiplied by 2.5 to translate the 
number into Munsell value, which amounted to 1.56 Munsell steps. Thus the 50 % mark 
for using green was exactly at 7.5BG + 1.56BG i.e., 9.06BG. The same calculation 
procedure was used for the colour blue and numbers were averaged across for a naming 
boundary between green and blue. The three Colour terms buru, dumbu and zozu were 
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used by the Himba for this colour range. The mean % of colour terms used for every 
colour is illustrated in table 4.1B. The colour 'Buru' was predominantly used to name 
most colours. As this was the only colour used at 50% or above, no reliable boundary was 
found. 
Table 4.1A Mean% Colour Term Used for English in the naming task of green-blue colour range. 
Colour Term Green Blue 
Colour Range 
2.5G 100 0 
5G 100 0 
7.5G 100 0 
lOG 100 0 
2.5BG 100 0 
5BG 100 0 
7.5BG 91.7~ 8.3 
lOBG 25 75~ 
2.5G 0 100 
5G 0 100 
7.5G 0 100 
lOG 0 100 
~Boundary calculation: Green: 91.7- 50= 41.7; 41.7 I 66.7 = 0.625; 2.5 x 0.625 = 1.56 -7 7.5BG + 1.56 
BG = 9.06 BG; Blue: 75- 50= 25; 25 I (75- 8.3) = 0.375; 2.5 x 0375 = 0.94 -7 lOBG- 0.94 BG = 9.06 
BG; Average Green & Blue: 9.06 BG. 
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Table 4.1B Mean% Colour Term Used for Himba in the naming task of green-blue colour range. 
Colour Term Buru Dumbu Zozu 
Colour Range 
2.5G 41.7 41.7 16.6 
5G 58.3 25 16.7 
7.5G 58.3 25 16.7 
lOG 66.6 16.7 16.7 
2.5BG 66.6 16.7 16.7 
5BG 50 25 25 
7.5BG 58.3 16.7 25 
IOBG 58.3 8.4 33.3 
2.5G 50 25 25 
5G 58.3 16.7 25 
7.5G 50 25 25 
lOG 66.7 8.3 25 
*No reliable boundary 
Naming: Dumbu-buru Probe colours 
The 3 Colour terms burn, dumbu and zozu were used by the Himba for this colour range. 
The mean % of colour terms used for every colour is illustrated in Table 4.2A. Dumbu 
was predominantly used to name colours up to 7.5GY, after which burn was used most 
often; 7.5GY was the reliable boundary and 50% point see table 5.2A). Zozu was used 
very little as compared to other colour terms and was therefore not considered for 
boundary calculations. 
English participants used colour terms brown, yellow, green and blue for this colour 
range. The mean % of colour terms used for every colour is illustrated in Table 4.2 B. 
50% colour term use was found between 5Y and 7.5Y and also at 2.5BG, indicating that 
there are two boundaries for this colour range. Munsell boundary location was calculated 
as in tables 4.1A, 4.1B, and 4.2A and also further annotated below table 4.2B. This time a 
reliable boundary was found at 8Y (With terms Brown and Green) and 2.5BG (With 
terms Green and Blue). 
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Table 4.2A Mean% Colour Term Used for Himba in the naming task of durnbu-buru colour range. 
Colour Term Buru Dumbu Zozu 
Colour Range 
5Y 8.3 83.4 8.3 
7.5Y 8.3 83.4 8.3 
lOY 8.3 83.4 8.3 
2.5GY 8.3 83.4 8.3 
5GY 33.4 58.3 8.3 
7.5GY 50* 50* 0 
lOGY 75 8.3 16.7 
2.5G 83.3 0 16.7 
5G 83.3 0 16.7 
7.5G 83.3 0 16.7 
lOG 83.3 0 16.7 
2.5BG 83.3 0 16.7 
*Boundary durnbu & buru: 7.5GY 
Table 4.2B Mean% Colour Term Used for English in the naming task of durnbu-buru colour range. 
Colour Range Brown Yellow Green Blue 
5Y 50~ 16.7 33.3 0 
7.5Y 8.3 16.7 75~ 0 
lOY 8.3 0 91.7 0 
2.5GY 8.3 0 91.7 0 
5GY 8.3 0 91.7 0 
7.5GY 0 0 100 0 
lOGY 0 0 100 0 
2.5G 0 0 100 0 
5G 0 0 75 25 
7.5G 0 0 75 25 
lOG 0 0 58.3 42.7 
2.5BG 0 0 50* 50* 
* Boundary green & blue: 2.5 BG. 
99 
-Boundary calculation: 75 -50= 25; 25 I 41.7 = 0.6; 2.5 x 0.6 = 1.5 -7 7.5Y- 1.5Y = 6Y; Average green 
& brown: (5Y+6Y) I 2 = 5.5Y 
4.3.2 Test 
Practice 
All participants needed 16 identity matching trials to reach criterion for the test. 
Test 
A 2 (Culture: English and Himba) x 2 (Set: Blue-green and Dumbu-buru) x 10 (Probe 
Colours:!, 2, 3, ... , 10) 3-way Anova, with repeated measures for the second and third 
factors, was carried out on the participants' performance (number of green or dumbu 
responses) in similarity matching trials. The significant effects were the 3-way interaction 
of Culture by Set by Probe colours (F(9,198) = 4.86, p = .007), in the context of 2-way 
interactions of Culture by Set (F(1,22) = 4.47, p = .046) and Probe by Set (F(9,198) = 
5.36, p = .004). The Culture by Probe interaction was not significant (F(9.198) < 1). Main 
effects of Set (F(1,22) = 6.74, p = .016), and Probe colour (F(9,198) = 643.57, p < .001 
are also reported with no main effect of Culture (F(1,22) < l).The 3-way interaction was 
further explored with 2-way Anovas of Culture by Probe colour for each Set. 
Blue-green Set: Post-hoc 
As confirmed in table 4.3 and figure 4.2 (below), the Culture by Probe colour interaction 
was significant for the Blue-green Set (F(9,198) = 3.85, p < .001) in the context of a main 
effect of Probe colour (F(9,198) = 318.46, p < .001) and no main effect of Culture 
(F(1,22) = 2.12, p < .2), indicating that overall performance did not differ between 
Cultures for the Blue-green Set, but that overall performance did differ among Probe 
colours. 
Tukey (HSD, p < .05) pair-wise comparisons were carried out to ascertain differences in 
treatment of Probe colours across and within Cultures. For 28 comparisons with 22 
degrees of freedom the Tukey HSD value was 2.41. The comparison results show that the 
English gave significantly more green responses for probes 2.5BG and 5BG (and 
marginally so for 7 .5BG). Even though Himba and English showed significantly different 
allocation (> 2.41) of green responses between probes 2.5BG and 5BG, 5BG and 
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7.5BG, and 7.5BG and 10BG with the exception of Himba showing an additional 
difference between probes 1 OG and 2.5BG, the English showed larger differences 
between those green response allocations on these probes indicating a sharper categorical 
function for more peripheral green and blue colours near the boundary. Trend analyses 
were carried out to assess the categorical function obtained from the Probe Colour 
response data. They showed a significant cubic trend by group interaction (F(l ,22) = 
17.2, p < .001 ) and upon inspection, the English show a stronger cubic trend indicative 
of a sharper categorical function with particular reference to colour near the boundary 
between green and blue. The boundary was assessed as follows: at-test was carried out to 
assess the colour in the continuum where participants were at chance. The at-chance-
performance for every participant was located on the continuum at 1 0 green responses 
given (from 20 as maximum performance). The difference between the English chance 
performances was not significantly different from the Himba chance performances (p > 
.05) indicating midpoints were not significantly different in location. Calculations were 
needed to convert chance score of 10 into Munsell steps as done before in Table 4.1A and 
4.1B. For e.g., the Himba midpoint: 11.08 at 5BG, is 1.08 different from 10. 1.08 divided 
by the difference in score between 5 and 7.5 BG (4.41) is .244. This value is then 
converted into Munsell steps by multiplying it by 2.5 (= 1 Munsell setp). The end result 
is a score of 10 at 5BG + .61BG i.e., 5.61BG. The same was done for the English 
midpoint amounting to 7 .03BG. 
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Table 4.3 Mean green responses (+/- 1 SE) for Himba and English participants for Similarity Matching 
trials. 
Colour (Munsell) Himba (N = 12) English (N = 12) 
5G 19.5 (0.23) 20 (0.00) 
7.5G 18.92 (0.50) 20 (0.00) 
lOG 18.08 (0.65) 19.75 (0.18) 
2.5BG 15.5 (0.81) 19 (0.35) 
5BG 11.08 (1.61) 14.75 (1.14) 
7.5BG 6.67 (1.36) 8.92 (1.70) 
2.5B 1.25 (0.51) 0.17(.11) 
lOBG 3.17(0.85) 1.42 (0.82) 
5B 0.75 (0.28) 0 (0.00) 
7.5B 0.33 (0.26) 0 (0.00) 
Fig. 4.2 Mean green responses (+/- 1 SE) for Himba and English participants for Similarity Matching 
trials. 
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Dumbu-buru Set: Post-hoc 
As confirmed in table 4.4 and figure 4.3, the Culture by Probe colour interaction was 
significant for the Dumbu-buru Set (F(9,198) = 2.63, p = .01) in the context of a main 
effect of Probe colour (F(9,198) = 272,38, p < .001) and no main effect of Culture 
(F( 1 ,22) = 3.31, p < .1 ), indicating that overall performance did not differ between 
Cultures for the Dumbu-buru Set, but that overall performance did differ among Probe 
colours. 
Tukey (HSD, p < .05) pair-wise comparisons were carried out to ascertain differences in 
treatment of Probe colours across and within Cultures. For 28 comparisons with 22 
degrees of freedom the Tukey HSD value was 2.67. The comparison results show that the 
Himba gave significantly more dumbu responses than the English for probes 2.5GY, 
5GY, and 7.5GY. Even though Himba and English showed significantly different 
allocation (> 2.67) of dumbu responses between probes 5GY and 7.5GY, 7.5GY and 
lOGY, with the Himba additionally showing a response difference between lOGY and 
2.5G in comparison to the marginal English difference, the Himba differences were larger 
than the English response, indicating a sharper categorical function for dumbu and burn 
colours near the boundary. Furthermore, English also showed a significant difference in 
response between lOY and 2.5GY, and 2.5GY and 5GY, indicating a more gradual 
descending function with dumbu responses more spread across matching-to-sample trials 
than the Himba. Trend analyses were carried out to assess the categorical function 
obtained from the Probe Colour response data across Cultures. They showed a cubic 
trend by Culture interaction approaching significance (F(l,22) = 3.55, p = .073. From 
inspection, a slight cubic difference is noticeable as the Himba look to show a stronger 
cubic trend than the English. The Himba show a stronger cubic trend indicative of a 
sharper categorical function with particular reference to colours near the boundary 
between dumbu and buru. The boundary was assessed as follows: at-test was carried out 
to assess the colour in the continuum where participants were at chance. The at-chance-
performance for every participant was located on the continuum at 1 0 green responses 
given (from 20 as maximum performance). The difference between the English chance 
performances was not significantly different from the Himba chance performances (p > 
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.05). The midpoints (as calculated in table 5.2A and 5.2B) for the English was on average 
at 6.34GY, and the Himba midpoint was on average at 7.6GY. 
Table 4.4 Mean dumbu responses(+/- 1 SE) for Himba and English participants on similarity matching 
trials. 
Colour (Munsell) Himba (N = 12) English (N = 12) 
7.5Y 20.00 (0.00) 20.00 (0.00) 
lOY 19.58 (0.19) 19.92 (0.08) 
2.5GY 19.75 (0.13) 16.58 (1.73) 
5GY 17.83 (0.94) 13.58 (1.86) 
7.5GY 10.25 (1.40) 7.00 (1.71) 
lOGY 3.75 (0.88) 2.83 (1.28) 
2.5G 1.08 (0.47) 0.5 (0.20) 
5G 0.25 (0.13) 0 (0.00) 
7.5G 0.25 (0.13) 0 (0.00) 
lOG 0.08 (0.08) 0 (0.00) 
Fig. 4.3 Mean dumbu responses (+/- 1 SE) for Himba and English participants on similarity matching 
trials. 
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4.4 Discussion 
This experiment achieves evidence of universal human grouping at the same time as 
showing some differences across cultures that is continuum specific. Therefore results are 
also consistent with linguistic relativity (Davidoff et al., 1999; Roberson et al., 2000) and 
replicate conclusion drawn by Roberson et al. (2005b) from their sorting task that show 
linguistic influence in colour grouping with the additional value these effects have been 
found in a more constrained task. 
The Sets used seem to affect responding depending on the Culture carrying out the task. 
For the blue-green continuum, compared to the Himba, the English made significantly 
more green responses on the "green" side of the boundary and fewer green responses on 
the "blue" side of the boundary (see Fig 4.2). The Himba also showed evidence of a 
linguistically driven difference for the dumbu-buru continuum (see Fig 4.3). Moreover, 
significantly different cubic functions, sharper for host cultures, support the claim that 
categorical functions (e.g., Maddox & Ashby, 1992) are markedly different for 
performance on both continua. The different cubic functions support linguistic relativity 
findings even further (e.g., Robertson et al, 2005a, b) under restrained task demands of 
matching by similarity. The origin of this general grouping propensity is both perceptual 
and conceptual in nature. On the one hand, it would seem that this propensity seems 
inevitably human as monkeys perform differently matching colours strictly to their 
endpoints rather than making broad perhaps abstract generalizations. On the other hand 
cross-cultural differences are not to be ruled out showing evidence of conceptual 
grouping. 
A possible counter-argument may be that the oddity of the task has induced the 
differences found across cultures, for when cultures were exposed to unfamiliar 
boundaries they may have found the task more difficult. However, task difficulty is not 
reflected in performance levels that did not vary across the different sets and only varied 
across probe colours near the boundary. Thus, although there are some perceptual 
constraints that make the categorical behaviour of two different cultures with different 
colour terms look similar in matching to sample, there are differences of linguistic nature 
that should not be mistaken for noise. In more detail, the same boundary behaviour has 
been found for the host culture of both continua, at the 4th, 5th and 6th colours of the 10 
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probe colours, indicating there is something culturally specific about the differences 
found. The findings that boundaries are created from shared linguistic experience and 
communication seems to fit nicely with this result (Braisby & Dockrell, 1999; Steels & 
Belpaeme, 2005). 
It is concluded that despite inherent groupmg behaviour, linguistic differences are 
perceived across cultures for different contexts. The Himba perform more sharply in their 
own context and more loosely in an English termed context, and the English categorize 
more sharply in their own context and more loosely in the Himba termed context. This 
double dissociation shows that although categorizing involves inherent grouping 
behaviour, language seems to bring out differences to be found at the boundary between 
two colours. 
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5. Experiment 4 and 5: A developmental study of effects of colour term 
acquisition and a cross-cultural comparison of colour categorization in 
toddlers. 
5.1 General introduction 
Do children who have not yet acquired colour terms respond to colour categorically? If 
the universal perspective is adopted (Bomstein, Kessen & Weiskopf, 1976; Franklin & 
Davies, 2004) children at a very young age will show evidence of colour categories 
despite the tardy acquisition of colour terms. If language plays a role in determining 
colour categories (Roberson et al., 2004; Roberson, Davies & Davidoff, 2000), children 
are not expected to show these categories unless they have acquired colour terms. Two 
experiments (experiments 5 and 6) were undertaken to address the nature/nurture debate 
on the origin of colour categories in toddlers of 2- to 4-years-old. Experiment 5 
particularly addressed colour term acquisition in English toddlers to ascertain whether the 
level of acquisition corresponds with the acquisition of CP. It attempts to replicate 
Franklin et al. (2005) where it is argued that there are panhuman colour categories that 
are not established by language but by biology (Franklin & Davies, 2004). A tight link 
between language and categorical perception would be in direct opposition to their 
universal approach to Categorical Perception. Experiment 6 considered the issue from a 
cross-lingual perspective. 
Franklin et al. (2005) looked for a causal relationship between naming accuracy and 
Categorization effects. In their study, children showed Categorical Perception 
irrespective of their colour naming ability but we will argue that their assessment of 
colour term acquisition paid insufficient account of colour term comprehension. Franklin 
et al. (2005) only took comprehension into account in one part of their analyses, namely, 
when investigating the relationship (correlation) between colour term fluency and 
Categorical Perception. Moreover, their assessment used only 11 colours with just one 
measurement for naming and another for comprehension; this is not enough to be sure 
that the colour terms are understood. The present investigation rectifies some of those 
flaws by testing a larger sample of children and by using 22 colours to verify colour term 
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acquisition. The meaning of colour terms is exoplored further by asking additional 
questions as to whether other samples would also be given the same colour name. Under 
these circumstances, one predicts that CP could apparently be achieved following 
Franklin et al. 's (2005) criteria, but that when stricter criteria are applied Categorical 
Perception will only be found for children that have properly acquired their colour terms 
needed at test (i.e., blue, green and purple). 
5.2 Experiment 4: A developmental study of effects of colour term 
acquisition with English toddlers 
5 .2.1 Method 
5.2 .1.1 Participants 
A total of 60 English-speaking children (37 girls and 23 boys) between 31 and 51 months 
of age (mean age= 42.24 months) were recruited from 4 different nurseries and a music 
group for toddlers in London, UK (Parkway Under 5s, Lingfield Nursery, Woodlands 
Nursery, Powerhall Infants School, and Hampstead Toddler Music Group). None of the 
children tested were colour blind (as ascertained by information given by the school). 
5.2.1.2 Stimuli 
Two identical bear cut-out figures (Bear A and Bear B) were used. The coloured stimuli 
in the form of sweaters were placed over the bear figures. All sweater cut-outs were 
mounted on cardboard and coloured either in ColourAid paper or Munsell coloured 
paper. The 22 colours used for naming and comprehension tasks (see Roberson et al., 
2004) were made from Colour-Aid paper. These colours included the 11 basic colours 
used by Franklin et al. (2005) with an additional set of 11 non-focal exemplars as in 
Roberson et al. (2004), chosen to be intermediate between each of the chromatic 
categories (e.g., half way between pink and orange), given the Munsell arrangement of 
colour in a spherical three-dimensional space. The focal colours were (with Colour-Aid 
codes in parentheses): black (BLACK), white (WHITE), red (RO Hue), green (G Hue), 
yellow (Y Hue), blue (B Hue), brown (0 S3), pink (R T4), purple (V Hue), orange (YO 
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Hue), and gray (GRAY 4). The non-focal colours were (with Colour-Aid codes in 
parentheses): blue (BV HUE), pink-purple (RVR HUE), yellow (YOY HUE), orange (0 
HUE), green (GBG HUE), pink-red (ORO T2), green (YGY Tl), orange (OYO T4), 
orange-yellow (YOY T3), purple (RVR T3), pink (ROR T2). All coloured sweaters were 
designated with a number code in the back. Table 5.1 gives the designations and CIE 
L *u*v* co-ordinates for each colour. 
Table 5.1 Designations of the 22 Color Aid sweaters in the CIE Lu*v* metric under Illuminant C as 
measured by Roberson et al (2005) 
Tile code Color-Aid Name L u* v* 
1 Gray4 Grey 71 1 1 
4 White White 100 0 0 
6 0 S3 Brown 44 13 8 
23 YO HUE Orange 82 101 62 
28 VHUE Purple 40 21 -31 
29 BVHUE Blue 36 -2 -23 
33 RVRHUE Pink-purple 57 113 1 
42 Black Black 35 5 2 
45 YHUE Yellow 90 54 80 
46 YOYHUE Yellow 92 83 78 
47 OHUE Orange 75 146 44 
49 ROHDE Red 59 136 28 
50 BHUE Blue 49 -30 -69 
53 GBGHUE Green 51 -46 -14 
54 GHUE Green 57 -55 4 
59 R T4 Pink 89 70 12 
77 OROT2 Pink-red 70 113 28 
78 YGYTl Green 74 -26 60 
79 OYOT4 Orange 83 100 49 
80 YOYT3 Orange-Y ell ow 87 78 57 
81 RVRT3 Purple 63 81 -13 
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I ROR T2 
The test stimuli sweaters for the 2AFC task were made from Munsell Glossy paper. 
There were two sets of test stimuli, blue-green and blue-purple, with three stimuli per 
set. The Munsell notation of the stimuli for the blue-green set were 7.50, 5BG, and 2.5B, 
all with lightness value 5 and saturation value 10. The stimuli for the blue-purple set 
were lOB, 7.5PB, and 5P, all with lightness value 3 and saturation value 10. The test 
stimuli are referred, as in Franklin et al. (2005) as Al, A2, and B, A1 and A2 belonging 
to one category and B being of another category. All test stimuli varied only in Munsell 
hue; Munsell Chroma (colourfulness, like saturation) and Munsell Value (lightness) were 
kept constant. 
For each set, there was a within-category pair and a between-category pair, and the 
separations of within- and between-category pairs were equated in Munsell units. There 
were 3 Munsell steps between stimuli in a pair. Although the nature of the human colour 
space upon which the Munsell set of colours is based is non-Euclidian and completely 
uniform colour differences are impossible to represent in a three dimensional colour 
model (MacEvoy, 2005), Franklin et al. (2004) made an attempt to also equate colour 
differences in the CIE Lu*v* colour space. It was successfully found (see figure 6.2) that 
test foils were equally separated in colour space units (~E) lending further support to the 
equidistance between colours suggested by Munsell (1905) and other 3-dimensional 
colour representation that are found by some to be the best at approximating human 
colour space (Indow, 1988). The location of the category boundaries was taken from 
Franklin and Davies' (2004) adult naming and similarity judgments, as was done in 
Franklin et al. (2005). As presented by Franklin et al. (2005), the Munsell codes and 
categorical status of stimulus pairs are shown in figure 5.1 A and B. (Blue-green and 
blue-purple separations were around 30 units in CIE colour space (30 ~E)). 
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Figure 5.1 Munsell codes, categorical status, and Munsell distances of the stimuli of the category pairs 
used in Experiment 5 as in Franklin et al. (2005). The categorical relationships (within or between) of the 
category pairs are shown for blue-purple (A) and blue-green (B). In panel A, Chroma= 3 and Value= 10. 
In panel B, Chroma= 5 and Value= 10. (Taken from Franklin et al. (2005)) 
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Figure 5.2 Munsell colours of figure 1 represented in CIE Lu*v* colour space. Same values used in 
Franklin et al. (2005). 
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5 .2.1.3 Procedure 
Overall Design 
The design was identical to Franklin et al. (2005) except that test stimuli were reduced to 
two sets; blue-purple and blue-green sets were kept and the red-pink set was omitted. All 
children completed the training, naming, and comprehension task using the 22 coloured 
sweaters. For the 2AFC task, children were tested on both sets with a counterbalancing of 
task order; half the children got the blue-purple set first, and the other half got the blue-
green set first. For each continuum, eight category-pairs were randomly presented until 
the four between- and four within-category pairs were exhausted. The 2-AFC task was 
always presented after naming and comprehension, and the naming task and 
comprehension task were presented in a randomized order. 
Comprehension and naming of focals and non-focals 
The 22 focal and non-focal sweaters were laid out in front of the child and the child was 
asked to point at a specific colour. The colour of the chosen sweater was recorded, with 
additionally asking the child if there were any other sweaters that corresponded to this 
specific colour (e.g., 'Are there any other red ones?'). The additional answers were 
recorded until the child said there were no more sweaters of that colour. This 
comprehension procedure was carried out for the 11 focal colour names. Each of the 22 
sweaters was then presented individually and in random order, and the child was asked to 
name the colour of the sweater. 
Training 
Training was carried out as in Franklin et al. (2005). The aim of the training session was 
to show each child that when Bear A wore a particular sweater, Bear B also wore the 
identically coloured sweater. Bearing in mind that the meaning of 'same' and 'different' 
are not properly understood by 2-year-olds (Glucksberg, Hay & Danks, 1976), the term 
'different' was not used in the procedure at all, and the training phase ensured that the 
child understood the meaning of the word 'same' as follows: The two bears were placed 
flat on the table in front of the child, who was encouraged to give each bear a name. The 
child was told that Bear A has lots of coloured sweaters, and the 11 focal sweaters were 
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randomly laid out above Bear A. The child was then told that Bear B also has lots of 
coloured sweaters and another set of 11 focal sweaters were randomly laid out above 
Bear B. A sweater from Bear A's set was randomly chosen and placed on Bear A. The 
child was told that if Bear A wears this sweater, then Bear B also wears this sweater, and 
so the corresponding sweater was picked out of Bear B's set and placed on Bear B. This 
was repeated three times with different coloured sweaters. Another sweater was chosen 
and placed on Bear A but this time Bear B 's set of sweaters was covered with white 
cardboard. The child was allowed to inspect the sweater, and after 5 s of stimulus 
presentation, Bear A and its sweater were covered. After a further 5-s delay, Bear B's set 
of sweaters were uncovered and the child was asked to find the same sweater for Bear B 
out of the set of 11 sweaters. After the child had made a choice, Bear A was uncovered 
and the child was encouraged to evaluate his or her response. If the choice was correct, 
then the child was praised; if the choice was incorrect, then the child was encouraged to 
amend his or her choice. This was repeated until a correct response was given three times 
and the experimenter was sure that the task was understood by the child. All of the 
children passed this training. 
Two-alternative forced-choice task 
Test stimuli sweaters were used in a 2-AFC task under standardized lighting conditions 
that simulate natural daylight with the use of a Gretag Macbeth lamp (D65, 6500 K, at 
810-1880 lux). These lighting conditions are necessary for the uniformity of the Munsell 
system to be maintained (Davies & Franklin, 2002). The procedure and goal of finding 
the matching sweater for the other bear was the same as in the training task except that 
the child was given a choice of only two sweaters: an incorrect choice (foil) and a correct 
choice (target) identical to Bear A's sweater. The categorical relationship (between 
category I within category) of the incorrect and correct choices was manipulated (for 
stimulus pairs see panels A and B in Fig. 5.1). The procedure was conducted for both 
within- and between-category stimulus pairs four times each. For two of these four trials, 
one stimulus was the target and the other stimulus was the foil; for the remaining two 
trials, this target/foil allocation was reversed. Therefore, the child made a total of eight 
113 
judgments, and the order was randomized for each child. The child was then presented 
with each of the stimuli individually and was asked to name the colour of the sweater. 
5 .2.2 Results 
Four analyses were carried out on the English toddler's data; three analyses identical to 
Franklin et al. 's (2005) and one additional analysis (analysis 4). The first analysis 
considered, for all children, category effects for the blue-purple and blue-green continua 
in the 2 alternative-forced-choice task. The second analysis addressed effects of naming 
ability on the category effect in the first analysis. The third analysis addressed colour 
term fluency in relation to the categorical effects of the first analysis. The fourth 
(additional) analysis is a variation of the first analysis but assigns children to whether 
they know or do not know colour terms based on further probing of their comprehension 
of colour terms. 
Analysis 1: Showing CP for blue-purple and blue-green 
For each child, the number of correct identifications in the 2-AFC task was calculated 
when the choice was between two stimuli of the same category (within-category pairs) 
and when the choice was between stimuli of different categories (between-category 
pairs). The maximum number of correct identifications was four for within-category pairs 
and four for between-category pairs. Tables 5.2 and figure 5.3 give the accuracy scores 
for within and between pairs for the blue-purple and blue-green set. The between-
category accuracy was higher than within-category accuracy for all conditions. 
Table 5.2 Mean accuracy (±1 SE) for within- and between-category pairs for the blue-
purple and blue-green sets. 
Category Within Between Total 
Set 
Blue-purple 2.78 (.152) 3.43 (.105) 3.11 (.129) 
Blue-green 2.58 (.123) 3.45 (.091) 3.02 (.107) 
Total 2.68 (.138) 3.44 (.098) 3.07 (.118) 
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Figure 5.3 Mean accuracy (±1 SE) for within- and between-category pairs for the blue-purple and blue-
green sets. 
The results were supported by an analysis ofvariance (ANOVA) looking at the effects of 
Category (Between or Within), Set (Blue-purple or Blue-green), and Task Order (Group 
1 (Blue-purple set first) or Group 2 (Blue-green set first)). Category and Set were 
repeated measures. The only significant effect was the main effect of Category. Accuracy 
was greater for Between-category pairs than for Within-category pairs, F(1,58) = 59.48, p 
< .001. Overall accuracy did not vary across Set, F(1,58) < 1 or Task Order, F(1,58) < 1. 
Moreover, Order did not vary by Set, F(1,58) < 1, or Category, F(1,58) < 1. Finally, the 
Category by Set interaction was not significant, F(1,58) = 1.04, p > .3, nor was the 
Category by Set by Order interaction, F(1,58) < 1. Accuracy was above chance (2/4) for 
both Sets; Blue-purple set, t(59) = 9.94, p < .001 and Blue-green set, t(59) = 13.21, p < 
.001, and a Bonferroni post-hoc test did not reveal a significant difference in accuracy 
between the Blue-green set and Blue-purple set, t(59) < 1. Therefore, as in Franklin et 
al. 's (2004), Categorical Perception was demonstrated equally for both Sets, regardless of 
Task Order. 
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Analysis 2: Effect of naming accuracy on the size of the category effect 
Table 5.3 gives the naming frequencies for each of the two alternative-forced-choice 
stimuli for all three sets. Overall, the majority name is between 60%-85% in agreement 
with the intended linguistic boundary for the blue-green and blue-purple sets. Out of the 
three stimuli, A2 seems to be most ambiguous for both sets, probably because it is closer 
to the linguistic boundary than Al and B. These dips are also perceived in Franklin et 
al. 's table 3, albeit to a lesser extent. 
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Table 5.3 Frequencies (percentages) of the colour terms offered for the stimuli of each set 
Set Stimulus Type: Munsell Colour term Percentage of children 
code offering the term 
Blue-Purple A1: lOB 3/10 Blue 83.6 
Purple 6.8 
Green 4.9 
Red 4.9 
A2: 7.5PB 3/10 Blue 59 
Purple 31.2 
Green 6.6 
Red 1.6 
Don't know 1.6 
B: 5P3!10 Purple 83.6 
Blue 6.6 
Red 3.3 
Yellow 3.3 
Green 1.6 
Pink 1.6 
Green-Blue A1: 7.5G 5/10 Green 85.3 
Blue 3.3 
Red 3.3 
Yellow 3.3 
Purple 1.6 
Pink 1.6 
Orange 1.6 
A2: 5BG 5/10 Green 65.6 
Blue 21.3 
Red 6.6 
Don't know 3.3 
Purple 1.6 
Yellow 1.6 
B: 2.5B 5/10 Blue 85.2 
Green 6.6 
Pink 3.3 
Red 3.3 
Yellow 1.6 
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As in Franklin et al. (2005), individuals' naming patterns were analyzed to investigate the 
effect of linguistic categorization on the category effect. If individuals gave A1 and A2 
the same term and gave B a different term, then they were classified as having a between-
category linguistic boundary (boundary). An "I don't know" response was also counted 
as a term. Therefore, two patterns of naming qualified: (A1: name 1; A2: name 1; B: 
name 2) and (A1: name 1; A2: name 1; B: "I don't know"). If individuals gave A2 and 
B the same term and gave A 1 a different term, then they were classified as having a 
within-category linguistic boundary or reverse boundary. Again, an "I don't know" 
response was counted as a term. Therefore, two patterns of naming qualified: (A1: name 
2; A2: name 1; B: name 1) and (A1:"I don't know"; A2: name 1; B: name 1). If 
individuals gave A1, A2, and B the same term, they were classified as having no 
linguistic boundary. Again, "I don't know" was counted as a term. Therefore, two 
patterns ofnaming qualified: (AI: name 1; A2: name 1; B: name 1) and (A1: "I don't 
know"; A2: "I don't know"; B: "I don't know"). In Franklin et al. (2004), naming 
accuracy for the different sets was combined because the sample sizes were not sufficient 
to look at the effect of language for each boundary separately. No further details were 
given by Franklin et al. (2004) about how this general naming pattern was inferred across 
the three data sets and there is a concern about those children that could name some 
colours correctly but not all of them. For example, if a child had a linguistic boundary for 
blue/green, a reverse linguistic boundary for blue/purple, and no boundary for pink/red, 
what naming pattern would this child qualify for if collapsing naming accuracy across all 
sets? In the present study, the matter was resolved by a sample size large enough to look 
at effects of language for each boundary separately. Thus, participants were grouped into 
a name boundary, reverse boundary, or no boundary group as in Franklin et al. (2005), 
although crucially for separate sets. 
For the blue-purple set, 30 children had a name boundary, 20 had a reverse boundary and 
10 had no name boundary. For the blue-green set, 38 children had a name boundary, 8 
had a reverse boundary and 14 had no name boundary. Tables 5.4 and 5.5, and Figures 
5.4 and 5.5 show within- and between-category accuracy for the three name boundary 
groups per set. 
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Table 5.4 Mean accuracy (±1 SE) of Name Boundary for the Blue-purple set on Within- and Between-
category pairs. 
Category Within Between Total 
Name Boundary 
N arne boundary 3.13 (.22) 3.53 (.162) 3.33 (.156) 
Reverse boundary 2.9 (.27) 3.05 (.198) 2.98 (.191) 
No boundary 2.2 (.381) 2.6 (.28) 2.4 (.271) 
Total 2.74 (.172) 3.06 (.127) 2.9 (.15) 
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Figure 5.4 Mean accuracy (±1 SE) of Name Boundary for the Blue-purple set on Within- and Between-
category pairs. 
Table 5.5 Mean accuracy (±1 SE) of Name Boundary for the Blue-green set on Within- and Between-
category pairs. 
Category Within Between Total 
Name Boundary 
N arne boundary 2.5 (.167) 3.47 (.130) 2.99 (.107) 
Reverse boundary 2.38 (.363) 3.5 (.282) 2.93 (.233) 
No boundary 2.71 (.275) 2.71 (.213) 2.71 (.176) 
Total 2.53 (.162) 3.23 (.126) 2.88 (.144) 
119 
DWJthin 
• Between 
Name No name Reverse 
boundary boundary name 
boundary 
Figure 5.5 Mean accuracy (±1 SE) of Name Boundary for the Blue-green set on Within- and Between-
category pairs. 
The results are supported by 2 ANOVAs (for the 2 different sets) on accuracy scores with 
Category (Within or Between), and Name Boundary (Boundary, No Boundary or Reverse 
Boundary) as factors. Category was a repeated measures factor. 
For the blue-purple set, only one effect was significant; accuracy varied with Name 
Boundary, F(2,57) = 4.59, p = .014 with post-hoc tests showing that the only significant 
difference in performance was between the Name Boundary and No Boundary groups 
(t(38) = 2.85, p = .007). A trend was also found for the main effect of Category, F(1,57) = 
3.18, p = .08 with increased performance on Between-Category trials. The Category by 
Name Boundary effect was not significant, F(2,57) < 1. 
For the blue-green set, the main effect of Category, F(1,57) = 12.01, p < .001, and the 
Category by Name Boundary interaction, F(2,57) = 3.31, p = .044, were significant. 
Accuracy did not vary with Name Boundary, F(2,57) < 1. Bonferroni post-hoc tests 
revealed that the difference between Within- and Between-category pairs was only 
significant for the Boundary group, t(37) = 4.68, p < .001. The Reverse Boundary group 
just escaped a significant difference, t(7) = 2.55, p = .038, and the No Boundary group 
showed no significant difference, t(13) < 1. 
It would seem that linguistic terminology does play a role for the blue-green set, and 
therefore the data are in contrast to Franklin et al.' s (2005) results of equal CP for all 
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groups. The data for blue-purple are more in keeping with Franklin et al. (2004) though it 
is noted that there is only a trend towards an effect of Category. 
Analysis 3: Colour term fluency and Categorical Perception 
Franklin et al. (2004) analyzed colour term acquisition in children that were 2- to 4-years-
old. These children were split into 4 age groups covering 6 months each (2-2.5, 2.5-3, 3-
3.5, 3.5-4 years). Participants' age in our study spanned from 2.5 to 4.5 years. Colour 
term acquisition was also analyzed at four stages with the removal of the age group 2-2.5 
years and with the additional group of 4-4.5 years. Thus, the groups amounted to 2.5 to 3 
years, 3 and 3.5 years, 3.5 and 4 years, and 4 and 4.5 years of age. Overall, 12 children 
were between 2.5 and 3, 23 children between 3 and 3.5, 17 children between 3.5 and 4, 
and 8 children between 4 and 4.5 years of age. Tables 5.6 and 5.7 give the percentages of 
correct responses for each focal colour. 
Table 5.6 Percentages correctly named focals in the naming task for each age band 
Age 2.5-3 years 3-3.5 years 3.5-4 years 4-4.5 years Total 
Colour (n=12) (n=23) (n=17) (n=8) (N=60) 
Black 58.3% 60.9% 88.2% 88.9% 74.08% 
White 33.3% 82.6% 88.2% 88.9% 73.25% 
Red 75% 69.5% 94.1% 88.9% 81.88% 
Green 50% 78.3% 94.1% 88.9% 77.83% 
Yellow 75% 82.6% 88.2% 100% 86.45% 
Blue 58.3% 78.3% 100% 100% 84.15% 
Orange 58.3% 60.8% 88.2% 77.7% 71.25% 
Pink 75% 73.9% 88.2% 88.9% 81.50% 
Purple 58.3% 78.3% 82.3% 88.9% 76.95% 
Brown 9.1% 43.4% 64.7% 66.6% 45.95% 
Gray 33.3% 26.1% 41.2% 55.6% 39.05% 
Total 53.08% 67.58% 83.40% 84.85% 72.42% 
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Table 5.7 Percentages correctly identified focals in the comprehension task for each age band using 
Franklin et al's criteria. 
Age 2.5-3 years 3-3.5 years 3.5-4 years 4-4.5 years Total 
Colour (n=12) (n=23) (n=17) (n=8) 
(N=60) 
Black 66.7% 78.3% 88.2% 88.9% 80.53% 
White 75% 82.6% 76.4% 77.8% 77.95% 
Red 66.7% 73.9% 64.7% 77.8% 70.78% 
Green 58.3% 65.2% 76.5% 66.7% 66.68% 
Yellow 66.7% 78.3% 94.1% 77.8% 79.23% 
Blue 58.3% 78.3% 94.1% 77.8% 77.13% 
Orange 66.6% 60.9% 82.3% 55.6% 66.35% 
Pink 75% 65.2% 88.2% 77.8% 76.55% 
Purple 58.3% 73.9% 76.5% 77.8% 71.63% 
Brown 41.7% 47.8% 58.8% 55.5% 50.95% 
Gray 25% 69.6% 64.7% 66.6% 56.48% 
Total 59.85% 70.36% 78.59% 72.74% 70.38% 
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Figure 5.6 Mean numbers correct on naming and comprehension tasks for each age band. Bars represent ±1 
SE. 
Children's naming and comprehension of the 11 focal colours improved from a mean of 
approximately 6 terms to a mean of approximately 9.5 terms (see figure 5.6). This is 
slightly different from Franklin et al.' s (2005) colour term acquisition that improved from 
a mean of approximately 6 to 11 terms. Although, using similar naming and 
comprehension tasks, some researchers have found that toddlers acquire names faster 
than they comprehend colour terms (e.g., Soya, 1994). As in Franklin et al. (2004), there 
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was no difference here between naming and comprehension, t(lO) < 1 (mean naming= 
72.42%; mean comprehension= 70.38%). 
The relationship between colour term fluency (colours named/colours comprehended) 
and the extent of the category effect was explored as in Franklin et al. (2005). Two 
indices were calculated to this effect; a colour term fluency index, averaging the mean 
number of colours named and the mean number of colours identified (as in Franklin et 
al., 2004), and a categorical effect index, subtracting the within-category score from the 
between-category score (on the two alternative-forced-choice task) for each child. A 
score higher than 0 indicates a categorical effect; that is, between-category accuracy is 
greater than within-category accuracy. A score of 0 indicates no categorical effect; that is, 
within-category accuracy and between-category accuracy are equal. A score lower than 0 
indicates a reversed categorical effect; that is, within-category accuracy is greater than 
between-category accuracy. 
For the blue-purple set, looking at scores obtained from 60 children, the relation between 
the colour term fluency and categorical effect indices was not significant, r = -.13, p > .2. 
For the blue-green set, the relation between the colour term fluency and categorical effect 
indices was also not significant, r = .12, p > .3. When looking at naming and 
comprehension from this perspective, it seems that there is no effect of the acquisition of 
colour terms on obtaining categorical effects. This suggests that showing CP for blue, 
purple and green does not rely on how many other colours have been acquired (whether 
6 or above 6 terms), and that perhaps a majority of children who have acquired as few as 
6 terms, know all three colours (blue, purple and green) in our task. Indeed, Pitchford and 
Mullen (2005) found that purple (a secondary colour) is acquired at the same time as 
primary colours. 
Franklin et al. (2005) found a small significant negative correlation signifying that the 
acquisition of more colour terms may have adverse effects on CP. Their result seems to 
indicate that CP will deteriorate with the acquisition of additional terms and will improve 
with the acquisition of fewer terms. This result seems counterintuitive and, indeed, 
Franklin et al. give no explanation of the negative correlation. Franklin et al. imply that a 
relativist account would predict a positive correlation between the extent of Categorical 
Perception for one colour and the number of other colour terms known by the child. 
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However, there is no reason to make that assumption. When children truly know a colour 
term this only implies that they do not confuse it with other nearby terms and not whether 
the children know fewer or more colours. Thus, there is no reason to believe that 
acquiring fewer secondary terms (e.g., not knowing orange and pink) would make a 
significant difference for Categorical Perception, as is suggested by Franklin et al. 
(2005). The present results show no relation between colour term fluency and 
categorization effects and point out the need for a different kind of test of the acquisition 
of terms for Categorical Perception effects to be observed. This point is addressed in 
Analysis 4. 
Analysis 4: Categorical Perception with a revised assessment of the understanding 
of colour terms 
Toddlers were assigned as knowing colours following Soja's procedure (1994), 
previously used with English and Himba toddlers in a study by Roberson et al. (2004). In 
Franklin et al. (2005), whether a child has a boundary is decided on the basis of naming 
test foils (Munsell colours used at test). Here we use a 22 coloured array to assess colour 
term acquisition with a comprehension measure that subsequently asks to point to any 
other colours that would be given the same name. This comprehension measure is also 
different from the one used to assess comprehension in colour term acquisition by 
Franklin et al. (2005); they used pointing to 11 focal colours. Thus, using our criteria 
before the test, children are classified as not knowing a colour name if they point to a 
focal colour incorrectly more than once and also if they name it incorrectly. 
There is evidence in table 5.8 that children classified as in Franklin et al. (2005) as 
knowing colour terms did not properly comprehend them. Take the blue/green Linguistic 
Boundary group, 38 children qualified as in Franklin et al. (2005) but only 27 of them 
showed full naming and comprehension, hence leaving 11 children with an incomplete 
understanding of blue and green. However, the question of allocation to groups is of 
equal concern for the no boundary group where some children clearly had comprehension 
of colours. Of the 10 children classified in the No Boundary Group for Blue/purple, 4 
knew the colours and of the 14 children classified to the No Boundary Group for 
blue/green, again 4 knew the colour terms. Thus, there is reason to believe that children 
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have been mistakenly allocated as having or not having a linguistic boundary. The next 
analysis tries to get a more complete picture of colour term acquisition and its effects on 
Categorical Perception. 
Table 5.8 Number of children who were allocated to Franklin et al.'s (2005) Linguistic Boundary, Reverse 
Linguistic Boundary and No Boundary groups according to naming and knew either blue and purple or 
blue and green according to prior naming and comprehension tests. 
Set Boundary Group Franklin et al. (2005) Naming/Comprehension 
Naming at test (Children that knew .. .) 
Blue-purple Linguistic Boundary 30 23 
Reverse Linguistic 20 10 
No Boundary 10 4 
Blue-green Linguistic Boundary 38 27 
Reverse Linguistic 8 3 
No Boundary 14 4 
Following the naming and comprehension criteria in the current study, children who 
knew their colour terms were defined as those who named blue and purple or/and blue 
and green correctly (one measure for each colour), and pointed at these colours in the 
comprehension test no more than once. Children, who did not know their colour terms 
were defined as those who did not give the correct names for focal colours blue and green 
or blue and purple or pointed to those on more than one occasion (when probed for other 
colours). In sum, there were thirty children who knew blue, purple and green, and twelve 
children who did not know all these terms. Additionally, there were seven children who 
knew blue and purple and 2 children who only knew green. Four children who knew blue 
and green and 1 who only knew purple. The remaining 9 children for the blue-purple 
condition did not qualify because they either knew blue or purple. The remaining 13 
children that did not qualify for the blue-green condition either knew blue or green. These 
children were excluded from the analysis because no definite conclusion can be drawn 
about their performance based on their colour understanding. Table 5.9 shows the 
allocation of children based on their naming and comprehension data. 
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Table 5.9 Number of children that qualified for full, partial or no colour term knowledge. 
Colour term knowledge Number of children 
(N=60) 
Blue, green, purple 30 
Blue, green 4 
Blue, purple 7 
Green, purple 1 
Blue 3 
Green 2 
Purple 1 
None of the three 12 
Table 5.10A Mean accuracy (±1 SE) of Linguistic Terminology for Within- and Between-category pairs 
for the blue-purple set 
Category Within Between Linguistic 
Linguistic Terminology 
Terminology 
K.nowBG 2.84(.176) 3.60 (.127) 3.21 (.126) 
Don't Know BG 2.71 (.285) 2.78 (.207) 2.75 (.204) 
Category 2.77 (.168) 3.19 (.121) 
Table 5.10B. Mean accuracy (±1 SE) of Linguistic Terminology for Within- and Between-category pairs 
for the blue-green set 
Category Within Between Linguistic 
Linguistic Terminology 
Terminology 
KnowBG 2.56 (.160) 3.44 (.128) 3.00 (.115) 
Don't Know BG 2.69 (.259) 2.69 (.207) 2.69 (.186) 
Category 2.62 (.152) 3.07 (.122) 
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Fig. 7a: Blue-Purple Set Fig. 7b: Blue-Green Set 
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Figure 5.7A and 5.7B: Mean accuracy (±1 SE) of Linguistic Terminology for Within- and Between-
category pairs for blue-purple and blue-green sets 
When comparing the Know group and Don't Know group for both sets, the Know group 
showed a category effect in the predicted direction, whereas the Don't Know group did 
not show CP. 
Tables 5.10A and 5.10B and figures 5.7A and 5.7B illustrate this finding that was 
supported by 2 two-way ANOVAs (separate analysis per set) with Category (Between or 
Within), as repeated measures, and Linguistic Terminology (Know, Don't Know) as 
factors. For the blue-purple set, two significant effects were found. The main effect of 
Category (F(1,49) = 6.12, p = .017) was significant with better performance on Between-
category trials. The interaction was also significant (F(1,49) = 4.19, p = .046), showing 
CP only for children who Know their terminology (t(36) = 4.13, p < .001; Don't Know: 
t(13) < 1). The main effect ofLinguistic Terminology was not significant (F(1,49) = 3.77, 
p < .1) showing no significant difference on overall performance between both groups. 
For the blue-green set, the same two effects were significant; there was a main effect of 
Category (F(1,45) = 6.93, p = .012) with better performance on between-category trials 
and the interaction (F(1,45) = 6.93, .012) with Categorical Perception only for the 
children who Know their terminology (t(33) = 4.96, p < .001; Don't Know: t(12) = 0). 
The main effect of linguistic terminology was not significant (F(1,45) = 1.97, p < .2 ) 
showing no difference in overall performance between both groups. These results 
critically indicate that when colour term knowledge is taken into account using this 
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procedure for both sets, Categorical Perception effects are only found for children who 
Know their colour terms. 
5.2.3 Discussion 
Four sets of analyses were carried out in the replication of Franklin et al. (2005). The first 
analysis focused on Categorical Perception effects regardless of age and colour term 
acquisition as in Franklin et al. (2005); their result was repeated here with sixty toddlers 
who showed Categorical Perception effects across both the blue-purple and blue-green 
boundaries. The second analysis that looked at naming measures taken for the Munsell 
colours used at test were only somewhat in agreement with Franklin et al. 's (2005) 
Categorical Perception effects. The data did not fully replicate findings especially for the 
blue-green continuum where the only group that consistently showed Categorical 
Perception for the blue-green continua were the toddlers that showed a boundary through 
correct naming of test foils. The third analysis addressed colour term acquisition by 
including comprehension measures, with a range that covered slightly older children than 
in Franklin et al. (2005) between the ages of2.5 and 4.5. It was found that children of that 
age acquire 6 to the 9.5 basic colour terms across that age span. This finding did not 
exactly match Franklin et al.'s (2005) findings as they found children at the age of 4 had 
acquired all 11 basic colour terms. Nevertheless, Franklin et al. (2005) found that colour 
term fluency was negatively related to Categorical Perception which seems odd when 
taking the first analysis into account where overall effects of categorization were found 
regardless of colour term acquisition. From results of the first analysis, one would expect 
fluency of colour terms not to matter. Moreover, from a universalist's point of view there 
should be no such relation because colour categories are expected to be innate and 
Categorical Perception a by-product of ontogeny. From a relativist's point of view the 
relation of interest is the precise knowledge of colour terms needed at test. Thus, the 
effects of knowing other terms than blue, green and purple are not of primary interest, 
because knowing more terms than those that were required (such as orange or pink) 
would certainly not deteriorate effects of Categorical Perception. This prediction was 
further supported in the present study's fourth analysis where effect of colour term 
acquisition from this point of view (whether a child knows blue and green or/and blue 
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and purple) was assessed. It was found that knowledge of those particular colour terms is 
most important to obtain colour categories. 
5.3 Experiment 5: A cross-cultural comparison of colour categorization in 
toddlers. 
Experiment 4 indicated a categorical effect only for those English children who know 
their colour terms. Experiment 5 will assess whether this finding can be reinforced by 
studying Himba toddlers that are unlikely to have acquired their own colour terms 
(Androulaki, 2003, in Franklin et al., 2004). Franklin et al. (2004) found Categorical 
Perception for Himba toddlers who, whether or not they have their own colour terms, 
clearly would not have had the English terms blue and purple used in their study. Their 
result fits with a nativist rather than a relativist account. However, the decision to use 
blue-purple as the only continuum seems rather an odd choice. So, in addition to 
replicating their study we also carried out the test with a continuum between primary 
colours (green-blue). Testing took place on two different field trips. 
5 .3 .1 Method 
5.3 .1.1 Participants 
As closely as allowed, the first Himba group of 36 toddlers (21 boys and 15 girls ranged 
between 2 and 4 1/2 years of age), resulting from the first field trip, and the second 
Himba group of24 toddlers (10 boys and 14 girls also ranging between 2 and 4.5 years of 
age) resulting from the second field trip, were matched in age to the group of 60 English 
toddlers from Experiment 6. As in Franklin et al. (2005), the age of the Himba toddlers 
had to be estimated as the Himba do not keep track of their age in the same way 
Westerners do. Ear touching (Gabriel, 2000), physical height and any other information 
the parents could give us (e.g., age in relation to sibling) were used to estimate the age of 
a child. 
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5.3.1.2 Stimuli, design, and procedure 
Stimuli, design and procedure followed experiment 4 very closely, although bears were 
replaced by boy-cut-outs as in Franklin et al. (2005). Naming and comprehension were 
not collected by Franklin et al. (2005) because from an initial check the children were 
found not to have colour terms. The same applies to the present data. A comprehensive 
account of colour term acquisition is given in Roberson et al. 's (2004) study with Himba 
children, but time constraints made it impossible to replicate that with the present sample. 
The same blue-purple set was chosen to replicate the Franklin et al. (2005) findings but, 
in addition, the blue-green set from experiment 4 was also used in this within-subjects 
design. As in Franklin et al., testing was in the shade of a tree, and not in direct sunlight 
for the first Himba toddler group. With the second Himba group, a light box was used to 
control for any light variations that may have affected the appearance of the coloured 
shirts. A Namibian translator helped with instructions, and mothers sometimes came to sit 
with their children but were refrained from commenting and helping the child, so that 
every child was tested individually, and free from distraction. 
5.3.2 Results 
As with the English children, for each child, the number of correct identifications on the 
two-Alternative Forced-Choice task was calculated when the choice was between two 
stimuli from the same category (within-category pairs) and when the choice was between 
stimuli from different categories (between-category pairs). The maximum number of 
correct identifications was four for within-category pairs and four for between-category 
pairs. The Himba children carried out the task for both color sets balanced for order. In 
the critical analyses of Category, it will be necessary to exclude children who are at floor 
or ceiling. To make sure that order effects will be unimportant for that analysis, the 
accuracy data were first analysed summing over the two sets in a 2: Task Order (blue-
purple set first vs. blue-green set first) x 2: Category (Between vs. Within) x 2: Lighting 
(Natural daylight vs. Lightbox) mixed design ANOV A with repeated measures over the 
factor Category. No effects were significant (all ps > .13). 
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For the blue-purple set, 17 children were at ceiling and 4 at or below chance leaving 39 
children for analysis of Category effects. The data from the 39 children were analysed in 
a 2: Category (Between vs.Within) x 2: Lighting (Natural daylight vs. Lightbox) mixed 
design ANOV A with repeated measures over the first factor. The only significant effect 
was the main effect of Category [F(1,37) = 7.71, p < .011, h/ = .162] with better 
performance on Between-category trials (see Figure 6). There was no main effect of 
Lighting [F(1,37) < 1] and no significant interaction between Lighting and Category 
[F(1,37) = 1.55, p < .3, h/ = .04]. 
For the blue-green set, 27 children at or below chance were removed, and the remaining 
33 children were submitted to a similar analysis. Neither main effect was significant 
[F(1,31) < 1], and the interaction was also not significant [F(1,31) = 2.45, p < .2, h/ = 
.073]. (see Figure 6) 
5.3.3 Discussion 
Our results replicate those of Franklin et al. (2005) for the blue-purple set while giving a 
quite different outcome for the blue-green set. The performance of Himba children in the 
blue-green set resembled that of the Don't Know group of English toddlers, with no 
evidence of Categorical Perception . .Importantly, since a relativist view of colour 
cognition would predict a null result, the toddlers were well above chance at the task. The 
results of the blue-green set therefore further support the view that acquisition of colour 
terms is required to show Categorical Perception. 
Both Franklin et al. (2005) and the present study showed Categorical Perception for 
Himba toddlers using the blue-purple set of colors. We wondered whether testing under 
natural daylight conditions in Franklin et al. (2005) could have produced the category 
effect for the blue-purple set but this seems unlikely as performance under controlled 
lighting was essentially similar to those replicating the conditions in their study. We 
would rather suggest that category effects for the blue-purple set arise because of some 
knowledge of the Himba color terms zoozu and burou (see Appendix 1), or because they 
are better acquainted with cattle terms than color terms (Goldstein & Davidoff, 2008). In 
considering the Himba names for colors, Roberson et al. (2004, 2005) found extensive 
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use of terms describing animal skin patterns (combinations of color, pattern and texture) 
for several colours, and confirmed that the preferred term used by adults for colours in 
the blue-purple range was not always a color term. Indeed, for the three colors used in 
the blue-purple continuum in Experiment 2, the purple color was named equally often 
with a cattle term as with the dominant color term. However, the two blue colors were 
called by the dominant color term around four times more frequently. Thus, if cattle 
terms were known by the children, they would likely have been used only for the purple 
color and hence set up an artifactual boundary. 
5.4 General Discussion 
A replication of Franklin et al. 's study (2005) was carried out with additional analyses 
that might help examine the role of toddlers' color naming and comprehension in color 
Categorical Perception. Despite some small procedural differences in the replication from 
the original study (within-group rather than between-group, naming undertaken before 
rather than after the two-alternative forced-choice, exclusion of the youngest age group) 
the results were initially very similar to those of Franklin et al. (2005). Of these small 
changes, it might have been thought that prior testing of naming before the two-
Alternative Forced-Choice task might be the most likely to have changed the outcome. It 
might have encouraged color naming and artefactually produced the between-category 
superiority in the two-Alternative Forced-Choice task (Munnich & Landau, 2003), but 
the data show otherwise. Indeed, despite the remarkable findings in Roberson and 
Davidoff (2000), now replicated in many laboratories, that perceptual similarity changes 
with verbal load, we know from the procedures introduced in Franklin, Pilling and 
Davies (2005) that overt naming is not the origin of Categorical Perception. 
Experiment 4 found an overall effect of category for both color sets for the sample of 60 
children (analysis 1). However, with such a large age range, a different performance by a 
relatively small number of children that did not know color terms might not be revealed 
in the group analysis. Hence, as in Franklin et al. (2005), children were allocated 
according to their color naming ability for the stimuli used in the two-Alternative Forced-
Choice (analysis 2). Using their procedure, we showed substantial agreement with 
Franklin et al. 's data for the blue-purple range though we did not fully replicate their 
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findings of equivalent Categorical Perception independent of the accuracy of color 
naming for the blue-green range,. More striking, a different assessment of the child's 
understanding of color terms produced a quite different outcome. Critical here is how we 
define the understanding of a color term. The procedure adopted by Franklin et al. (2005) 
of naming the colors used in the two-Alternative Forced-Choice may appear to be a 
reasonable way to assess the knowledge of a color term. However, we argue that for 
young children it is more important to have some estimate of the range of colors that the 
child finds acceptable for the color term. Only then can we be confident that colors from 
within the same category are perceived as being more similar to each other than would be 
assumed from their separation in L *u*v* space. Most rigorously, one might use a signal 
detection procedure (Mullen & Pitchford, 2002, 2003) but the simpler procedure from 
Soja (1994) was sufficient to cause a rather different interpretation of the data. In the 
present study, color term acquisition was re-analyzed using a method that split children 
into Know and Don't Know (analysis 4). Now, the only group that showed category 
effects was the group of children who truly knew their colour names. 
Within our analysis 2, we replicated Franklin et al.' s (2005) intriguing finding that a 
substantial number of children would be classified as having a reverse boundary, because 
their name boundary between green and blue (and also between purple and blue) was not 
yet aligned to that of adults. Franklin et al. make little comment on this reverse boundary 
group. Clearly, both their and our data find that Categorical Perception does not simply 
align with actual naming but there is more than one possible interpretation. It might be 
interpreted to show that color term acquisition is not necessary for the establishment of 
Categorical Perception. However, we suggest that the names reported by the children do 
not properly reflect their underlying colour knowledge (see also Pitchford & Mullen, 
2003). Table 3 shows that almost half of the children classified as having a reverse 
boundary should actually be classified as knowing the color terms, which supports the 
second interpretation. 
With respect to analysis 3, Franklin et al. (2005) suggested that, if color term acquisition 
was needed to establish Categorical Perception, then there could be a positive relation 
between color term fluency and Categorical Perception. This argument presumes that a 
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relativist account would predict a positive correlation between the extent of Categorical 
Perception for any particular color and the number of other color terms known by the 
child. In fact, they found an unexplained small but nevertheless significant negative 
correlation. However, there is no reason to assume a relationship between Categorical 
Perception for a particular boundary and the total number of terms known. When a child 
defmitely knows a color term this implies only that they will not confuse that color with 
other nearby terms, but says nothing about their knowledge of other regions of color 
space. There is no reason to suppose that acquiring more secondary terms (e.g., knowing 
orange and pink) would make a significant difference for Categorical Perception to 
green, blue or purple and the present data found no such correlation. 
Considering the Himba data, Experiment 5 replicated the cross-category advantage found 
by Franklin et al. (2005) for the blue-purple range but did not find the same for the 
additional blue-green range of colours. Yet, the boundary between blue and green is one 
that is still regarded as potentially universal (Kay & Regier, 2003) while that between 
blue and purple is not. The lack of Categorical Perception for the blue-green range is not 
due to the Himba children misunderstanding the task, as their performance was well 
above chance. We further examined whether testing under natural daylight conditions in 
Franklin et al. (2005) could explain the differences between the two sets of results, but 
this seems unlikely, as the pattern of results under controlled lighting were essentially 
similar to those replicating the conditions in their study. Above, we proposed that the use 
of non-color words for the purple color could have produced a boundary for the Himba 
toddlers. 
In summary, though our results looked at first to be very similar to those of Franklin et al 
(2005) they end up not supporting their conclusions that there is one particular set of 
universal color categories (those named in English) that are independent of language 
acquisition (Franklin & Davies, 2004; Bomstein et al, 1976). The counter-argument here 
points to the importance of color term acquisition by children of Himba and English 
cultures in establishing both color categories and hence Categorical Perception. These 
findings reflect differences across cultures in accord with other color categorization 
studies (Davidoff et al, 1999; Roberson et al, 2004, 2005; Winawer et al., 2007; 
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Roberson et al., 2007) and among toddlers of the same culture separated by language 
acquisition (Roberson et al, 2004; O'Hanlon & Roberson, 2006). 
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6. Experiment 6: A cross-cultural comparison of animal pattern 
categorization in two-alternative-forced-choices 
(Also a publication: Goldstein, J., & Davidoff, J. (2007). Categorical perception of 
animal patterns. British Journal of Psychology, In Press). 
6.1 Introduction 
As part of the more general issue of whether culture can affect perception (Nisbett & 
Miyamoto, 2005), the present paper addresses the Whorfian question of whether the 
language available to describe perceptual experience can influence the experience itself 
(Whorf, 1956). There has been a considerable revival of interest in the Whorfian 
hypothesis (Lucy, 1992; Davidoff, Davies & Roberson, 1999; Boroditsky, 2001; Ozgen 
& Davies, 2002; Saunders & van Brakel, 2002). The revival has provided evidence for 
the Whorfian view from systematic investigations of the relationship between language 
and thought. Differences between languages in their grammatical structure and 
vocabulary have been associated with perceptual differences of the same experience in 
the following domains: grammatical gender (Sera, Berge & Pintado, 1994; Sera et al, 
2002, Boroditsky, Schmidt & Phillips, 2003); colour (Kay & Kempton, 1984; Davidoff et 
al, 1999; Roberson, Davidoff, Davies & Shapiro, 2004); material and shape classification 
(Lucy, 1992); spatial relations (Levinson, 1996; Bowerman & Choi, 2001), number 
systems (Gumpertz & Levinson, 1996, Gordon, 2004), artifact categories (Malt & 
Johnson, 1998); modes of motion (Gennari, Sloman, Malt & Fitch, 2000); time 
(Boroditsky, 2001) and shape (Roberson, Davidoff & Shapiro, 2002). However, other 
recent studies have argued against the influence of linguistic differences on mathematical 
abilities (Gelman & Butterworth, 2005), colour (Kay & Regier, 2003), and perceptual 
classification, both at the level of terminology (Munnich & Landau, 2003; Malt et al, 
1999) and grammatical structure (Karmiloff-Smith, 1979; Perez-Pereira, 1991). The 
present study seeks to provide further evidence in favour of an effect of vocabulary on 
perceptual classification by the study of the Himba, a remote culture which has a rich 
vocabulary of pattern terms. 
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Eckl (2000), and Turton (1980) for an Ethiopian group of cattle herders with similar life-
style to that of the Himba, outlines cultural interests and reasons why colour and patterns 
are used to recognise individual animals. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Herero 
and Himba have many names for cattle patterns (Eckl, 2000). The present study will 
assume that each of these names refers to a category of patterns and will argue that these 
categories should obey the principles of Categorical Perception (CP). Hamad (1987) 
provides a comprehensive discussion of CP across a range of auditory and visual 
categories. He argued that, with CP, a physical continuum is perceived as qualitatively 
discontinuous. Items from different categories appear more different than items from the 
same category despite being equated for physical difference (e.g., by numbers of just-
noticeable-differences). CP is thereby revealed by faster and more accurate 
discriminations between stimuli that cross a category boundary than between two stimuli 
that are both good exemplars of the same category (Bomstein, 1987). Goldstone ( 1994) 
further argued that this between-category expansion might also be accompanied by a 
within-category compression where items within a category become to look more 
similar. As a technique, CP has been used to consider debates in face (Etcoff & Magee, 
1992) and colour categorisation (Roberson, Davidoff & Braisby, 1999). 
In cross-cultural studies, CP has been used to show precise differences based on colour 
terms in the speaker's language (Roberson, Davidoff, Davies & Shapiro, 2005). 
However, there has been considerable debate as to whether the origin of colour CP is 
linguistic (Roberson et al, 2004, 2005) or at least is partially based on universal 
neurophysiological constraints in colour vision (Bomstein, 1975; Franklin & Davies, 
2004). No other visual type of stimulus has been used in cross-cultural investigations of 
CP. The present paper by extending the CP methodology to animal patterns does so 
clearly to categorisation that is not innately given. It will use the two-alternative forced-
choice (2AFC) methodology as in the previous studies (Roberson, Davies & Davidoff, 
2000) to examine whether a target is better recognised when contrasted with a foil from a 
different category compared to when the foil is from the same category. In summary, the 
aim of this study was to provide a different type of stimulus to confirm previous findings 
with colour that linked perceptual and cognitive differences to labelling differences. 
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6.2 Production of the animal continua 
Stage 1: Preliminary naming 
Two individuals from different Himba villages, (man, age 45 and woman, age 35) helped 
in the picture-taking of animals at two different waterholes. With their advice, 128 
pictures were taken with a digital camera; these were transferred to a laptop pc and 
shown to 10 Himba men (age 23-45), from two separate groups. Like all the subsequent 
participants, they were rural inhabitants of Northern parts of Namibia (Kaokoveld); 
mainly herders taking their animals to waters sources, often having to travel quite far by 
foot. They were monolingual, and paid in kind. All participants were screened for colour 
vision abnormalities with the City Colour Vision Test (Fletcher, 1980). Every participant 
was tested individually in a darkened vehicle. The experimenter showed one picture at a 
time on a computer, and the translator asked the participant to give a name per picture 
and recorded the answers in a notebook. 
Stage 2: Obtaining the morphed stimuli 
Eighteen pictures were selected on the basis of results from naming stage 1; for these 
pictures, there was 90% naming agreement. The animals were isolated from their 
context/background and were manipulated in Adobe Photoshop and given a light yellow 
background, approximating the colour of the earth/sand of the Himba territory. Next, 
pictures were paired by the experimenter and manipulated in the Meditor morphing 
package to produce a continuum. Every continuum was based on two pictures (endpoints) 
from the same species (cow, goat or sheep) and resembled each other to increase the 
likelihood of a 'natural' continuum after morphing (see figure 6.1 A-E for endpoints used 
in the 2AFC Test). However, to ensure that the animal shape was identical for both end-
points, the same silhouette was used for both endpoints. The pattern was lifted from one 
end-point in Photoshop and transferred to the outline of the other end-point. A continuum 
consisted of 21 pictures in total as there was a 5% difference between each morphed 
picture going from one endpoint to the other. Nine continua were created following this 
procedure, resulting in 189 pictures (21 pictures x 9 continua) that were printed and 
prepared for use in Stage 3. 
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Figure 6.1 A-E. Endpoint pictures of continua used for 2AFC test. 
Figure 6.1A Continuum 1 
Figure 6.1B Continuum 2 
Figure 6.1C Continuum 3 
Figure 6.1D Continuum 4 
Figure 6.1E Continuum 5 
Stage 3: Naming the morphed continua 
For the second phase of naming, laminated pictures were placed on a table, either in a 
sequential or random order. The sequential order (1 -21 in Fig 2) was simpler to 
administer but as this could have led to perseveration in naming, we added a random 
order condition. Fifteen different Himba from those in Stage 1 (12 men and 3 women, 
varying in age from 17 to 45 years) participated in the sequential naming, and 15 
different Himba from those in Stage 1 and those who did the sequential order (12 men 
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and 3 women varying in age from 19 and 50 years) participated in the naming in random 
order. Every Hirnba participant was asked to give the name of the animal that the 
experimenter pointed at, or was asked to name every picture individually (depending on 
the condition). In the sequential phase, four blocks were needed to assess 189 pictures, as 
only 50 pictures fitted the table. For individual picture naming, the Hirnba participant 
named 189 pictures placed on the table in random order. All answers were recorded on 
an answer sheet. There was some disagreement about the names given in phase 2 to those 
in phase 1. Our interpreter advised us that this was to be expected as the Hirnba 
participants carne from a large area and that there was some naming variation between 
different groups. 
Stage 4: Deciding on the continua 
The fourth stage in the production of the animal continua was to ensure that they would 
be suitable for use in a two alternative-forced-choice experiment. In one respect, all 
continua were suitable. In all continua (see, for example, figs 6.2 a-e) there was a sharp 
drop where the name given to one endpoint changes to the name given to the other 
endpoint. As these intermediary points represent "imaginary" animals, one might ask 
why there is not a gradual change from one name to the next rather than a sudden change. 
The most likely answer is that we have chosen prototypical animals for the endpoints. 
Animals with the same name would bear a strong family resemblance to the prototype, 
and the rnorphing procedure would move, in a few images, from pictures that would 
easily be named as the endpoint to ones that would not be so named. Of course, there was 
an area on every continuum that some of the Hirnba were not prepared to give either 
endpoint name and gave other names. However, for a different reason, not all nine 
continua could be used. Four of the nine continua consisted of boundaries (name 
changes) that were very close to either one of the endpoints. It was therefore not possible 
to create a two alternative-forced-choice procedure for these continua as the test requires 
a minimum of a boundary location at 5 pictures away from the endpoints. 
The remaining 5 continua were suitable for use in the two alternative-forced-choice test. 
The agreement on endpoint names and our interpreter's definition of names were as 
follows: Continuum 1 Cow (Ongange-Ornvahe), 90% consensus for Ongange (white 
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spots on body and face), and 56.66 % for Omvahe (cream colour); Continuum 2 Goat 
(Orupera-Ongwiti) 53.33% agreement for Orupera (brown body with white circling rim 
around the body), and 86.66% for Ongwiti (white body and brown or black head and 
neck); Continuum 3, Goat (Ombundu-Onganga), 36.66% consensus for Ombundu (light 
red body) and 50% for Onganga (tiny dots all over a red body); Continuum 4, Goat 
(Othaona-Ongara), 40% consensus for Othaona (golden-brown colour) and 96.66% for 
Ongara (black background with golden-beige patches); Continuum 5, Sheep (Ondondo-
Ombotozu) 40% consensus for Ondondo (white with black around the body and ears) 
and 43.33% for Ombotozu (brown/black with white on the stomach). To ensure that the 
two naming techniques (sequential or random) from Stage 3 did not cause a difference in 
naming, t-tests were performed on the naming scores from each technique comparing 
each of the 21 positions for each continuum. There were no significant differences. All t 
values< 1 except Continuum 3(0nganga, t(20) = 1.2, p = .25) and Continuum 4 (Ongara, 
t(20) = 1.48, p = .15). 
The boundary at which one name changed to the other was assessed by eye from the 
name agreement at all21 positions (see fig 6.2 A-E). For Continuum 1, the boundary was 
between pictures 12 and 13. For Continuum 2, the boundary was between pictures 15 and 
16. For continuum 3, the boundary was between pictures 6 and 7. For continuum 4, the 
boundary was between pictures 5 and 6, and for continuum 5, the boundary was between 
pictures 12 and 13. 
Figure 6.2 A-E Naming agreement from 30 Himba participants on five continua for animal patterns. Each 
continuum consisted of 21 pictures (19 equally spaced morphed images from the two endpoints). 
Continuum 1 (a) was for cow patterns, Continua 2 (b), 3(c) and 4(d) were goat patterns and Continuum 
5( e) was for sheep patterns. The two curves for each continuum represent the number of times the endpoint 
names were given to each picture. 
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Figure 6.2E Continuum 5 
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Figure 6.2B Continuum 2 
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Figure 6.2D Continuum 4 
5 9 13 
goat 
17 21 
_._othaona 
-ongara 
142 
6.3 Two alternative-forced-choice test 
6.3.1 Method 
6. 3 .1.1 Participants 
Thirty different Hirnba (17 women and 13 men, varying in age from approximately 18 to 
45 years) and 30 English (17 women and 13 men varying in age from approximately 20 
to 43 years) took part in the 2AFC Test. The English participants were students at 
Goldsmiths' College and participated under course requirements. As for the production of 
the animal continua, the Hirnba were monolingual, rural inhabitants of Northern parts of 
Namibia (Kaokoveld), tested in those areas and paid in kind. All participants were 
screened for colour vision abnormalities with the City University ColourVision Test 
(Fletcher, 1980). 
6.3.1.2 Stimuli 
Pictures for the between-category and within-category items were selected from the five 
continua (see Stage 4 of preceding section). There was always 10% rnorph length 
between two pictures in each pair. Fig 3 a-e shows the section of each continuum used to 
select pictures for the 2AFC range. It also shows the actual pictures used for each type of 
trial. Note that though the same labels (a-j) are used in figure 6.3 to denote the section of 
each continuum used in the 2AFC, these carne (see Stage 4 above) from different 
positions on the 21 step rnorphed continua. 
Figure 6.3 A-E Subsets of the 5 continua containing the pictures used in the 2AFC test. The boundary for 
each continuum was between e and f. Within-category pairs were pictures a-c and h-j ([-----1). Between-
category pairs were d-f and e-g (j ...... [).(next page) 
143 
Figure 6.3A Continuum 1 
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Figure 6.3B Continuum 2 
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Figure 6.3C Continuum 3 
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Figure 6.3D Continuum 4 
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Figure 6.3E Continuum 5 
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6.3.1.3 Procedure 
Practice 
The task was explained to the Himba via an interpreter. He told the participant that he 
would show a picture of an animal and that they had to remember what they had seen. 
After the first picture, there would be immediately two pictures one of which was 
identical to the first. The participant was asked to point to the one that was identical. 
Practice trials (maximum of 1 0) with feedback were given using animals not included in 
the Test until there were three consecutively correct answers. Exactly the same 
procedure was adopted for the English participants except that the stimuli were shown on 
a computer (programmed in E-prime) with a 5 sec interval between target and 2AFC. The 
participants were asked to respond by pressing key 'v' for the left picture and 'n' for the 
right picture when presented with the two alternatives. 
Test 
Procedure at Test was similar to that at practice. The experiment was carried out 
manually in Namibia in a shaded area and answers were recorded on a scoring sheet. The 
test consisted of 40 2AFC trials per continuum (20 cross-category and 20 within-category 
trials), summing to 200 trials per participant. Half of the trials for each continuum had the 
correct answer on the left and half the correct answer on the right. A different random 
order of the 200 trials was administered to each participant with trials for all the continua 
intermingled. To ensure smooth running of the experiment, for the Himba, the trial cards 
were assembled prior to the start of the experiment. 
Naming 
At the end of the test, Himba participants were shown all pictures of the test one at a time 
and asked to name them. 
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6.3.2 Results 
Naming 
Naming agreement was assessed for the 8 pictures used for each continuum. Each picture 
was classified as in agreement if the same name was given as in the production of the 
animal continua (see stage 4 of previous section). For each continuum, some Himba 
participants were in complete agreement but others showed disagreement on one name or 
more. The numbers ofHimba with naming agreement for the continua was as follows: 27 
for continuum 1; 22 for continuum 2; 10 for continuum 3 (and therefore 20 participants in 
naming disagreement); 29 for continuum 4; 19 for continuum 5 (and 11 participants in 
naming disagreement). 
Two alternative-forced-choice 
For the initial analysis, all Himba and English participants were included to allow all 
continua to be included in the same analysis. A 2 (Group: Himba vs. English) x 2 (Trial 
Types: Between-Category vs. Within-Category) x 5 (Continuum: Continua 1 vs. 2 vs. 3 
vs. 4 vs. 5) Anova, with repeated measures over the second and third factors was carried 
out on the accuracy data. All main effects were significant. The Himba were more 
accurate than the English (F(1,58) = 7.84, p = .007), Between Category trials were more 
accurate than Within-Category Trials (F(1,58) = 11.36, p = .001) and Continua differed in 
their recognition accuracy (F(4, 232) = 11.37, p < .001, with highest performance on 
Continuum 1 and 4 and lowest scores on Continuum 2 and 5). 
In the context of these main effects, the analysis showed three significant two-way 
interactions. Most important, there was a significant Group x Trial Types interaction 
(F(l,58) = 32.62, p < .001), revealing on post-hoc analysis (Bonferroni correction, p < 
.013), higher scores for the Himba on Between-Category trials than Within-Category 
trials, t(29) = 5.34, p < .001, whereas English performance did not reach reliable levels 
between Trial Types, t(29) = 2.22, p = .034 which, in any case was in the direction of 
greater accuracy for Within-Category trials. The Himba were more accurate than the 
English on Between-Category trials, t(29) = 5.62, p < .001 but the Groups did not differ 
on Within-Category trials, t(29) < 1. 
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There were also reliable effects that involved Continuum. The Category x Continuum 
interaction gave F(4,232) = 10.2, p < .001 and there was also a weakly significant Group 
x Continuum interaction, F(4,232) = 2.43, p = .048. In light ofthese effects that involved 
differences between Continua and also because Himba were included in the analysis who 
did not agree on the names for the animal patterns, further analyses were carried out on 
individual continua. Analyses were carried out on the accuracy data for continua 1, 2 and 
4 on only the participants who were in naming agreement. However, in Continua 3 and 5 
there was substantially more naming disagreement than for other continua, so Himba 
naming disagreement groups were also considered in the data analyses of these continua. 
Continuum 1 
A 2 (Group: Himba vs English) x 2 (Trial Types: Between-Category vs. Within-
Category) Anova, with repeated measures on the second factor was carried out on the 
accuracy data. 
Figure 6.4 Mean accuracy scores (max= 20) and standard errors for English and Himba participants on 
continuum 1 for Between-Category and Within-Category trials in the 2AFC test. Comparisons giving p < 
.001 are indicated. 
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As confirmed in figure 6.4, the analysis showed a significant interaction (F(1,55) = 
11.18, p = .001) accompanied by main effects of Trial Type (F(1,55) = 21.87, p < .001) 
with better performance for Between-Category Trials, and Group (F(l ,55) = 1 0.28, p = 
.002) with better performance for the Himba (see fig 6.4). Analysis of the interaction 
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revealed higher scores for the Himba on Between-Category trials (t(55) = 4.6, p < .001) 
but not on Within-Category trials (t(55) = 1.39, p > .1). However, the Himba (t(26) = 
5.58, p < .001) have a Between-Category advantage over Within-Category trials in their 
own language whereas the English do not (t < 1). The lowest mean accuracy (M = 12.80, 
SD = 2.34) was for the English on Within-Category trials, and this score was above 
chance (t(29) = 6.55, p < .001). 
Continuum 2 
A 2 (Group: Himba vs. English) x 2 (Trial Types: Between-Category vs. Within-
Category Trials) Anova, with repeated measures on the second factor, was carried out on 
the accuracy data. 
Figure 6.5 Mean accuracy scores (max = 20) and standard errors for English and Himba participants on 
continuum 2 for Between-Category and Within-Category trials in the 2AFC test. Comparisons giving p < .1 
are indicated. 
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As confirmed by figure 6.5, the analysis only showed a significant interaction (F(l ,50) = 
13.41, p = .001). Both Main effects (Trial Type and Group) gave F < 1 (see fig 6.5). 
Analysis of the interaction revealed higher scores for the Himba on Between-Category 
trials (t(50) = 2.57, p = .013), but not on Within-Category trials (t(50) = 1.37, p > .1). 
However, unlike for Continuum 1, the Himba only showed a trend for superior 
performance on Between Category trials (t(21) = 1.74 , p = .097) whereas the English 
(t(29) = 3.17, p = .001) were more accurate on Within-Category trials. A further analysis 
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showed that much higher accuracy was obtained for English participants on one of the 
Within-Category pairs (t(29) = 3.88, p = .001). It was for the Within-Category pair h-j in 
fig 3b. As one may see, the contrast in picture j is low and could be remembered as 
having a much larger white area than the other. The lowest mean accuracy (M = 1 0.80, 
SD = 2.54) was for the English on Between-Category trials; this score was not above 
chance (t(29) = 1.73, p > .05). The next lowest mean accuracy (M = 11.68, SD= 2.38) 
was for the Himba on Within-Category trials; this score was above chance (t(21) = 3.32, 
p = .003). 
Continuum 3 
A 3 (Group: Himba Naming Agreement (HNA), vs. Himba Naming Disagreement 
(HND) vs. English) x 2 (Trial Types: Between-Category vs. Within-Category) Anova, 
with repeated measures on the second factor was carried out on the accuracy data. 
Figure 6.6 Mean accuracy scores (max= 20) and standard errors for English and Himba participants on 
continuum 3 for Between-Category and Within-Category trials in the 2AFC test. Himba participants are 
divided into those with naming agreement (HNA) and those in disagreement (HND). Comparisons giving p 
< .05 are indicated. 
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As confirmed from figure 6.6, the main effect of Trial Type gave F < 1, no effect of 
Group (F(2,57) = 2.30, p > .1) was found, and the interaction showed a trend (F(2,57) = 
2.49, p = .092) (see fig 6.6). This trend was further explored in post hoc tests. When 
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comparing trial types within groups, the only significant value found was for HNA with a 
between-category advantage (t(9) = 2.58, p = .029). A similar comparison for HND gave 
t(19) = -1.67, p > .1, and for English gave t(29) = 1.18, p > .2. When comparing groups 
across a single trial type condition, the groups failed to show significantly different 
performances from each other on Between-Category trials (F(2,57) = 2.05, p > .1), or 
Within-Category trials (F(2,57) = 2.61, p > .05). The lowest mean accuracy (M = 11.90, 
SD = 1.52) was for HNA on Within-Category trials; this score was above chance (t(9) = 
3.94, p = .003). 
Continuum 4 
A 2 (Group: Himba vs English) x 2 (Trial Types: Between-Category vs Within-Category 
Trials) An ova, with repeated measures on the second factor was carried out on the 
accuracy data. 
Figure 6.7 Mean accuracy scores (max= 20) and standard errors for English and Himba participants on 
continuum 4 for Between-Category and Within-Category trials in the 2AFC test. Comparisons giving p < 
.05 are indicated. 
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As confirmed from figure 6.7, a significant interaction (F(1,57) = 17.29, p < .001) was 
found in the context of a main effect of Trial Type (F(l,57) = 30.15, p < .001) with 
superior performance on Between-Category trials but no main effect of Group (F < 1) 
(see fig 6.7). The interaction showed that the English were more accurate on Within-
Category trials (t(57) = 2.38, p = .02) and the Himba more accurate on Between-
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Category trials (t(57) = 2.21, p = .031). However, English participants did not distinguish 
between the Trial Types (t(29) = 1.22, p > .2), whereas the Himba did (t(28) = 5.71, p < 
.001) scoring more accurately on Between-Category trials than Within-Category trials. 
The lowest mean accuracy (M = 11.38, SD = 3.61) was for Himba on Within-Category 
trials; this score was above chance (t(28) = 2.05, p = .05). 
Continuum 5 
A 3 (Group: Himba Naming Agreement (HNA) vs Himba Naming Disagreement (HND) 
vs. English) x 2 (Trial Types: Between-Category vs Within-Category Trials) Anova, with 
repeated measures on the second factor, was carried out on the accuracy data. 
Figure 6.8 Mean accuracy scores (max= 20) and standard errors for English and Himba participants on 
continuum 5 for Between-Category and Within-Category trials in the 2AFC test. Himba participants are 
divided into those with naming agreement (HNA) and those in disagreement (HND). Comparisons giving p 
< .06 are indicated. 
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As confirmed from figure 6.8, the analysis showed a significant interaction (F(2,57) = 
8.26, p < .001) in the context of a main effect of Trial Type (F(2,57) = 8.41, p = .005) 
with superior performance on Between-Category trials and of Group (F(2,57) = 5.96, p = 
.004) with better performance for the Himba (see fig 6.8). Analyses of the interaction 
showed differences between Groups only for Between-Category trials (F(2,59) = 15.68, p 
< .001) and not Within-Category trials (F < 1). The largest difference was found between 
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the HNA and English Groups (Tukey HSD, p < .001), with a trend towards a significant 
difference between the HND and English Groups (Tukey HSD, p = .056). When looking 
at performance differences according to Trial Types, the only significant difference was 
found for HNA (t(18) = 4.42, p < .001) with an advantage for Between-Category Trials; 
HND (t(lO) = 1.51, p > .1) and English (t(29) = -1.53, p > .1) groups performed equally 
well on both Trial Types. The lowest mean accuracy (M = 10.73, SD = 1.64) was for 
Himba on Within-Category trials; this score was above chance (t(29) = 2.45, p = .021). 
6.4 Discussion 
The present study examined CP with a type of stimulus not previously used to assess the 
effect of labels on perceptual judgements. In cross-cultural studies of colour CP, it has 
been found that colour categories correspond to the terms in the speaker's language 
(Roberson, Davidoff & Davies, 2000; Riberson et al., 2004, 2005). Indeed, Roberson et 
al (2005) showed that colour CP for the Himba was different to CP in another language 
with the same number of colour terms. For the cattle patterns, the Whorfian view 
predicted that it would only be the Himba who showed superiority for cross-category 
decisions as only they have the appropriate labels. The Whorfian view was largely 
upheld from the recognition accuracy for these animal stimuli. 
Continua 1 and 4 gave the clearest results. For these continua, the Himba participants 
showed strong name agreement to those given at production of the continua. For 
Continua 1 and 4, the Himba showed greater recognition for cross-category trials 
whereas the English found the two types of trial equally easy. The pattern of results was, 
in Goldstone's (1994) terms one of between-category expansion in that it would seem 
that, to the Himba, animals from different categories look more different. One can also 
see, for example in Continuum 4, evidence of within-category compression in that the 
Himba performed worse than the English on these trials. Similar trends are in the other 
continua but they are difficult to be confident of in the context of the generally superior 
accuracy for the Himba with these animal patterns. The same pattern of cross-category 
advantage was seen for Continua 3 and 5 though the data were complicated by the fact 
that not all the Himba agreed on the names given by those who helped make those 
continua. However, if we considered only those Himba who showed name agreement, 
exactly the same pattern was found. The Himba who showed name disagreement showed 
152 
category effects identical to the English participants. The clear pattern in the other four 
continua was less marked in Continuum 2 that only produced a trend in the same 
direction of the Himba showing superior performance for cross-category trials. We offer 
no certain explanation for the weaker effect for this continuum. However, as noted 
above, there are effects of contrast that could prompt the use of additional labels. We also 
note that the only chance score (English, Between-Category) was found on Continuum 2 
and one of the within-category pairs appeared to offer easier recognition for the English 
participants. 
It would seem that the CP found for the Himba derives from their possession of pattern 
categories not found in the Western participants. However, alternative explanations 
might be considered. Stimuli were presented to the Himba manually and it is possible 
that this different procedure altered overall performance. In fact, despite it being an 
artificial task, the Himba were generally better at the recognition of the animals than the 
English participants. In any case, the critical aspect of the data is not the overall level of 
the performance but the superiority of between-category trials and this cannot be 
explained by the pictures being shown as photographs rather than on the computer. We 
can also rule out the possibility that the task was simply too difficult for the English 
observers. While there is significantly lower overall performance for the English 
observers for several of the continua, this is not always the case and performance levels 
were above chance for English participants on almost all the continua. 
Another potential artifact is that of explicit naming by the Himba whereby, it could be 
argued, superior recognition memory could be achieved as a result of matching by name 
in the 2AFC. The 2AFC task is that most commonly used in cross-cultural studies of CP 
(Roberson et al, 2000, 2004, 2005) but it is perhaps not the best. However, the same 
argument about labelling could have been made if the 2AFC task had been replaced by 
similarity judgements to determine CP (see Roberson et al, 2000). We could have more 
clearly ruled out explicit naming by use of interference procedures (Roberson & 
Davidoff, 2000) but these were not possible with a Himba population. Probably a better 
technique would have been to employ rapid presentations that would make naming 
difficult (Gilbert, Regier, Kay & Ivry, 2006) though even then some limited naming 
might be possible. 
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In fact, there was no evidence to the experimenter of any explicit naming but it would be 
difficult to rule out some implicit naming from this first study of animal pattern CP. 
Indeed, one might not want to rule it out; activation of a perceptual difference linked to a 
linguistic network (i.e, implicit naming) could be critical to all CP (Roberson & 
Davidoff, 2000). An indication that categorical representations are activated implicitly 
was shown in the neuropsychological case study of Roberson et al (1999). The patient 
demonstrated intact CP (colours and facial expressions) when using the 2AFC procedure 
as given to the Himba. The limited role that explicit labelling played in the task was clear 
because the patient was unable to name colours or facial expressions correctly so any 
such attempt by him would have been detrimental to his performance. 
The neuropsychological data (Roberson et al, 1999) are also consonant with the view that 
networks activated in colour CP are not even implicitly linguistically driven but are 
simply perceptual (Pilling, Wiggett, Ozgen & Davies 2003). Indeed, the introspection of 
observers (Kay & Kempton, 1984) is that discriminating between colours from the same 
or different categories is a perceptual decision. The issue concerning the underlying 
perceptual or linguistic mechanism for CP has to date been examined by use of 
interference techniques. In some cases, verbal interference has resulted in complete 
abolition of CP (Roberson et al, 2000; Gilbert et al, 2006) and in others less than 
complete abolition (Pilling et al, 2003). For the case of animal pattern CP, as there is no 
likelihood of innately given categories, the perceptual codes underlying CP would 
presumably be linked to a linguistic network but that would need verification in future 
studies. 
CP for animal patterns we regard as highly likely for the Himba. Colour categories have 
very limited functional significance for the Himba; this is not the case for animal 
patterns. However, the CP could arise from ways other than from labels. A different 
explanation for the origin of animal pattern CPs could be that they derived from the 
function of an animal with a particular type of pattern though of course these functions 
are going to be highly correlated with labels. Indeed, by adulthood, it is clear from our 
HNA groups that the classification is intrinsically linked to the names but a distinction 
between the two potential origins might be possible in future testing. Even very young 
children look after animals in the Himba culture so one might be able to carry out the 
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same sort of longitudinal study as in Roberson et al (2004) to investigate the 
development of animal pattern CP. In Roberson et al (2004), the acquisition of colour CP 
was linked closely to the acquisition of colour terms. It might be different for animal 
patterns though one must stress it would be hard to distinguish between the two 
explanations as pattern names might be acquired very early given their cultural 
significance. 
In summary, the data clearly imply that labels have affected the Himba perception of 
animal patterns. Indeed, one could simply point to the continua in figures 6.2 A-E and be 
surprised that what appears to us to be a smooth progression could be marked with an 
abrupt change to any observer. The proposal that it is the acquisition of vocabulary in the 
language that causes the abrupt change is rather nicely confirmed by the fortuitous result 
from the HND groups in Continua 3 and 5 who gave no evidence for cross-category 
superiority. Thus, though one cannot rule out alternative explanations, the consideration 
of animal patterns has given further evidence in favour of linguistic relativity with 
respect to categorical perception. 
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7. General Discussion- From grouping behaviour in perception to 
conceptual grouping in categorization 
The discussion of the current results focuses on a progression from fmdings of conceptual 
grouping that has been found to take place under the influence of language. First of all, 
perceptual grouping is identified as a mechanism made use of by both human and non-
human primates even though this kind of grouping has been questioned in monkeys (e.g. 
D'Amato, Salmon & Colombo, 1985). Monkeys show evidence of matching by similarity 
in experiments 1 and 2; they match to training colours and show an advantage for within-
category matching. Human primates rather show categorical grouping preference as 
perceived in experiments 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 that has identified an involvement of culture 
and language setting humans and monkeys apart as seen from experiment 1 and 2. The 
discussion further consolidates ontogenetic, phylogenetic and cross-cultural findings in a 
context that describes the implications of this research to universality and relativity of 
categorization behaviour. The discussion then further leads to a three-pronged 
investigation with the inclusion of phylogenetic, ontogenetic, and cross-cultural 
approaches to address the nature and origin of grouping behaviour. In comparison to 
former cross-sample investigations (e.g., Bomstein, 1980), the overall findings indicate 
that sometimes universal perceptual grouping trends are identified, but that categorical 
grouping for the case of colour and animal patterns are always relative to language and 
culture. 
7.1 Cross-species grouping differences 
The first achievement of this thesis found cross-species differences in a set of 
experiments that involves colour categories (experiment 1 and 2). Cross-species 
differences have been found that may indicate language is involved in the findings. 
Perhaps this may be due to the fact colour has been identified as a special case of 
conceptual rather than perceptual grouping (Braisby & Dockrell, 1999). Although 
previous research shows similar colour apparatus for monkeys and humans (e.g., 
Bowmaker et al., 1991) and some researchers believe monkeys do show the ability to 
categorize (e.g., May et al., 1989; Ohlemiller et al., 1999; Thompson & Oden, 2000), it 
does not necessarily follow that monkeys conceptualize colour as humans do 
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(Matsuzawa, 1985; Matsuno, Kawai, & Matsuzawa, 2004). In fact, we achieve cross-
species differences on categorization of colour in matching-to-sample and two-alternative 
forced choice tasks that lead us to believe monkeys do not categorize as humans do. The 
results of experiment 2 and 3 are in contradiction to the only other comparative colour 
categorization study carried out almost thirty years ago by Sandell, Gross & Bomstein 
(1979) that showed identical colour categories across species. 
The cross-species grouping behaviours perceived in MTS and 2 AFC tasks coincide with 
previous findings that have shown that global precedence is specific to human beings 
even though common biological mechanism have been identified across species (Fagot & 
Deruelle, 1998). In so far as categorization may be viewed as a form of global grouping 
behaviour, human primates are the only group to show this behaviour in experiments 2 
and 3, due to their response to the boundary that exists between blue and green and their 
subsequent cross-category advantage. Despite evidence of monkey's excellent memory 
(Fagot & Cook, 2006) that may have allowed them to learn about the green and blue 
endpoints in experiment 2 and as noted for results of monkey's behaviour in experiment 
3, monkeys show grouping locally by similarity, but do not show abstraction for 
categorical grouping. Moreover, monkey's learning and memory skills should not be 
confused with the presence of colour categories, because although they can memorize 
colour they categorize colour quite differently to humans. Indeed, monkeys were found to 
show carry-over memory effects from matching in experiment 3 in which learning of a 
local nature was identified by showing extensive within-category advantages related to 
the endpoints of the continuum used in both the matching-to-sample and two alternative-
forced-choice. 
Contrary to human colour category learning (Ozgen & Davies, 2002) which has been 
shown to be influenced by language, there is evidence of extensive and long-term symbol 
learning needed for colour categories to emerge in non-human primates (Matsuzawa, 
1985). These results indicate that monkeys in the current experiments may not have had 
well-informed colour categories and may have reflected that at test, as has also been 
shown for a chimpanzee with only two years experience of colour-symbol training 
(Matsuno et al., 2004). This is an indicator of how much previous experience monkeys 
may need for conceptual grouping to occur as probed for in experiments 2 and 3, showing 
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that language is for them perhaps not as natural an abstraction as it is for human-primates. 
Thus, the current cross-species differences indicate that conceptual coding involving the 
use of symbols such as may be helped by acquiring linguistic terms is needed for colour 
categorization to take precedence over matching and learning by perceptual similarity. 
7.2 Some cross-cultural linguistic influences in colour grouping 
Using matching-to-sample as with the comparative study, results of similar grouping 
patterns have been found between the Himba and English that are in sharp contrast to the 
grouping behaviour of monkeys. Nevertheless, some small variations have also been 
found between the two cultures that are likely to be caused by language. The result of 
experiment 3 are in agreement with other findings of colour grouping on restrained 
(Davidoff, Davies, & Roberson, 1999; Roberson et al., 2005a) and less restrained tasks 
like colour sorting (Davies & Corbett, 1997; Davies, 1998; Roberson et al., 2005b) in 
some of which the Himba and English took part. All the more interesting is perhaps that 
matching-to-sample may be on the other side of the continuum in terms of task restraints 
than colour sorting, seeing that matching-to-sample has also been used as a 
psychophysical procedure (e.g. Sperling & Harwerth, 1971) probing perceptual 
mechanisms, and yet one still finds significant differences related to language. 
Relating to similarities between the Himba and English response functions and matching-
to-sample tasks also being used as psychophysical procedures, Helson ( 1964) has 
suggested an adaptation level theory which may also be applied to the current response 
pattern similarities of experiment 3. Adaptation-level theory suggests behaviour can be 
predicted from a stable context if one looks at the frames of reference given in an 
experiment. In the matching-to-sample of experiment 3 frames of reference were the 
middle ofblue and green categories (2.50 and 10 B) and dumbu and buru categories (5Y 
and 2.5BG). These endpoints were the reference points which participants used to split 
the continua into two groups; one can see Himba and English participants have adapted to 
matching-to-sample levels of grouping and split the continuum into two in quite a similar 
way. Although these similarities may be accounted for by the adapting behaviour of 
participants in this task, there were significant differences based on conceptual levels of 
responding that can be perceived at the category boundaries. 
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Just as found for the cross-species difference in categorization, the differences are related 
to language because it is found for colours near category boundaries that have been found 
to be markers of conceptual grouping under the influence of language (Braisby & 
Dockrell, 1999; Roberson, Davidoff & Braisby, 2000). These regions have been argued 
to be salient in categorization with particular attention to categorical perception of colour 
(Bomstein & Korda, 1984) and in agreement, experiment 4 also shows a sharper decrease 
in responses for both cultures at the intersection between two colours that are identified 
by their names; for the English the sharper decrease is found at the blue-green 
intersection and for the Himba the same is found at the dumbu-buru colour intersection. It 
is interesting that monkeys showed a response function induced by two boundaries in 
their adaptation to this task versus humans showing typical categorical functions 
characterized by one boundary. This perhaps indicated that perceptual groupmg 
behaviour as can be predicted from adaptation levels may also be influenced by language, 
resulting in a more typical categorical function induced by one boundary that 
characterizes a type of conceptual grouping as well. 
Thus, even in a constrained task as is matching-to-sample versus other tasks that may be 
less demanding (Roberson et al., 2005b ), one still finds evidence of linguistic difference 
for colours near the boundary in experiment 3 between the Himba and the English, and 
this evidence is all the more compelling seeing that adaptation behaviour would predict 
perceptual rather than conceptual behaviour. 
7.3 Conceptual grouping influenced by language in developmental work 
on colour. 
In the developmental work of experiment 4 and 5, categorical grouping behaviour has 
only been found among children who have colour terms needed to establish a blue-green 
and blue-purple boundaried two alternative-forced-choice task. These results were unlike 
published work by Franklin et al. (2005) that found colour categories for all children 
irrespective of their culture and colour term acquisition. The differences between the 
studies were marked by the different criteria used to determine whether children knew 
their colour terms with particular attention to the comprehension measure in experiment 
4, and also by using two boundaries rather than one for the cross-cultural comparison in 
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experiment 5. Moreover, the current results of experiment 4 and 5, showing no parsing of 
the continuum unless a toddler has acquired colour terms (as also suggested for the blue-
purple continuum for the Himba toddlers), is also not in agreement with previous 
evidence of infant colour categories suggesting innate English categories (Franklin and 
Davies, 2004; Franklin, Pilling & Davies, 2005; Bomstein, Kessen & Weiskopf, 1976). 
With particular relevance to Franklin et al. (2005), the supporting evidence for innate 
categories has not been achieved due to our partial non-replication in experiment 4 and 
experiment 5. 
Experiment 4 also repeated fmdings of research (e.g., Carey, 1985; Gelman & Markman, 
1986; Keil, 1989; Rips, 1989; Soja, 1994; Sandhoffer & Smith, 1999) showing that 
categorization is a special matter that evokes the relations between attributes and more 
abstract knowledge rather than perceptual knowledge. This conclusion is made in the 
context of categorization being of particular difficulty that suggests biological/perceptual 
mechanisms are not sufficient to categorize. For instance, tardy acquisition of colour 
terms has been shown (Shatz et al., 1996; Soja, 1994; Andrick & Tager-Flusberg, 1986; 
Rice, 1980; Carey, 1978) compared to other categories such as for example shape (Clark, 
1987; Baldwin, 1989). Experiment 4 also shows that colour term acquisition begins from 
the age of 3, and 9 terms are achieved at the age of 4.5. As to what causes the delay of 
full colour term acquisition of 11 terms, some researchers (Sandhoffer & Smith, 1999, 
Soja, 1994) have argued a lack of being able to abstract or filter the necessary 
information required to make the colour word meaningful and that this comes slowly 
because one needs to learn deeper relational properties than perceptually similar 
attributes (Medin, Wattenmaker & Hampson, 1987) suggesting a conceptual grouping 
problem. Elsewhere, the meaning of colour terms has also been pointed out as being a 
special case because the boundaries between colours are not as sharp and definite as they 
are for other categories of natural kinds indicating that those are the consequences of 
semantic processing triggered by colour names involved in colour categorization (Braisby 
& Dockrell, 1999). 
The results of experiment 4 agree that unless a child comprehends their colour terms they 
will not respond more accurately to colour crossing a category boundary indicating that a 
semantic level of naming and comprehension is required to do so. The latter is further 
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supported by previous findings of cross-cultural differences and colour category 
acquisition linked to colour names (Roberson et al, 2004). Those Himba children's 
behaviour concurred with findings of experiment 5 for Himba children that did not 
express a differential response for between cross- and within-category trials on the hue-
green continuum. These results further agree with linguistic relativity for the same cross-
cultural comparison with adults (Roberson et al., 2005) and for other areas of research 
that have tested children's spatial cognition (Brown & Levinson, 2000). Not in the least, 
experiment 4 and 5 are also compatible with the comparative work in experiments 1 and 
2 because they further emphasize the crucial role of language for colour categories. 
7.4 Cross-cultural findings of conceptual grouping of animal patterns 
influenced by language. 
For the first time, we report categorical perception depending on having animal pattern 
terms. The Himba in comparison to the English, were the only culture to show categorical 
grouping of animal patterns. This result further supported linguistic relativity because the 
Himba, who had not acquired animal pattern terms in line with naming data, behaved just 
like the English using a perceptual mechanism to do the task. 
In agreement with cultural significance of having animal patterns (Turton, 1980; Eckl, 
2000) for e.g., animal patterns being indicators of wealth and ceremonial use, and 
previous reports of linguistic relativity (Roberson et al, 2005), one can say that Himba 
animal pattern categories are a regularity for them in their everyday environment with a 
strong need to communicate about them that leads to strengthening boundary areas in this 
continuum, as shown from evidence of categorization with robots and their need to 
communicate for optimal colour categories to occur, where shared regularities in the 
environment have not coincided in shared colour categories (Steels & Belpaeme, 2005; 
Introduction, section 1.5.4). Our results would seem to model discriminative and 
communicative success achieved through language i.e., communicative interaction is 
needed over and above learning from a shared environment just as the robots show in 
their communicative intentions to achieve colour categorization that is apparent in 
humans. Himba' s discriminative and communicative success also points to The Paradox 
of The Heap for further explanation of what is meant by the importance of 
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communication (Introduction, section 1.3.3). Thus, without communication it is ''· 
to have more than a vague notion of animal pattern categories. This is consistent \ 
English participant's perception of animal categories, but also with the Him},, 
vague and more robust animal pattern categories as found in experiment 6. 
We know from the animal pattern results that the setting of boundaries resultin.:.' 
process of communication shows strong conceptual grouping in accordan 
categorical grouping hallmarks (Bornstein & Korda, 1984). Moreover, in experi. 
the boundaries have been established through naming, and had they been 
established one might expect the Himba to be as confused as the English were in 11 
alternative-forced-choice tasks that followed. The fact that most Himba \\1 
confused about the boundaries and showed categorical grouping, indicates that n:.1 
essentially important (Braisby & Dockrell, 1999; Roberson, Davidoff & Braish> 
Roberson et al., 2005). Perceptual grouping, in this case seen in the English and : 
the Himba for some continua, involves perceptual similarity or local grouping I 
these categories, which shows some parallels with monkey behaviour of expe1 i 
and children who have not acquired their colour terms in experiment 4. It is the 1 
safe conclusion to suspect categorical grouping is influenced by language for 
patterns as it is for colour. 
7.5 Implications for universality 
Universalists have shown that language is not a necessary pre-condition for c.:1l 
and suggest categories are innate rather than learned (Franklin & Davies, 2004, I' 
Pilling & Davies, 2005), despite cultural differences (Berlin & Kay, 1969; RoselL 
Kay & Regier, 2003, 2006b), and irrespective of species-differences (Sandell, 
Bornstein, 1979). 
Common colour categories across cultures have been found (Rosch-Heider, 111' 
Rosch-Heider & Olivier, 1972) that have pioneered a universal approach tc1 
categories based on prototypes. However the research has now been rna 11 
misrepresentation of some differences among cultures that were interpreted in aoc''· 
with colour universals (Saunders & Van Brakel, 1997; Roberson, Davies & [):II 
2000). For example, the Dani showed extremely poor performance on their rec: 
for English foci and to conclude that there are universal foci seems to discount 
and Dani performance and perceptual differences of these foci. Had this iss1.1 
addressed, one may also have expected further comparison for colours for which tl 
may have been expected to have readily available labels with the prediction that t I 
may have performed better in this case. Recent evidence in colour research has 
shift from absolute universality, showing the same colour categories across cult11.1 
for the latter part complex statistical similarities, to a more relaxed form of 1111 
grouping (Kay & Regier, 2006a) opening possibilities for acknowledgment 
differences among cultures as is seen by for e.g., pointing out 70 % commur1 
cultures of 5-colour terms, yet leaving 30% worth of cultural differences leadi:111. 
more cautious conclusions about universality. This thesis accommodates som<.: 
universal findings in that it partially agrees that our biology plays a role in our pc 1 
grouping behaviours because there are biological constraints of perceptual sim1l 
the grouping behaviour of experiment 1 and the adaptation behaviour of experim,;: 
both Himba and English cultures. However, significant differences are foun1l 
cultures in experiment 4 for colours near the boundary, and in experiment 7 fo1 
pattern categories that do not support universal categories. Moreover, in all tb '· 
cultural experiments of this thesis, Himba and English showed significant differ 
performance levels from chance, indicating genuine relativity that is not confollll. 
task difficulty and the animal pattern task of experiment 7 gives another ' 
approaching cross-cultural research that looks at a comparison from the perspecti., 
experimenters' foreign language as has been previously done for colour (Robersc' 
2005a). 
Universality is nevertheless still strongly advocated by researchers that ha\11 .. : 
evidence of innate categories for human- and non-human primates (Bomstein, I<. 
Weiskopf, 1976; Sandell, Gross & Bomstein, 1979; Franklin, Pilling & Davies, 
Although these pioneering experiments in the 1970s have been re-address1. 
conclusions replicated (e.g., Franklin & Davies, 2004), the same has not been tl 
the comparative work. Thus although the same cannot be said of monkey categor 
infant abilities have been found to be largely similar to those of adults and have 1.1 
reinforcement from other areas of research such as numerical abilities (Spelke & I· 
2007). However, this thesis does not find evidence pointing in this direction. lEx]''. 
4 does not fmd the same infant abilities in toddlers that were similarly not able 1 
their colour categories. A particularly sharp statement against innateness is al ~;,1 
when not finding colour categories in monkeys in experiments 1 and 2. Even 
cross-cultural colour categories in toddlers do not fully correspond to English 
categories (blue-green), and one wonders about innate colour categories (Franklir11 .. 
& Davies, 2005) being universal. Therefore it seems that universality is not accoil~l 
by innate colour categories because if it were one would expect the same T . 
categories across and within cultures, and also across species. One would also mJI 
from innate colour categories, which are shown to be the same in infancy as in ac!lt 
for those to be lateralised in the brain in relation to language processing (Gilbcr 
2006). Language would not be needed if colour categories were innate and uh 
Perhaps one can say colour categories have evolutionary and therefore cultural 
(McNamara, 2004) that make language important to their evolution; colour c.ul 
may be influenced by culture in an evolutionary sense and our knowledge may 
across time under that influence. Perhaps an evolutionary explanation, tending I. 
increased social intelligence needed in a more populated environment, makes II u 
all the more important (Dunbar, 1996). This could also explain the strangc'l 
Darwin's (1977; in Bomstein, 1987) reports of children not having acquired categ.t 
the age of 7 years, when now children acquire their categories between the ages r;1 
6 years (Roberson et al., 2004) in accordance with experiment 4. Elsewhere~ I 
separating us from other non-human primate species in terms of different evoilu 
paths due to differing cognitive adaptations (Bartow, Cosmides & Tooby, I' 
Cartwright, 2000) can also be inferred in experiment 1 and 2 due to findings (.\ 
species differences. 
In conclusion, this thesis takes the view of a limited universal grouping beha-i.1 1i1 
may have biological origins for perceptual mechanisms and rather more evolll 
origins influenced by language and culture for conceptual mechanisms that wm.1l, 
infant categories, cross-species differences, and cross-cultural differences to c 
More precisely, language skills that affect colour categories are human skills thal 
found in other species, nor are they identical for all toddlers or adults within ami :.1.' 
cultures, and this thesis disagrees with those that conclude otherwise. 
7.6 Implications for relativity 
For relativity, conceptual grouping is of particular interest because this bcha.\ i .. ' 
influenced by language and therefore not innate as shown by the boundaries that Jn 111 
categories seen in all experiment of this thesis. Therefore results of this thesis :11 
agreement with previous cross-cultural fmdings (Davidoff, Davies & Roberson 
Roberson et al., 2004, 2005a) and coincide with other relativist fmdings (Levinson,, 
Boroditsky, 2001) that categories are conceptually formed with the help oflanguag, .. : 
This thesis could endorse a strong view of the Whorfian hypothesis (Whorf, 1956:, ! 
1992) seeing that where conceptual grouping is found, linguistic influence is als<t1 1 
evident in its most absolute form. It is partially the case that this thesis finds 
influences grouping behaviours even when under a perceptual constrained tasks 1111 
matching-to-sample (experiments 1 and 3). Moreover, monkeys do not show 
behaviour in this task indicating that matching-to-sample requires human abit11l1' 
show a categorical function that includes one boundary rather than two. Additi~:'1 
differences can also be strictly attributed to language in experiment 4 and 6, bec .. :1.1 
both colour and animal pattern studies there are differences found among ini1.J1 
belonging to the same culture who know and don't know their terms. In the same il 
of investigation as the latter, cross-cultural differences between Himba and II:: 11 
categories are found in experiment 5 and 6 and additionally those effects are als'1.'1 11 
in experiment 3. Thus, this thesis shows no doubt that language is involved in the 
of concept formation and production for colour and animal patterns. 
There are also reasons for abstaining from a strong Whorfian view i.e. that 
influences category formation but it is not the only influence. Clearly, experimenl 
shows similarities in grouping of a non-Whorfian kind; humans use similar 
strategies clearly not permeated by language. Experiment 5 also shows some 
similarities on the blue-purple continuum, and although this seems a coincidence 1.1 
possible animal pattern naming and blue and purple designated English colour tertll'l 
is not sure of the coinciding categories' nature. 
Nevertheless, other influences have been noted that make grouping relative to expcl'i'.' 
and are not any different from the implication and suggestions linguistic relativity 111111 
about categories being nurtured and moulded by experience. Therefore when dif'f.~ 
cultural experiences are noted, different linguistic expressions are also found to be 
origin of the variation, as seen in the examples of the next paragraph that '' 11, 
accordance with experiment 3, 4, 5, and 6 of this thesis. 
Levinson suggests spatial cognition is affected by frames of references in space 
relative to expression of orientation in different cultures e.g., differences found bel,\'' 
Tzeltal Maya with an Absolute frame of reference, and the Dutch found to have a_n;''l.• 
frame of reference whereby cross-cultural differences are found on a spatial a1iglllll 
task (Majid et al., 2004). Boroditsky (2001) and colleagues (e.g., Cassasmrl.r 
Boroditsky, 2003; Cassasanto et al., 2004) showed that grammar affects meltlci 
different objects in different cultures and also suggested that time may be pc.n, 
differently due to different cultural experience and in particular the linguistically dill II .... 
expressions found in Mandarin where time is perceived vertically and in English "'''' 
time is perceived horizontally (Boroditsky, 2001). Findings of experiment 6 may al 
in agreement with the influence of culture on cognition as suggested by Nisbt:lll 
colleagues (Nisbett et al., 2001; Nisbett & Miyamoto, 2005) who have studh~~~:l 
differences in attentional patterns and their link to the origin of afforded Clllilll 
differences. The origin has mainly been argued as one of socialisation and indl\ 1. 
difference. For example, the way cultures talk about self may impact on the W~i ':' 
plays attention to other objects and individuals (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). This r:1111 
well with acculturation of the Himba and the relation they have to their hetdH. 
example, a lot ofHimba are given cattle names such as Gongoro meaning 'spotted .I 
leopard' (Eckl, 2000) indicating the spotted animal pattern, or Vahekonde, meaning II 
coloured and speckled' (Eckl, 2000), and in this case indicating a combinatim1 
pattern of off-white colour and speckled. This may lead to a close relationship be 1 .. \' 
self and animal patterns, not in the least because wealth is described in tenus 1:J 1 
number of animals a particular family has. The latter may also be a clue to a 1.1 
thorough outlook on animal patterns that is indicative of the need for expertise i 1·1 
area. Cultural practices have also been found to extend to differences in the envJlrol'l, 1 
that may lead to an attention pattern only found in the host culture; Americans. havt: l . 
found to be analytic or field independent and Asians are described as holistic or I 
dependent in various cognitive tasks such as the Framed-line Test (Kitayaiha r,:;i .i! 
2003). Perhaps it is the case that the closer relationship to nature/animals fotind lt~1 :'I 
Himba way of life makes the Himba consider their context more closely ( dependlh;. , :1 
their herds for survival) as the Asians do in showing holistic or field dependent atten · 1' 
due to their strong sense of interdependence. This type of acculturated attention ca.h : '1 
be characterised as grouping behaviour of a particular kind that allows one to move: l1 ' 1 
perceptual similarity to conceptual grouping as found in the discrete grouping tendtm · 1 .. 
of the Himba in experiment 6. Although findings fit a cultural theory, it is argued, , 1 
fmdings point to culture closely linked to language too, because experiment 6 aiso F~h. ' 
evidence oflinguistic influence between Himba who know and don't know their :.:1 
terms emphasising the importance of language affecting category boundaries within 1 
same culture. An identical finding has been reported for colour cognition in EHg · •··•I 
toddlers. Thus without language one cannot reinforce the shared and acculitu: · 
attention one has for the environment (see section 7.4). 
Furthermore research that supports linguistic relativity m other areas such as 1 
(Boroditsky, 2001) and colour cognition (Roberson et al., 2004, 2005a) also irldicrHc I· 
tight bond between cultural and linguistic experience, and the fact that this tight b ·· 1' 
may also be affected among people of the same culture indicating communicatiofi ~· ::1 
important (e.g., colour cognition: Agrillo & Roberson, 2007). Thus, categorizati.o1 : 1 
concluded to be relative to culture and language in nature and origin rather thL: 
mechanism adhering to fixed and innate grouping patterns. 
7.6.1 A three-pronged investigation's implications for relativity \'Cr .I 
conclusions of previous two-pronged investigations 
The thesis contains a three-pronged investigation to address the nature of t.~o · 1 11 
categories. This type of investigation has only ever been approached using a twb-phltil: '1 
enquiry. The current results' implications for linguistic relativity are held in comprtJI ·· 11 
to these previous two-pronged investigations. The first compared ontogenetic · ' 1 1 
phylogenetic work (Bomstein, 1980), and found common colour categories He ' : 
II 
species indicating a common innate origin for monkeys and humans. This thesis does nirtJ 
have the same conclusions because differences between species have been fo Jrlt. 
(experiment 1 and 2), and evidence ofblue and green infant colour categories (Bo1ns .. 1. ~~ 
et al., 1976) would clearly not be in line with monkey behaviour found in this thesis. 
would these findings be in line with evidence from children that have not acquired 1 
colour terms (experiments 4 and 5). The second two-pronged investigation cdi11p.~ 
ontogenetic and cross-cultural work (Franklin, 2003) and again found cornmort cor,Jrrr 
categories, indicating colour categories are innate. From children (experiment 4) we · iili. 
colour categories are not present unless names are learnt from language, and the satne i .. ~~rrr 
be said from cross-cultural work (experiments 3, 5 and 6), indicating language 
cultural and conceptual mechanism ensuring categorical grouping with no signs of in r 
colour categories. The third kind of two-pronged approach is in accordance with CIDI'i,tll 
results and is suggested in papers addressing cross-cultural and develop1m1r:1 
differences (e.g., Levinson, 1996; Brown & Levinson, 2003; Roberson et al.; 2i 
' 2005a). The results of these studies agree with current developmental and adult \', 
showing differences in cognition that are under linguistic influence. Importantly;. 
current reported findings of adult colour categories (experiments 1, 2 and 3) crlitu1LII 
correspond to those found for children who have acquired their colour terms (expetini1:l;t 
4 and 5). Thus, this three-pronged investigation has implications for linguistic relati'i 
and from additional information obtained from cross-species categorization diffeten 
does not conclude with a similar argument to the unanimous universal and in.i 
categories found from previous two-pronged investigations. 
7. 7 Future research 
Suggestions are made for future improvement of the current findings and conclusion~ 
First, the three-pronged investigation could be ameliorated by adopting an identical tasl· 
for all populations to make comparisons more effective. For instance the matching· .. to 
sample could be adopted with young children. This remains to be investigated with th.. 
positive consequence that three-way i.e. phylogenetic, ontogenetic and cross-cultiJr<J 
comparisons might bring fruitful additional information by comparing three population: 
that may show a lack of colour terms or show none at all like with the monkeys. H ·: 
interesting that Himba show a weak cubic function just like the English on parts of th· .. 
continuum that are unfamiliar, and if grouping is inherent to humans, as it is not t•l 
monkeys, one wonders at what age this kind of grouping behaviour is established; th.. 
outcome of children at a young age on matching-to-sample might give further evidcnc, 
of the origins of the grouping behaviour perceived in this task. 
Second, one might want to pursue grouping behaviour in matching-to-sample to firid 01J 
whether the same grouping i.e. adaptation behaviour is evident when changing th .. 
context (Helson, 1964, see section 7.2). The context of colours could be changed to sjJa, 
3 categories so that category compression as part of categorical perception for within 
category trials may also be predicted and further conclusions may be made ar:iml 
language's influence under this context. The line of investigation is also worth pursHin:. 
with the idea of further investigating how perceptual grouping may be flexible in thi 
kind of task. 
Third, one might adopt tasks that minimize language use even further than in this tliesi 
where the 2AFC method is used, such as visual search (e.g. Nagy & Sanchez, 1 
Wolfe, 1998; Daoutis, Pilling & Davies, 2006) with minimal response time, so that on'. 
can further ensure language's influence on cognition by minimizing direct effeCts o 
language (e.g., Witthoft et al., 2003). In the animal pattern task one could argue that th .. 
Himba made access to pattern names and therefore showed linguistic effects. Althougl 
this is highly unlikely due to short response time given in the 2 alternative-forced-choice 
this possibility cannot be ruled out completely. Regardless, whether language can evet h. 
ruled out completely is a philosophical matter that for some researchers does not sc~·en 
possible (Dedrick, 1996; Saunders &Van Brakel, 1997; Braisby & Dockrell, 1999 
indicating that this avenue may perhaps be futile seemg that there are non-trivin 
constraints such as language on colour categories that leave their traces in memory by fol 
e.g. affecting the boundaries as discussed previously. Although this thesis agrees witl' 
non-trivial constraints on colour categories that might extend to other categorizatior 
instances, this suggestion is fitting in the sense that it might be in agreement with th .. 
results of experiment 7 and further support linguistic relativity. 
Fourth, a gap in the nature and origin of grouping behaviour is cross-cultural infant wmk 
presumably because infant work is a lengthy process that requires patient experimd1tc1' 
procedure, and from a relativist point of view one might be chasing null results 
However, null results may serve a purpose in questioning Franklin Pilling & Davies' · 
(2005) evidence of infant categories and are worth carrying out. Related to cross-cultllra 
investigation, further work with different populations (other 5-colour term populations a~ 
in Kay & Regier, 2006a) might continuously elaborate on cross-cultural differences. Sr 
far in the area of colour, the Dani of Papua New Guinea, and the Himba of Namibia havl: 
participated in cross-cultural investigation that have shown linguistic relativity bet\veer, 
those two cultures as well as in comparison to the English (Roberson et al., 2005a) . I 
would be interesting to replicate the latter findings by further research of other culture:: 
that Kay & Regier (2006a) point universal patterns for, such as the Yaminahua of Peril 
and Jicaque of Honduras, to perhaps find further differences between those cultures. 
Last but not least, testing bilingual Himba who lead a more secular lifestyle migb I 
provide us with more information about language's role in the formation of categories. 
For example, evidence can be sought of primary and secondary linguistic influenc< 
(Boroditsky, 2001; with Mandarin and English) and the outcomes of learning at differe111 
ages to find out whether there is anything special about the tardy more unifom: 
acquisition found in the West (when a child I adolescent started going to school miglil 
vary a lot among the Himba). 
i 711 
8. Conclusion 
Having suggestions for future research does not outweigh the fact that for the first time, 
we have brought together a three-pronged investigation of grouping behaviour that ha~; 
evidenced the use of perceptual and conceptual mechanisms in different situations .. 
Rather than adhering to absolute linguistic relativity (Lucy, 1992) as initially suggested . 
by Whorf (1956), a weaker form of the Whorfian hypothesis (Davidoff, Davies &. 
Roberson, 1999; Roberson, Davidoff & Braisby, 2000) fits with findings of universal 
perceptual grouping tendencies and conceptual grouping influenced by language. 
In conclusion: 
1. The phylogenetic work shows cross-species differences that set humans and 
monkeys apart in their grouping of colour (experiment 1 and 2) and further shows 
conceptual grouping is a human skill (experiments 1 and 3). 
2. The ontogenetic work shows language influences colour grouping, and does so for 
children of the same culture (experiment 4) and for children from different 
cultures (experiment 5). 
3. Some cross-cultural work shows inherent grouping behaviour (experiment 3, 5). 
However, those findings also reveal more specific evidence of category expansio11 
and suppression that are the hallmarks of linguistic influence on categorization 
(experiment 3, 4, 5 and 6). 
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